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3Abstract
The aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema
This thesis seeks to develop an aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema. 
Whilst a significant amount of critical work has been undertaken on spectacle 
within the context of narrative theory, little attention has been paid to defining 
and analysing spectacle in itself and its place in the cinematic experience. Not 
only does this mean that a pervasive concept in film studies is left poorly 
defined and unconsidered, it also hampers an understanding of the nature of 
the cinematic experience itself.
The central question addressed by the thesis is ‘What is the role of spectacle 
in the cinematic experience, with particular reference to mainstream cinema?’  
This involves a consideration of the ways in which spectacle has been treated 
in theoretical terms to date.  In particular, the contribution of cognitive 
approaches is critically assessed with a view to establishing a more inclusive 
framework that recognises the experiential nature of cinematic spectacle.  In 
the light of this, the thesis proposes a new critical model for understanding 
spectacle, one based on a notion of transmission which presents narrative and 
spectacle as coexistent within the cinematic experience rather than as 
antithetical qualities. As another aspect of this, the thesis considers the 
historical development of spectacle in the context of spectatorship at the time 
of early cinema at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The latter part of the thesis applies its definition of spectacle to specific 
elements of the cinematic experience, namely the use of technology and mise-
en-scene.  It thereby engages with the aesthetics of spectacle within particular 
contexts and conditions. This exercise makes it clear that far from being a 
marginalised element, as suggested by current narrative-centred film theory, 
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7Introduction: The aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema
In his essay on the historical dimensions of Hollywood blockbusters, Steve 
Neale notes that spectacle “has proved notoriously resistant to analysis”. He 
goes on to advance a definition himself, suggesting tentatively that spectacle 
might be defined as “presentational prowess”, a definition which, whilst it has 
the merit of being short and to the point, may beg more questions than it 
answers (Neale, 2003, p.54). Lavik reflects that spectacle “has probably been 
one of the key terms within film studies over the last couple of years. Sadly, it 
is also highly confusing” (Lavik, 2008, p.169). Brown notes that spectacle 
“has become a term often cited but rarely probed, and even more rarely 
defined” (Brown, 2008, p.157).  Why is this the case?
As Neale’s observation above suggests, attempts have been made to advance 
fairly generalised definitions of spectacle, but there has been little analysis of 
what the concept means and how spectacle affects the cinematic experience. 
Laura Mulvey famously defined spectacle as “to-be-looked-at-ness” (Mulvey, 
2004, p.841) and Neale suggests “a system which is especially concerned…to 
display the visibility of the visible” (emphasis in original) (Neale, 1979, 
p.66). Geoff King, in his book-length analysis of narrative and spectacle in 
Hollywood cinema, proposes “the production of images at which we might 
wish to stop and stare” (King, 2000, p.4). All of these definitions suggest the 
conscious construction of a display by the film, a moment or sequence in 
which the film shows something to the spectator which is, at least implicitly, 
of a different order or nature to the rest of the film. Precisely what that 
difference is or how spectacle achieves its effect remains unexplored. It is 
often at this point that commentators will refer to the difficulties of analysis, 
or suggest that spectacle “encompasses too many elements to be usefully 
discussed in overarching terms” (Brown, 2008, p.157) or that “it denotes a 
wealth of phenomena whose common features are hard to make out” (Lavik, 
2008, p.170). Neale and Brown in their respective essays tackle spectacle in 
quite specific contexts – Triumph of the Will in Neale’s case and Gone with 
the Wind in Brown’s – but so far there has been no systematic attempt to 
define and analyse spectacle in the context of mainstream cinema as a whole 
8and to consider what this analysis can tell us about the spectator’s cinematic 
experience.
Spectacle is a concept which often features in discussions of aspects of 
mainstream cinema, particularly narrative issues, but which is never fully 
defined or analysed and in some cases is simply referred to without any 
further explanation at all.  Implicit in many of these discussions is the 
assumption that spectacle is somehow the opposite of narrative, that these are 
concepts which are almost mutually exclusive. Neale refers to the point at 
which “the narrative starts to freeze and spectacle takes over” (Neale, 1983, 
p.12) and Wood, in reviewing discussions of the effect of digitally-enhanced 
spectacular sequences, notes that: “Instead of providing coherence and unity 
in the narrative, the exaggerated spaces of spectacle make no obvious 
contribution to the progression of the narrative, as they seem only to draw 
attention to themselves as surface, an excess that distracts from temporal 
flow” (Wood, 2002, p.372). These assumptions are so ingrained that they 
permeate the vocabulary used to debate the issue of spectacle and narrative 
itself, primarily by insisting that spectacle and narrative are entirely separate 
concepts. 
Spectacle is an important component of mainstream cinema.  However one 
seeks to define it, clearly it appears in many films. Some commentators 
suggest, as discussed in Chapter One, that it has in fact become the central 
component of most Hollywood blockbuster productions. Narrative and 
psychological complexity of characterisation has declined, it is argued, and in 
its place we see a series of empty spectacles strung together by a largely 
vestigial narrative whose only purpose is to move the film from one spectacle 
to the next. If that really is the case then it would seem even more important 
to understand the precise nature of spectacle, how it affects the spectator’s 
cinematic experience and what this tells us about the nature of that experience 
itself. Is spectacle just the car crash, the explosion, the high speed chase, or is 
it also something else?  What, in short, is its purpose? 
9As I will demonstrate in Chapter One, in fact spectacle has been approached 
by film studies on a number of occasions, but never fully or properly debated. 
Early theorists such as Munsterberg, Eisenstein (in his theoretical writings) 
and Bazin were aware that spectacle existed but chose not to concentrate 
upon it, almost taking for granted the intrinsic power of the cinematic image. 
Spectacle and its emotional impact were assumed to be an integral part of the 
cinematic image but its precise operation in this context was never explored. 
Later theorists such as Mulvey saw spectacle (which she called visual 
pleasure) as a positively disruptive element escaping the unifying force of the 
narrative, which sought to contain it and, to a large degree, usually succeeded. 
This idea of spectacle as a dangerous threat to narrative dominance persisted 
into the Neoformalist-based approach and indeed any model of the cinematic 
experience which takes narrative as its central aspect must in the end confront 
the issue of spectacle which remains a vague and ill-defined concept and, for 
that very reason, hard to accommodate. 
Investigating the nature and effect of spectacle is therefore more than idle 
curiosity: as this thesis will show, spectacle is a fundamental part of the 
cinematic experience, perhaps more fundamental than has been appreciated 
up to now. As Rushton has observed in the context of a discussion of 
absorption and theatricality in the cinema: “narrative and spectacle are 
intertwined in complex ways, so that dividing them as polar opposites is 
ultimately a reductive and unproductive project for film studies” (Rushton, 
2007, p.109). Grindon goes further and suggests that the assumptions 
underlying the term “spectacle” “have created obstacles to the study of the 
film image” (Grindon, 1994, p.35). Given the prominence that has been 
afforded to spectacle in film studies, particularly in recent years, it must be of 
benefit to ongoing considerations of the cinematic experience to attempt a 
proper definition of spectacle capable of critical analysis.
Consequently, the aim of this thesis is to provide a model for understanding 
spectacle in aesthetic terms. A way to achieve this is, first, to define precisely 
what is meant by “spectacle” in the context of mainstream cinema. It is, 
however, necessary to go further in order to provide a context for this 
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definition and to test it against specific elements of the cinematic experience. 
In order to understand how spectacle contributes to the spectator’s cinematic 
experience, we need to look at the various ways in which it actually manifests 
itself on the screen. If we can arrive at a workable definition of spectacle, 
what happens when we apply that definition to the cinematic experience? 
This thesis therefore seeks to address what is currently a significant gap in 
film theory: to provide a working definition of spectacle that is capable of 
proper critical analysis and then to apply that definition to aspects of the 
cinematic experience so as to begin to sketch out an aesthetics of spectacle in 
the mainstream cinema. 
Setting the scene: spectatorship and cognitivism (and beyond)
In order to undertake the exercise proposed in this thesis it is in fact necessary 
first to take several steps back, to strip away the accumulated layers of theory 
and start afresh. It is immediately apparent when commencing this exercise 
that the very terms used to describe the concepts that are being considered 
rest upon a number of assumptions about the separate and apparently opposed 
notions of spectacle and narrative, as described above. Consequently, it is 
necessary to approach this issue from a fresh perspective, adopting a model 
which does not incorporate pre-existing assumptions about narrative and 
spectacle and revisiting early film theories which do not carry historical 
baggage about narrative and spectacle and their relationship.
Spectacle as a concept clearly cannot be studied in isolation from its historical 
context. Any term used over a significant period of time is likely to find its 
precise definition being altered to suit the prevailing theoretical and 
ideological conditions. Added to this, as will be discussed in more detail in 
the main body of the thesis, what is considered to be spectacular alters 
regularly over the years, affected by both technological change and one of the 
basic drivers for the development of spectacle: the need to find something 
novel which the spectator has not experienced before. It is therefore necessary 
to examine spectacle in its historical context as well as its theoretical 
development. Historicizing spectacle will point not only to development in 
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terms of novelty driving change but also to continuity in terms of the basic 
characteristics of spectacle. The precise delineation of what constitutes a 
spectacular sequence may alter from one period to the next, but the basic 
nature of spectacle itself and the function that it performs does not. 
Considering the historical development of spectacle also assists in 
understanding issues of spectatorship and in proposing a model of
spectatorship that accommodates spectacle. What spectacle is and how it 
communicates with the spectator reveals much about the nature of 
spectatorship and the developing characteristics of the spectator, from the 
passive observer predicated by more traditional concepts of spectatorship in 
the arts and the ideologically focussed model proposed by Apparatus theory 
to the emotionally engaged and active participant suggested by Crary’s 
reformulation in Techniques of the Observer (Crary, 1990) and an 
examination of the social and cultural changes that occurred at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Early cinema allows us to examine a model of 
spectatorship where narrative was not considered to be necessarily 
paramount, and to set this example against the theoretical propositions 
advanced in Chapter One so as to construct a definition of spectacle that does 
not assume that film is narrative-centred and which can be accommodated 
into a model of spectatorship that allows for the actively engaged spectator. 
Consequently, a detailed consideration of spectacle allows us also to 
reconsider issues of spectatorship and to propose a revised model of 
spectatorship which can cater for spectacle and which, I suggest, more 
accurately reflects the affective, involved and emotionally-centred experience 
of cinema.  
This approach highlights the methodology adopted in the thesis: to establish a 
theoretical contextualisation of spectacle and an historical model which 
supplies the specific conditions giving rise to spectacle and to review these 
consecutively, showing how one interacts with the other. This draws out not 
only the essential characteristics of spectacle but also the nature of the 
interaction of spectacle with the spectator, emphasising the emotional 
engagement and response which spectacle seeks to elicit. 
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It is inevitable in considering the issue of spectacle from a theoretical 
perspective that it is necessary to engage with what is currently the most 
influential work in the field of narrative study, David Bordwell’s Narration in 
the Fiction Film (1985). This work advanced a narrative-centred model based 
upon what has been termed Neoformalism, adopting a cognitively-based 
approach and utilising principles adapted by Bordwell from Russian 
Formalism. As such, any attempt to define spectacle must address the cogent 
arguments that Bordwell has advanced in Narration in the Fiction Film and 
elsewhere, not only in terms of the narrative-centred model that he has 
proposed, but also the extent to which cognitive theory is adequate to 
accommodate the revised definition of spectacle which is proposed in the 
thesis. Consequently, in terms of the methodology adopted, the third aspect 
arising from the definition of spectacle that needs to be considered, after the 
theoretical and historical contextualisation, is the extent to which Bordwell’s 
model and cognitive film theory can deal adequately with the issues raised by 
the revised definition of spectacle or whether it is necessary to move beyond 
these and seek a more radical approach. I will seek to argue that whilst 
cognitive film theory has done much valuable work in analysing the mental 
processes involved in the spectator’s cinematic experience, it has reached 
something of a dead end in the context of the issues I am considering in that 
the increasingly detailed models of mental activity now being proposed run 
the risk of erecting barriers between the spectator’s experience and the model 
which obscures the visceral impact of that experience. Again, a fresh 
approach is needed and in fact that involves taking a step back and re-
examining those early film theories that were not hampered by pre-existing 
concepts of narrative and spectacle and filtering these through an approach 
which straddles critical analysis and film theory.  Frampton’s Filmosophy is 
proposed as the basis for this new approach.
Having arrived at a working definition of spectacle, it is then necessary to 
apply that definition to certain aspects of the cinematic experience since, in 
Brown’s terms, having defined spectacle we then need to probe it. There are 
any number of elements of the cinematic experience that could be examined, 
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and I have suggested a number in the Conclusions to this thesis, but the two 
that I have concentrated upon are technology and mise-en-scene. The first 
was chosen because technology is so often equated with spectacle and a study 
of the relationship between technology and spectacle provides a tightly-
focussed and historically specific area to examine. In contrast the issue of 
mise-en-scene and how it relates to spectacle offers the opportunity to look at 
how spectacle operates in a far wider context, relating to the organisation of 
all elements of the cinematic image. In both cases a number of conclusions 
can be drawn about the way in which spectacle manifests itself in film and the 
particular forms it adopts in certain circumstances which shed light on the 
larger issue of the spectator’s relationship with the film itself. 
Consequently, I will argue that the formulation of a robust definition of 
spectacle and the beginnings of an aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream 
cinema will not only finally clarify this important concept, it will also shed 
light on the nature of narrative and its place in the cinematic experience and it 
will transform our understanding of the nature of the cinematic experience 
itself by highlighting how the central element of that experience is the 
spectator’s visceral, affective engagement with the film.   
The subjective approach and mainstream cinema
In Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, which deal with the application of 
the definition of spectacle so as to sketch out the beginnings of an aesthetics 
of spectacle in mainstream cinema, I am aware that I am seeking to suggest 
how a spectator might emotionally or otherwise respond to a spectacular 
sequence. I do not in such cases pretend to know how any particular spectator 
would actually respond (other than myself of course) and I have not sought to 
suggest that I have reviewed studies of audience responses to films. Given 
that any consideration of spectacle must, however, delve into the area of the 
experiential and that the response to a spectacular sequence must to a degree 
be subjective, it is inevitable that on occasion I have to suggest that certain 
other approaches to the spectator’s experience of watching a film may not 
adequately cater for the full complexity and diversity of that experience. In 
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doing so I can only rely on what I feel to be the case, acknowledging that the 
spectator to which I refer throughout this thesis is an abstract. Having said 
this, spectacle is experiential in nature and it is legitimate to consider that 
previous approaches such as the psychoanalytically-based models of the 
1970s have themselves been largely abstract rather than experiential when it 
comes to the question of how the spectator interacts with the film. Even 
cognitive film theory has a tendency towards the abstract, as explored in 
Chapter Three. A proper understanding of spectacle will, I argue, assist in 
allowing for a greater acceptance of the experiential and subjective nature of 
the spectator’s experience than perhaps has been the case since the early days 
of film theory. 
I have confined my study of spectacle for the purposes of this thesis to 
mainstream cinema. I have chosen mainstream cinema as opposed to any 
other form for a number of reasons. First, this is to avoid the area of study 
from becoming too amorphous and extensive and to permit a degree of focus. 
Secondly, it is within the context of mainstream cinema that most of the 
debates about narrative and spectacle have taken place and consequently 
where it is easiest to contextualise these debates and to give them proper 
consideration. Finally, mainstream cinema, as its name suggests, accounts for 
the majority of films actually produced, and the purpose of this thesis is to 
construct an aesthetics of spectacle that has the widest possible application. 
This is not, of course, to suggest that it cannot be applied elsewhere.  
I define mainstream cinema as commercially produced mass entertainment 
cinema as opposed to, for example, avant garde cinema. It is not necessarily 
limited to fiction film; indeed, as mentioned above, one of the few considered 
studies of spectacle available is Neale’s review of Triumph of the Will. It may 
well be fruitful to extend the working definition of spectacle beyond 
mainstream cinema in any event, and this is suggested as an area of further 
study in the Conclusions. Mainstream cinema is often equated with the films 
made in Hollywood, or by companies inevitably associated with Hollywood. 
This is not necessarily the case, of course, and the rise of films from across 
the world that could reasonably be classed as mainstream cinema 
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demonstrates that the hegemony previously enjoyed by Hollywood in that 
regard is now probably at an end. To take one example out of many, the vast 
number of films produced by the Indian film industry can clearly be described 
as mainstream cinema in India. In order to maintain a degree of focus in this 
thesis I have tended to concentrate on those films which have been made by 
the film industry based in Hollywood or adopting the characteristics of 
mainstream film most often associated with Hollywood film production. 
Again, a fruitful area of enquiry would be to consider the extent to which 
cultural differences affect what is considered to be spectacle in other parts of 
the world. Is spectacle the same in Bollywood as it is in Hollywood?
Structure of thesis
As indicated above, this thesis is structured around the creation of a working 
definition of spectacle and the application of that definition to certain 
elements of the cinematic experience. Consequently, the thesis is divided up 
into five chapters, as set out below.
Chapter One: The Other – Spectacle and Film Theory
This chapter provides a literature review, considering the extent to which film 
theory has either engaged or failed to engage with the concept of spectacle. 
The present position of spectacle in theoretical terms as a marginalised and 
dangerous concept is examined, arising from its difficult position in relation 
to Neoformalist film theory. Consideration is also given to the Neoformalist 
concept of excess and its relationship to spectacle is reviewed. It is proposed 
that in order to allow a proper consideration of spectacle the existing 
approach to the fundamental process that film undertakes should be revised so 
as to avoid current preconceptions about spectacle and narrative and their 
relationship to each other. The transmission model is suggested and its 
implications explored, providing a basis for an approach to defining spectacle 
that does not see narrative and spectacle as opposing concepts but simply 
balances between narrational and non-narrational transmission.
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Chapter Two: The act of looking – Spectacle and Spectatorship
Chapter Two reviews spectacle in its historical context to assist in developing 
a model of spectatorship capable of accommodating the idea of transmission 
and spectacle understood as being far more central to the cinematic 
experience than existing film theory suggests. Notions of spectatorship are 
considered with particular emphasis on Apparatus theory and Crary’s 
approach in Techniques of the Observer. Early cinema is reviewed as a period 
when narrative was not seen as central to the cinematic experience. The social 
and cultural changes that affected conditions of spectatorship at the time and 
the nature of early cinema are considered to propose a revised model of 
spectatorship. Gunning’s Cinema of Attractions is reviewed in this context to 
reinforce the characteristics of spectatorship now being defined and to link to 
the model of spectatorship being proposed. This exercise reveals the direct, 
exhibitionistic and visceral nature of the communication between film and 
spectator and the strong emotional content inherent in spectacular sequences.
Chapter Three: Emotional intelligence – Spectacle and cognitivism
This chapter considers the extent to which cognitive film theory is able to 
accommodate spectacle and the transmission model. The development of 
cognitive film theory is outlined and particular consideration is given to a 
number of works which deal with film and emotion in a cognitive context. 
Tan’s and Grodal’s work is examined in some detail. It is concluded that 
although cognitivism marks a step closer to the actual experience of spectacle 
in the cinema than previous theoretical models, it has reached something of a 
dead end in this regard in that it tends to over-analyse the experiential aspects 
of film, losing the immediacy of affect which spectacle represents. 
Frampton’s Filmosophy is proposed as an alternative. This is considered in 
detail and it is suggested that the inclusive approach based upon the 
recognition of the direct emotional communication between film and 
spectator that Frampton recommends is to be preferred. Spectacle is seen to 
play a central role in the cinematic experience, being the generation of an 
emotional response through its direct, exhibitionistic communication with the 
spectator.
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Chapter Four: Formation, Assimilation and Formalism – Spectacle and 
Technology
Having arrived at a working definition of spectacle in the first three chapters, 
Chapter Four applies that definition to the relationship between spectacle and 
three particular facets of technological development in the cinema: colour, 
widescreen and computer generated imagery (CGI). This allows a 
historicising of spectacle through an examination of the way that it has 
manifested itself in the context of these three technologies as each emerged at 
different points in the history of the cinema. Spectacle is seen to be associated 
with the presentation of technology at various points in its development, 
giving rise to what I have called formative spectacle, when the film in which 
the technology first appears is at least partly structured so as to advertise the 
technology itself, and formalist spectacle, when the technology becomes 
visible once more and advertised by the film, but this time in an almost 
abstract, formalist manner.
Chapter Five: Events and Objects – Spectacle and mise-en-scene
This chapter reviews the relationship between spectacle and mise-en-scene, 
exploring the differences between the two concepts and how an 
understanding of the way in which spectacle operates in the context of the 
mise-en-scene assists in further understanding both spectacle and mise-en-
scene itself. It is concluded that mise-en-scene can be seen as the organisation 
of the transmission communicated by the film and that spectacle is a 
particular manipulation of that transmission which has the characteristics 
previously identified. This manifests itself as two primary forms of spectacle 
which I have called event spectacle and object spectacle. The characteristics 
of these forms of spectacle are reviewed and the chapter concludes with a 
detailed case study which demonstrates the simultaneous use of both event 
and object spectacle.
The Conclusions draw together these various strands, showing how the 
concept of spectacle in mainstream cinema has journeyed from the 
marginalised Other of narrative-driven and Neoformalist film theory to a 
concept that is central to the idea of film as an emotion machine (in Tan’s 
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phrase), directly engaged with the spectator as an active participant in the 
process. In defining spectacle, a central aspect of the cinematic experience 
has also been clarified. Spectacle, like narrative, can now be seen as one of a 
number of resources available to the film to communicate with the spectator. 
Further areas of study are proposed, both in terms of the application of the 
definition of spectacle to other elements of the cinematic experience and in 
widening the enquiry to areas outside the definition of mainstream cinema 




Spectacle and film theory
1.1 Introduction
When discussing the making of Tomb Raider (2001) Simon West, the film’s 
director, is reported to have described the approach that he took as “post-
narrative”: constructing a film composed entirely of a series of action 
sequences which dispenses with a plot. Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the 
film’s many scriptwriters, Stephen de Souza, poured scorn on this notion in a 
subsequent interview (De Souza, 2005). Judging by the many reviews of the 
film that pointed to the flimsy or nearly incomprehensible storyline, West’s 
ambition seems to have been at least partially realised 
(http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0146316/externalreviews, no date). 
Tomb Raider is one of many films of a similar type turned out by the 
mainstream cinema, particularly in Hollywood, which Gross has described as 
the Big Loud Action Movie (appropriately, BLAM for short), perhaps best 
exemplified by the action films which developed in the 1980s and 1990s and 
which were criticised for apparently abandoning storyline and psychological 
character development in favour of increasingly expensive and vacuous 
action sequences (Gross, 2000, p.3). Arroyo observes that reviewers referred 
with dismay to the decline in narrative and the increase in “astonishingly 
witless” films made purely for entertainment (2000, pp. xi, citing Susan 
Sontag writing in the Guardian on 2 March 1996).   
West’s comments bear closer scrutiny, however, for embedded within them is 
a series of widely held if tacit assumptions which raise a number of issues 
about narrative and spectacle in mainstream cinema. What precisely do these 
terms mean? What is their relationship to each other and has this relationship 
changed as cinema has developed over the course of its existence? Was there 
once a cinema which was based upon narrative and which has now been 
replaced by an action cinema based upon spectacle instead? Is spectacle 
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solely about action sequences and nothing else? Do action sequences 
themselves in fact have no narrative content? Underpinning these questions is 
a much broader and fundamental issue which goes to the nature of cinema 
itself: what is the function of spectacle in mainstream cinema? 
What of those sequences whose primary aim appears to be not the 
communication of  the narrative but an action sequence of some sort or, to put 
it another way, communication of information not primarily concerned with 
the narrative element of the film? Describing such sequences as spectacle 
simply to distinguish them from other sequences where it is clear that the 
primary aim is to convey narrative information is unsatisfactory since it begs 
the obvious question: what is spectacle? These are issues that apply equally to 
films of any era. To take one example out of many, are the establishing shots 
of Lara Croft’s palatial mansion in Tomb Raider to be treated in the same way 
as the fight between Croft and the robot which forms the opening sequence of 
the film?    
Such issues demonstrate the practical difficulty of assigning terms such as 
narrative and spectacle to elements of any particular film even, or indeed 
particularly, Hollywood films. Notwithstanding this, a considerable amount 
of film theory work has been devoted to the study of narration and the 
narrative process itself. This concentration upon narrative has resulted in 
many cases in spectacle being marginalized or simply ignored.  
In addressing the nature and function of spectacle, it is important to look at 
what film theory has and has not said about spectacle. This will involve an 
engagement not only with current thinking on this issue but also with earlier 
work which sheds light on the historical development of this subject.  
The logical starting point for this review is to examine what is currently the 
most influential theory of the use and function of narrative, formulated by 
David Bordwell in his book Narration in the Fiction Film and which has 
come to be known as Neoformalism (Bordwell, 1985). It is, however, 
necessary to look at Neoformalism in the context of the theories that preceded 
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it and against which it was reacting. As Tredell has pointed out, film theory 
does not proceed like scientific theory, with each new development wiping 
out the previous approach (2002, p.10). Earlier theories remain valid and 
indeed often the source for reflection upon theoretical issues many years after 
they have apparently been superseded.  This review will therefore go on to 
consider both certain elements of classical film theory which engage directly 
with the characteristics of the cinematic image, particularly those of 
Munsterberg, Arnheim, Eisenstein (in his theoretical writings) and Bazin and 
those psychoanalytical theories that have sought to tackle the issue of 
spectacle. As will be demonstrated, even those classical theories that focussed 
on the nature of the cinematic image rather than narrative are haunted by the 
idea of spectacle whilst avoiding the need to address directly the issues raised 
by its presence. In contrast, narrative-centred theories such as Laura 
Mulvey’s, as described in her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, 
and Bordwell’s Neoformalism turn spectacle into a threatening Other by 
virtue of their concentration upon narrative as the driving force of the film 
leading them to attempt to contain or control spectacle, which now appears to 
become opposed to narrative because it cannot be reconciled with the 
narrative-centred model (Mulvey, 2004, pp. 837 to 848). 
This investigation of previous cultural and theoretical work will form the bulk 
of Chapter One. It will demonstrate the gap in knowledge that currently exists 
in relation to a properly articulated definition of spectacle in mainstream 
cinema and the impasse that theory has reached in this regard. It will show 
that addressing this gap will enable a more complete understanding of the 
nature of spectatorial engagement with mainstream cinema. I will conclude 
with a discussion of the questions that arise from the literature review 
undertaken in this Chapter and I will establish a methodology that will permit 
the analysis of these issues and their implications in subsequent chapters. 
1.2 The Neoformalist model and the concept of excess
In this section I review the narrative model known as Neoformalism which 
Bordwell explicated in Narration in the Fiction Film. I will show that 
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Neoformalism attempts to account for the cognitive processes that occur 
when the spectator watches a film. It chooses to do so by concentrating upon 
narration as the central plank of the cinematic experience. The attempt to 
bring the entirety of that experience within the Neoformalist embrace is not 
entirely successful, at least insofar as spectacle is concerned. Something is 
missing, namely a detailed treatment of spectacle. I will argue that the 
experience of spectacle in the cinema is therefore relegated to artistic 
motivation or excess material which escapes the unifying force of the 
narrative. I will demonstrate that excess is itself a troubling concept for 
Neoformalism and that there have been several attempts to clarify its function 
and relationship to spectacle, none of which have been entirely successful. 
Excess appears to end up occupying much the same marginal ground as 
spectacle.  
The concept of spectacle therefore raises difficult issues and it remains a 
problematic Other within the Neoformalist model. This section thus clarifies 
the issues that are raised when a narrative-centred model attempts to deal with 
non-narrative elements of the cinematic experience. 
In Narration in the Fiction Film Bordwell set out a theory of how narration 
functions in the context of the mainstream fiction film.  He describes 
narration as the process of “selecting, arranging, and rendering story material 
in order to achieve specific time-bound effects on a perceiver” (1985, p xi).  
This is a wide definition which could, as Bordwell points out (1985, p.12) 
encompass any and all film techniques insofar as they construct the story 
world for specific effects: “any device can function narrationally” (1985, p. 
146). This is an important point to remember in the context of what 
constitutes narrative. It is by no means the case that the narrative element in a 
film is confined to its verbal or even visual elements. It is perfectly possible 
for editing or music, for example, to play a part in the narrative thrust of a 
film. As Grodal points out, this preconception has arisen because until the 
advent of audiovisual media, language was the prime intersubjective medium 
for narrative structures (1997, p.10). As the Russian Formalists had observed, 
however, a narrative can be represented in many different ways, not all of 
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them verbalised (such as a ballet or silent film). As will be discussed further 
below in the context of the reformulation of terms necessary to take this 
analysis of the aesthetics of spectacle forward, what is of more importance is 
what any particular element in the film is doing. What is its purpose? Is it 
providing information which directly drives the plot or story forward or not? 
This point is further emphasised by Bordwell’s consideration of mimetic and 
diegetic models of narration (1985, pp. 3 to 15 and 16 to 26). A diegetic 
model sees narration as consisting either literally or by analogy of verbal 
activity: in other words, telling a story. This telling may be either oral or 
written. A mimetic model, on the other hand, conceives of narration in terms 
of presentation: showing rather than telling. The obvious historical analogies 
between these two modes of narration are the poet reciting his or her epic 
poem and the dramatic presentation of the events recounted in the poem on 
the stage.  Both processes are concerned with providing narrative 
information, although one process involves a direct address to the audience 
and the other does not. As Bordwell points out, there are further subtleties to 
consider in relation to the precise distinction between the two, such as what 
occurs when the poet stops speaking in his or her own voice and instead 
adopts one of the characters’ voices in the poem. Bordwell suggests that 
either model may be applied to any medium so that it would be possible to 
hold a mimetic model of the novel if you believe the narrational methods of 
fiction resemble those of drama, or a diegetic model of painting if you argue 
that visual presentation is analogous to linguistic transmission (1985, p.3). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Bordwell refers to mimetic narration as “a 
spectacle”, it is clear that his approach to this term is focussed through the 
function of mimesis as a means to tell a story (1985, p.4). In other words, the 
distinction between mimetic and diegetic narration lies in the mode of 
storytelling, not in a distinction between narrative and spectacle itself. 
Spectacle in this context simply means presenting the narrative rather than 
recounting it. The act of mimetic presentation is for Bordwell driven by the 
narrative function and seems to serve no other purpose. Spectacle is therefore 
narrativised to the extent that it has a narrative content. This seems a rather 
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circular argument and leaves Bordwell with the issue of what he should do 
with spectacle that does not have, or appears not to have, any narrative 
content. 
Bordwell bases his distinction between mimetic and diegetic narration on the 
principles of mimesis described by Aristotle in his Poetics. As Bordwell 
points out, the concept of mimesis applies primarily to theatrical performance 
(1985, p.4). It has also been noted that Aristotle disliked staged spectacle, 
which in his view supplied effects that were unnecessary to effective drama 
(Bukatman, 2006, p. 75). In fact, Bordwell’s use of the term “spectacle” to 
denote mimetic narration and the assumption about Aristotle’s apparent 
dislike of spectacle confuses what Aristotle actually discusses in the Poetics. 
This is worth clarifying because it demonstrates that the historical 
assumptions about the role of spectacle insofar as they are apparently derived 
from Aristotle are more complex than may at first appear. Aristotle is careful 
to draw a distinction between epic poetry (as recited by the poet either using 
his own voice or speaking in the voices of others) and Tragedy, where the 
action is staged by actors. Tragedy is composed of six elements, being plot, 
character, language, thought, spectacle and melody. Poetry is composed of 
four of those six (1982, pp.50 to 54). The two elements that do not contribute 
to Poetry are melody (music) and spectacle because these are attributes of the 
staged or theatrical nature of Tragedy. Aristotle does not say that spectacle is 
unnecessary or inferior to the performance of staged Tragedy; he simply 
maintains that it is not necessary to the art of Poetry. Spectacle is, however, 
far from inessential to Tragedy:
Since the imitation is carried out in the dramatic mode by the 
personages themselves, it necessarily follows, first, that the 
arrangement of Spectacle will be part of tragedy, and next, that 
Melody and Language will be parts, since these are the media in 
which they effect the imitation (1982, p.50).  
Given that Aristotle was concerned with the art of poetry, he concentrates 
primarily on plot, which is in his view entirely separate from spectacle. 
Spectacle as understood by Aristotle was the manner in which the mimetic art 
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of Tragedy was carried out; in essence the visual aspect. In fact he says very 
little about spectacle in the Poetics since he was concentrating on poetry 
(1982, p.51). As a result the precise ambit of what he considered to be 
spectacle remains unclear, but there is little doubt that Aristotle considered 
spectacle to be an essential element of staged action (1982, p.90, footnote 5).  
Bordwell seeks to narrativise spectacle by including it within the definition of 
mimetic narration, but Aristotle keeps the two separate:
…Spectacle, though fascinating in itself, is of all the parts the least 
technical in the sense of being least germane to the art of poetry. For 
tragedy [as recited in the epic poem] fulfils its function even without a 
public performance and actors, and, besides, in the realisation of the 
spectacular effects the art of the property man counts for more than 
the art of the poets (1982, p.52).
Perhaps we can see his last observation as an early acknowledgement of the 
importance of technology in the effective delivery of spectacle.
To summarise, in fact Aristotle is not responsible for the view that spectacle 
is somehow inferior to cinematic narrative. There are other reasons for this 
view, as will be discussed below. Aristotle carefully distinguished between a 
staged production, in which spectacle plays an obvious part, and the recitation 
of epic poetry. Spectacle was the visual dimension of the staged production, 
the outward appearance (or opsis) which necessarily followed from the nature 
of the event. This does not, however, mean that spectacle does nothing more
than show the plot to the audience. Since he was concentrating on other 
things, however, Aristotle does not say a great deal about spectacle or its 
boundaries, commencing a practice which has continued in the discussion of 
narrative and spectacle ever since.  
Having established his distinction between diegetic and mimetic models of 
narration, Bordwell goes on to review the characteristics of both models. 
Ultimately Bordwell dismisses the mimetic and diegetic approaches as being 
inadequate in themselves to offer a comprehensive account of how narration 
functions (1985, p.29). Bordwell instead turns back to the theories originally 
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advanced by the Russian Formalists in the earlier part of the twentieth century 
and melds their approach with cognitive analysis to produce a new model that 
explicitly turned its back on the semiological basis of film theory that had 
dominated thinking since the late 1960s.
Bordwell seeks to explain how spectators make sense of films. Narration is 
seen as the process through which films furnish cues to spectators who then 
use interpretative schemata to construct intelligible stories (1985, p.30). “The 
story action is not in the film but in the spectator’s mind; it becomes a 
construction which the viewer puts upon a configuration of stimuli” (1985, 
p.14).  The schemata used by the spectator to construct the story will need to 
be adjusted to cater for the information presented to the spectator by the film, 
particularly if the film does not correspond to well known or canonic forms of 
story, in which event the “template schemata” will have to be adjusted. 
Bordwell notes that the method of making sense out of the assembly of 
devices presented to the spectator by the film, be they visual or aural, was 
called by the Russian Formalists “motivation”. Four types of motivation were 
identified: compositional motivation, which explains the presence of a device 
or element in terms of its necessity for story comprehension; realistic 
motivation, which justifies the presence of the device because it enhances the 
film’s surface verisimilitude or plausibility; intertextual (or transtextual) 
motivation, which links directly to the spectator’s familiarity with the 
conventions inherent in the film they are watching (most obviously with a 
genre film such as a Western or horror film); and finally, and most rarely, 
artistic motivation, where an element is present simply for its own sake, as 
part of the “showmanship” of the film itself (1985, p. 36 and Maltby, (1995) 
pp. 336 and 337). Bordwell notes that Formalists thought highly of this latter 
category because it directly focussed the spectator’s attention on the forms 
and materials of the film itself, drawing attention to the fact that the film 
existed as a work of art in its own right, not just as a transparent device for 
transmitting the story to the spectator (1985, p.36). 
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In his account of Hollywood cinema Maltby suggests that the use of spectacle 
would fall into the category of artistic motivation, but does not explain why 
he thinks this should be the case (or what he means by “spectacle”) although 
he does indicate that in fact usually these various types of motivation operate 
collaboratively at any one time (1995, p.337).  Implicit in Maltby’s 
characterisation of spectacle as being an artistic motivation is the idea that 
spectacle serves no purpose other than pure “showmanship” (as he puts it), in 
other words a sequence or image that exists merely for itself, isolated from 
the other elements of the film. Having said this, the fact that he believes these
motivations work collaboratively points towards an important element of the 
relationship between narrative and spectacle, namely that it is artificial to see 
these two concepts as operating in isolation to each other. Whether seen as 
elements of motivation or otherwise, they operate together. 
Bordwell, on the other hand, takes a more restrictive view of the function of 
artistic motivation. In his view the first three of these procedural rationales (as 
he calls them) often cooperate with one another but artistic motivation is “a 
residual category and remains distinct from the others; the spectator has 
recourse to it only when the other sorts do not apply” (1985, p.36).   He does 
not go on to explain why he believes this to be the case, but it is an instructive 
comment. Bordwell’s focus on narration leads him to marginalize any 
element that does not fit in with his scheme.  
Notwithstanding these observations, the concept of the assignment of 
spectacle to the category of artistic motivation raises some interesting points. 
Both Russian Formalism (as Bordwell understands it) and Neoformalism are 
posited on an active cognitive engagement between film and spectator, 
requiring the spectator to be far more than a passive observer or recipient of 
the information being transmitted to him or her. If as Maltby suggests 
spectacle is an artistic motivation this implies an active participation in the 
understanding and decoding of the images themselves, a far remove from the 
so-called dumb spectacle of the action movie beloved of the critics, which 
implies the uncritical absorption of a sequence devoid of meaningful content. 
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Bordwell identifies a difference between the events as the spectator sees them 
unfold in the film and the story represented by those events. The film may 
show the events out of sequence, may withhold certain parts of the story from 
the spectator until a later point in the film (or may not show those parts at all) 
and so on. Utilising terms coined by Russian Formalists, Bordwell therefore 
distinguishes between the plot (or “syuzhet”), which is the order in which 
events are presented in the film, and the story (or “fabula”), which is the 
reconstruction of events carried out by the spectator in their chronological 
order through which the spectator establishes the chain of causality linking 
them (1985, pp.49 and 50). Consequently, narration could be seen as the 
process by which the plot is arranged to permit the telling of the story. One 
part of this process is constructed by filmmakers through their choice of the 
sequence of events and actions in the plot, the editing, music and mise-en-
scene and other elements in the film production process, but the whole 
process is completed by the spectator in the cinema using his or her 
knowledge of convention and plot information to construct the story mentally. 
Neoformalism has exerted a considerable influence on film studies. It has 
been followed by Kristin Thompson’s Breaking the Glass Armor,
(Thompson, 1988) a series of essays on Neoformalist film analysis, and has
been used by Bordwell and Thompson together with Janet Staiger in their 
seminal study of classical Hollywood cinema, The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960 (1985). Whilst efforts 
have been made to show that the narrative structures of the films discussed by 
Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson did not in fact always conform to the 
paradigm advanced in this book (Cowie, 1998), there remains a deeper issue 
regarding the approach taken by Neoformalism in the context of this study of 
spectacle. This issue is rooted in the very terms used by Bordwell in the first 
place. At the most basic level, it can be argued that the use of terms such as 
“narration”, “plot” and “story” inevitably focus upon those elements of the 
film that deal with the narrative itself and therefore exclude any other 
elements which do not. By concentrating on narrative, spectacle is left behind 
or assigned to the margins of the filmmaking process in terms of any clear 
definition or understanding of the part it plays. The assumption is that it plays 
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no part in the process which communicates the narrative to the spectator. This 
also assumes, of course, that the communication of the narrative is a film’s 
primary purpose.   
Neoformalism is of course by no means the only approach to the study of 
narration in mainstream cinema, albeit the most influential recently. Tom 
Gunning has, for example, proposed a system based upon the theories of 
literary critic Gerard Genette (Gunning, 2004b) and both Edward Branigan 
and Torben Grodal have undertaken a thorough review of the function and 
organisation of cinematic narrative as a mode of thought requiring distinctive 
forms and processes (Branigan, 1992 and Grodal, 1997). In addition, the rise 
of the action movie in the 1980s and 1990s with its emphasis on spectacle has 
led many to review the nature of such films, the apparent demise of the 
traditional narrative and its replacement with a more episodic and schematic 
approach to the story (King, 2000; Shone, 2004; Neale and Smith, 1998).  
The consequence of this focus upon narration is that those elements of a film 
that do not bear directly upon the narrative (however that may be described) 
are sometimes seen as in some way disruptive. This additional material is 
classified by Neoformalism as excess to the requirements of the well-
constructed narrative film (Thompson, 2004).
Occasionally, style claims attention independently of its narrative function, 
although it is usually largely invisible in the classical Hollywood film. 
Bordwell defines those films where style is more visible as employing 
“parametric narration”, where the stylistic system “creates patterns distinct 
from the demands of the syuzhet system. Film style may be organised and 
emphasized to a degree that makes it at least equal in importance to syuzhet 
patterns” (emphasis in original) (1985, p.53). In such circumstances the 
apparently non-narrative function of style claims at least equal attention to its 
narrative function. In identifying this type of narrative model, Bordwell 
admits that he is concentrating at least to some extent on what he calls 
“isolated filmmakers and fugitive films” (1985, p.274).  Although he is 
careful to point out that this does not mean that such films are the same as art-
house movies, the work of the directors upon which he concentrates, such as 
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Dreyer, Ozu, Mizoguchi and Bresson, would, at least today, be seen only in 
art-house cinemas (1985, p.282). Interestingly, the art-house film is the same 
area in which Thompson ends up locating the concept of excess, as discussed 
below.  The implication is that such non-narrative stylistic devices are rare in 
mainstream cinema. Given the arguments advanced in this thesis, this seems 
doubtful.
It can therefore be argued that anything falling outside the parameters of the 
Neoformalist narrative model is unnecessary to an understanding of the film’s 
meaning since a film’s meaning is contained within the narration as that 
concept is defined by Neoformalism. This material is excess, as Thompson 
explains:
…a steady and exclusive diet of classical narrative cinema seems to 
accustom people to ignoring the material aspects of the artwork, since 
these are usually so thoroughly motivated as to be unobtrusive. But 
the minute a viewer begins to notice style for its own sake or watch 
works which do not provide such thorough motivation, excess comes 
forward and must affect narrative meaning. Style is the use of 
repeated techniques which become characteristic of the work; these 
techniques are foregrounded so that the spectator will notice them and 
create connections between their individual uses. Excess does not 
equal style, but the two are closely linked because they both involve 
the material aspects of the film. Excess forms no specific patterns 
which we could say are characteristic of the work. But the formal 
organisation provided by style does not exhaust the material of the 
filmic techniques, and a spectator’s attention to style might well lead 
to a noticing of excess as well (Thompson, 2004, p. 515).
Thus, it can be argued that if non-narrative stylistic gestures create a pattern 
which is repeated often enough to become characteristic of the film in which 
they appear, they may be classed as part of a parametric narration, whereas if 
they do not, or are less patterned, they may be excess. The difference would 
appear to be one of degree rather than substance. How many times does a 
moment of excess have to be repeated before it becomes a pattern 
characteristic of the work? Given that parametric narration remains within the 
Neoformalist model whereas excess is consigned to the margins, this does 
seem to be rather arbitrary. 
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Thompson goes on to describe such excess flourishes as “non-diegetic aspects 
of the image”, suggesting that they may be exhibitionistic elements (2004, 
p.515). The notion of excess is the inevitable corollary of the narrative model 
proposed by Neoformalism. If an element is not part of the narration (or 
accepted within the parametric narrative model) then it becomes problematic, 
a threat to the unity of the narrative model itself. It is excess, “not only 
counternarrative” but also “counterunity”: “To discuss [excess] may be to 
invite the partial disintegration of a coherent reading” (2004, p.517). Excess 
is a dangerous Other haunting the margins of Neoformalism. As I shall argue 
below, spectacle is in the same position.
It therefore appears that both spectacle and excess are casualties of the 
Neoformalist model, both treated as a threat to the unity of the model which 
needs to be marginalised in order to curb its dangerous potential. Both, 
however, require further consideration and clarification, not only in terms of 
their relationship to each other, but how they operate within the context of the 
cinematic image. What were the historical and ideological drivers for their 
development, and what can a consideration of these drivers tell us about these 
concepts now? To what extent should excess in fact be equated with 
spectacle? They share a common relationship to Neoformalism but should 
they in fact be seen as essentially the same thing? If not, how do they interact 
with each other, if at all? To what extent can the transmission model and the 
definition of spectacle proposed in this thesis assist in dealing with the 
concept of excess?   
   
Spectacle and excess remain problematic in the context of Neoformalism and 
an adequate explanation of their relationship and function has proven to be 
difficult to articulate adequately. Thompson’s definition of excess is 
examined by Grindon in an article which seeks to contextualise the concepts 
of spectacle and excess within a broad history of the use of cinematic illusion. 
Grindon contends that spectacle and excess are terms in need of clarification 
and in fact that the absence of any precise definitions has hindered the 
development of the study of the cinematic image (Grindon, 1994, p.35). In 
fact, whilst he then reviews the various definitions of excess, particularly 
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those adopted by Heath and Barthes, Grindon does not attempt to define 
spectacle precisely. His investigation begins with Debord’s Situationist 
approach as explicated in Society of the Spectacle (1973) that spectacle is 
essentially “a social relation among people mediated by images” and that 
spectacle “embodies a power relationship in which the ruling hierarchy 
produces and manipulates visual communication for ideological domination 
of its subjects, who lack the ability to evaluate or resist the spectacle” 
(Grindon, 1994, p.36).  This approach became influential in film theory of the 
1970s allied with Lacanian psychoanalysis and further developed by Baudry 
and Mulvey as discussed in Chapter Two. 
In order to challenge the pervasive power of the cinematic illusion, critics 
therefore looked to self-reflexive elements in the cinema, moments that 
reminded the viewer that they were witnessing a material artefact, a film, 
rather than being dragged into believing that what they were witnessing was 
in some way real. This gave rise to the concept of excess, which might at its 
most basic mean simply “something which surpasses the boundaries of 
typical films” as Hoberman suggested (Cited by Grindon, 1994, p.39).   
Grindon rightly observes that “excess” is a term of quantitative relation, as 
Hoberman’s definition makes all too clear, so one has to ask: in excess of 
what? 
Grindon points out that Thompson bases her concept on Barthes’ idea of the 
“third meaning” and Heath’s analysis of Touch of Evil (1958) (Barthes, 
1977b). Barthes’ definition of the third meaning is rather vague: he points to a 
meaning which exceeds the obvious meaning and “seems to open the field of 
meaning totally”.  Heath sees excess as the filmic material outside narrative 
unity. Thus Thompson’s approach is to look at the way that style and excess 
interact:
Style embodies the film’s materiality and excess becomes an aspect of 
style that cannot be accounted for by a comprehensive analysis of the 
text; it exceeds the unifying systems of meaning (Grindon, 1994, 
p.39).
33
Excess therefore appears to be an overstatement in the style of the film. 
Grindon observes that Thompson “appears indifferent” to the political 
dynamics of spectacle in the context of the cinematic illusion and that the idea 
of excess as a subverter of illusion derives largely from aspects of Barthes’ 
thought which she does not develop. Barthes’ third meaning in fact goes 
beyond Thompson’s notion of excess to encompass any element in the image 
that is extraneous to its obvious or symbolic content. This concept is however 
not a manifestation of style, like Thompson’s idea of excess, but something 
more elusive and beyond the bounds of critical analysis altogether. It is 
perhaps difficult to see how this concept can therefore be taken much further 
in any meaningful way if we apparently lack the means to subject it to any 
critical review. The absence of a precise definition of either spectacle or 
excess and their positioning in an historical and ideological context is too 
restrictive to permit an appreciation of the wider issues these concepts raise. 
The approaches which Grindon identifies in Heath and Barthes as well as 
their development by Thompson all proceed on the basis that narrative is 
actually separable from spectacle. Grindon’s review of the concept of 
spectacle proceeds from the ideological approach based upon Debord, who 
never explicitly applied his theory of spectacle to the cinema. The ideological 
approach therefore seems to treat spectacle as simply representative of the 
cinematic image in total, arriving at the position that any proper critical 
analysis of spectacle seeks to avoid: the idea that everything on the screen is
spectacle. In fact Grindon arrives at much the same conclusion:
The claims for excess as a vehicle to smash the spectacle and bring the 
critique of illusion onto the screen are inflated – but then so are the 
claims made for spectacle as an agent of deception (1994, p.42).
Grindon identifies the paradox of excess as a critical mechanism somehow 
existing outside the confines of a narrative-driven cinema, the position which, 
as mentioned above, Thompson has to reach as a result of the Neoformalist 
insistence on the centrality of narration in the fiction film:
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The critique of illusion portrayed a shackled, insensitive spectator. 
This school could only grudgingly recommend an ascetic cinema 
destined to forego pleasure in a perpetual unmasking of the spectacle. 
Arising from the same discourse, excess allowed one to look again. 
Paradoxically the concept of excess allowed critics to anoint 
extravagant style as reflexive and to sanction pleasure as long as these 
stylistic elements did not participate in the construction of narrative or 
the creation of meaning. Under the rubric of excess the audience was 
liberated, observant and capable of extracting delight from all the 
flourishes and mannerisms that animate the movies (1994, p.42).
Put this way, excess appears to be a device to allow critics to have their cake 
and eat it: a rigorous dislike of the ideological basis of film or strict adherence 
to the Neoformalist canon whilst at the same time acknowledging that there is 
in fact more to film that just an intellectual exercise and that in reality people 
go to the cinema to enjoy themselves. What is missing from both the 
ideological and Neoformalist approaches is a recognition of the emotional 
effect of the cinematic experience. 
Grindon therefore provides a useful critique of Thompson’s approach as well 
as identifying, although not fully addressing, the historical and ideological 
issues that have hindered a proper understanding of the role of spectacle, but 
he does not go far enough in defining what spectacle actually means or in 
suggesting how the issue of excess can be resolved. Lavik also discusses the 
role played by spectacle and excess in the context of what he describes as a 
“kind of struggle for the cultural status of the blockbuster” (Lavik, 2008, 
p.169).  Lavik reviews the history of the term “spectacle” but concludes that it 
is a “fuzzy” term which “denotes a wealth of phenomena whose common 
features are hard to make out” (Lavik, 2008, p.170). This is unfortunate since 
it means that, like Grindon, the absence of any attempt at a precise 
formulation of what the term means makes it difficult to set it in context 
against excess or narrative, the other terms that he considers in detail. He 
refers to King’s formulation of spectacle as being “sequences that employ a 
heightened degree of spectacle or spectacular action”, which is, as he points 
out, a rather tautological definition (King, 2000, p.184). He does however 
usefully distinguish between the concept of spectacle based upon Debord and 
analysed by Grindon, which he considers to be far too generalised and 
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abstract to be of much use, and the more specific, concrete definition of 
spectacle as “something that is on display, that is eye-catching, out of the 
ordinary” (Lavik, 2008, p.170). 
The major difficulty that Lavik sees in defining spectacle is its subjectivity 
and historicity. Tastes change and what one person finds spectacular another 
may not.  Given the development of spectacle over the course of cinematic 
history and particularly the ease with which anyone could identify event 
spectacle in a generic context (the gunfight, the car chase, the musical 
number, the space battle) the extent of this subjectivity is perhaps a little 
overstated.  What is more pertinent perhaps is his observation that spectacle is 
tied to novelty: “Since what is extraordinary depends on what is ordinary at 
any given moment in time, any definition of spectacle should be thought of as 
very much approximate, provisional, and tentative” (emphasis in original) 
(2008, p.172). This may be the case if we are trying to say whether any one 
particular sequence at any particular time is or is not spectacular but, as has 
been demonstrated above, this is not the case if we are attempting to arrive at 
a more generalised definition of spectacle and its aesthetic in mainstream 
cinema. It is also the case, as Gunning has pointed out, that even when a 
spectacle has lost its novelty value it may still be a source of wonder through 
a defamiliarisation with the techniques employed, such as when they are 
presented in a new or unusual way:
…new technologies invoke not only a short-lived wonder based on 
unfamiliarity which greater and constant exposure will overcome, but 
also a possibly less dramatic but more enduring sense of the uncanny, 
a feeling that they involve magical operations which greater 
familiarity or habituation might cover over, but not totally destroy. It 
crouches there beneath a rational cover, ready to spring out again
(Gunning, 2003, p.47).
As Gunning suggests, the most obvious example of this sort of effect can be 
found in the spectacle arising from the use of technology, an issue that will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
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Lavik suggests that spectacles hold “some kind of autonomous attraction, 
independent of their narrative function” but that whether or not they serve 
“some story purpose” is irrelevant to the definition of the term (2008, p.172). 
He notes that spectacle is presentational in the way it displays itself to the 
spectator whereas narrative is representational in the way that it allows a 
voyeuristic observation by the spectator of the characters in the film, an 
indication of the essentially exhibitionistic nature of spectacle and the 
voyeuristic nature of narrative. He is correct to point out that nevertheless 
“There is no necessary opposition between narrative and spectacle” 
(emphasis in original) (2008, p.173). I will demonstrate in this chapter that in 
fact there is no opposition at all.   
Whilst it is clearly not the case that modern blockbuster films have dispensed 
with narrative altogether, it may be that the importance of narrative, at least in 
the sense that term is used in the context of classical Hollywood cinema, has 
diminished. Even this requires further clarification in that whilst spectacle is 
ill-defined it is also the case that, as Lavik suggests, what counts as 
advancement of the plot “is equally mystical” (2008, p.174). In other words, 
part of the formulation of the aesthetics of spectacle may include a 
reconsideration of what narrative actually means. This may tie back to King’s 
suggestion of thematic narration, the way that spectacle may also seek not 
only to bring narrative closure in certain cases but also to advance the story in 
a more generalised thematic way tied into a high level narrative framework 
often dictated by generic considerations (King, 2000, p.29). 
Lavik suggests that whilst spectacle has been seen as “a form of visual 
display that overwhelms viewers” (based upon Debord’s ideologically 
motivated definition of spectacle), excess is seen as “a kind of direct address” 
which the trained spectator can spot and which tends to occur, at least in 
Thompson’s examples, only in art house films. Consequently, “whereas the 
use of spectacle in Hollywood cinema tends to be conceived of as an appeal 
to the lowest common denominator, excess suggests a kind of 
connoisseurship” (2008, p.176). This observation highlights the difficulty 
with seeing any relationship between excess and spectacle based upon their 
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ideological and historical development. If spectacle is considered purely in 
ideological terms, excess is almost its opposite, the vehicle through which the 
illusion of the cinematic experience can be revealed.  For the reasons 
discussed in Chapter Two, however, this historically-limited view of 
spectacle is not adequate to deal with spectacle as it should now be 
understood in the light of developments after the 1970s and particularly given 
the rise of cognitivism and Neoformalism.  Consequently, whilst historically 
spectacle and excess may be seen as entirely separate concepts they now find 
themselves in very similar positions in relation to the Neoformalist model.  
It is worth noting that excess has a particular meaning in the context of cult 
cinema, or what Sconce has called “paracinema”, an elastic category of films 
which covers “just about every…historical manifestation of exploitation 
cinema” (Sconce, 1995, p.372).  Sconce points out that whereas Bordwell’s 
parametric narration celebrates the systematic application of style “as the elite 
techniques of a cinematic artist”, paracinema celebrates the systematic failure 
of conventional style as a result of material poverty and technical ineptitude 
(1995, p.385). As a result excess acquires a new meaning, going beyond the 
occasional artistic flourish noted by Thompson and becomes instead in 
Sconce’s terms a non-diegetic aspect of the cinematic image, “a gateway to 
exploring profilmic and extratextual aspects of the filmic object itself” (1995, 
p.387).
Sconce’s argument is that this concept of excess takes the spectator outside 
the closed text of the film which arises as a result of the application of models 
such as Neoformalism. As such, excess moves beyond the deigetic and the 
film becomes a cultural and sociological document in itself. Using excess in 
this way to create an alternative aesthetic position for paracinema, it is 
suggested, thus highlights the true extent of non-narrative transmission that 
may exist in a film: not just those incidental details that may have been 
included by the filmmakers but also those accidents of production over which 
the filmmakers had little or no control. Excess in this context demonstrates 
the porous nature of the boundary between the diegetic and non-diegetic 
elements of a film. Spectacle serves a similar purpose in this regard, showing 
38
that films may communicate directly with the spectator outside the film’s 
diegesis. This happens deliberately in moments of spectacle but may happen 
accidentally in paracinema.  
Maltby suggests that the concept of excess material is in reality an admission 
that narrative theory cannot really account for everything that goes on in a 
film, choosing instead to categorise the material that escapes the unifying 
process of the narrative structure as material that reveals the hidden psychic 
or ideological processes at work in the text (1995, p.335). This would appear 
to be an attempt to evade a proper definition of that which is not primarily 
narration by lumping all of it together as somehow being extraneous to the 
true purpose of the film itself. As Maltby suggests, the Neoformalist approach 
may also leave out of account the possibility of other incidental pleasures 
available to the spectator that have nothing to do with the narrative content of 
the film (1995, p.335). In the consumerist view of Hollywood, narrative may 
be only one of a number of things which the spectator wants to experience 
when he or she goes to the movies, and by no means always top of the list. 
Audiences may be just as interested in the action, the stars in the film or the 
sheer technical wizardry on display (Maltby, 1995, pp.324 and 334).  These 
considerations demonstrate the rather artificial approach represented by 
Neoformalism: it does not really take into account the more complex and 
messy motivations and irrationalities of the spectator, whose desire to see a 
film and experience of the film itself may have little to do with the calculating 
cognitive process that Neoformalism proposes. As Robert Stam succinctly 
suggests “the cognitive approach downsizes, as it were, the ambitions of 
theory” (2000, p.242). 
In conclusion, the strength of the Neoformalist model is that it seeks to define 
the important function of narrative in the cinematic experience. By definition, 
however, to the extent that this theory seeks to present a model which caters 
for the entirety of the cinematic experience, it runs into difficulties with what 
are plainly the non-narrative elements of that experience. Neoformalism 
attempts to confine these non-narrative elements to the realms of excess 
material or artistic motivation, but this does not mean that these elements 
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simply go away. Spectacle haunts the margins of Neoformalism, an untidy 
aspect of the spectator’s experience which, inconveniently, resists efforts to 
bring it entirely within the narrative envelope.
1.3 Spectacle and the cinematic image
It is useful at this stage to review earlier theoretical models that have referred 
to the cinematic image so as to set the Neoformalist approach into its 
historical context. This review will identify where these earlier models have 
considered the issue of spectacle, if they have considered it at all, and the 
shortcomings in the approaches taken by these models. This will assist in 
identifying the research questions and issues that will inform the rest of this 
thesis.  In this section I will argue that the first step in appreciating and 
understanding the experience of spectacle in the cinema is to reconsider the 
nature of the cinematic image. Neoformalism contemplates a cinematic image 
dedicated to advancing the narrative. For the reasons that I have discussed in 
the previous section, this narrative-centred model does not deal adequately 
with the concept of what it sees as a non-narrative element such as spectacle. 
What is required is a new formulation of the cinematic image that will 
accommodate the presence of spectacle and its concomitant emotional 
response. 
The material considered will fall broadly into two sections: the first classical 
film theorists, particularly Munsterberg, Arnheim, Eisenstein and Bazin, and, 
following the significant change of direction in the 1960s, the structuralist 
approach, in particular Mulvey’s consideration of spectacle in her essay 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”.  As will be discussed below some 
classical film theorists did consider the nature of the cinematic image and, 
whilst never fully wrestling with the concept of spectacle that would follow 
from such considerations, they did acknowledge the visceral, emotional 
impact of the cinematic image outside its function as simply a communicator 
of the narrative. Eisenstein contemplated the development of a sensual 
cinema based upon the generation of an emotional effect upon the spectator, 
as will be discussed further in Chapter Three, so it would be apt to describe 
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this new approach to the cinematic image as the “sensual image” (Eisenstein, 
1988 cited in Frampton, 2006, p.199).
1.3.1 The classical film theorists - formalism
The first sustained work of film theory was The Photoplay: A Psychological 
Study, by Hugo Munsterberg, published in 1916. In this book, Munsterberg 
aimed to establish the distinctiveness of film as a separate art form and in 
particular to disassociate it from the stage play. Essentially, Munsterberg 
offered a legitimation of and apology for film and a plea for it to be taken 
seriously at a time when many thought it crude and limited, based upon an 
application of the neo-Kantian aesthetics that Munsterberg had been 
practising for many years. Munsterberg argues that the spectator reacts to the 
powerful emotional stimulus of the film’s images. A work of art (such as a 
film) was therefore not primarily mimetic but rather a creation which 
instigates an aesthetic experience (2002, pp.21 and 138). Film moves beyond 
mimesis and the attempt to present reality and becomes a work of art in itself. 
As such, Munsterberg anticipates the need to consider the spectator’s 
emotional response to the cinematic image, a crucial element of the cinematic 
experience via the sensual image which structuralism and Neoformalism 
appeared to overlook or discount (Andrew, 1976, pp.14 to 26).
The notion that film as an art form should therefore necessarily be limited in 
its attempts to represent reality (by not, for example, embracing the use of 
sound or colour) was followed by Rudolf Arnheim in his book Film as Art
(1958). Whereas Munsterberg and Balazs after him were primarily concerned 
with differentiating film from theatre, Arnheim aimed to distinguish it from 
mechanical reproduction in general (1958, pp.17 to 18). Arnheim defended 
film against the criticism that it was nothing more than the feeble 
reproduction of real life by asserting that the deficiencies in the film process 
such as lack of sound or colour or its two-dimensional aspect were in fact the 
very things that identified it as a legitimate art form in itself and that these so-
called deficiencies should be used to create a new art form, the seventh art. 
Film should resist the temptation to move towards an ever-more realistic 
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representation of reality (the “fallacy of the complete film” as he called it 
(1958, pp. 129 to 134)) and instead seek to attain the status of true art by 
manipulating that reality through the devices available to film such as 
lighting, editing and motion effects.    
What is notable about these theories is that they are not addressing issues of 
narrative or spectacle but instead concentrate upon the place that film as a 
whole occupies in the pantheon of the arts, whether it can be called an art 
form at all and whether it should resist the inevitable tendency towards an 
ever-more realistic representation of reality. It is interesting to note, in this 
context, that for Arnheim, sound destroyed much of film’s artistic potential 
by taking another step towards realism and by forcing every element of the 
film to serve plot and dialogue at the expense of everything else, an 
imbalance which only highlighted film’s inadequate depiction of reality and 
moved it away from the well-developed art form that the silent pictures of the 
1920s had become (1958, pp.187 to 189). Clearly, the films of the 1920s had 
sophisticated narrative strands, communicated not through speech but visually 
through action, intertitles and aurally via the accompanying music. Arnheim 
considered that the balance reached in these films between their various 
elements was upset by privileging one element over all of the others. 
Eisenstein in his theoretical writing suggested that the primary vehicle for 
transcending reality by manipulating the materials available to the filmmaker 
was montage, the editing together of shots and sequences for a particular 
effect (Eisenstein, 1949a). Whereas Pudovkin, for example, used this 
technique to create a largely realistic effect, Eisenstein saw it as a way of 
producing a kind of collision or shock, intended to produce an effect on the 
spectator. The conflict produced by successive shots could manifest itself in 
any number of ways via movement, lighting, emotional content, rhythm and 
so on. Eisenstein referred to this as a “montage of attractions”, an attraction 
being a demonstrable fact that exercises a definite effect on the attention and 
emotions of the audience and that, combined with others, acts to direct the 
audience’s attention in the direction desired by the filmmakers. As such, 
Eisenstein was aiming to produce a film which had a visceral, measurable 
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impact on the spectator through the use of the sensual image (Tredell, 2002, 
p.46; Bordwell, 1985, pp.116 to 123). Eisenstein’s attraction was, as 
Bukatman puts it: “an attention-grabber, something that could not be 
naturalized through the terms of a psychologized narrative” and as such this 
returned the spectator to the role an observer of an event, almost a witness. As 
Bukatman notes: “This is after all, the definition of spectacle itself: an 
impressive, unusual, or disturbing phenomenon or event that is seen or 
witnessed” (2006, p.81). Consequently, although not addressed in terms as 
such, Eisenstein’s attractions contemplated the presence of spectacle arising 
out of the use of the sensual image, operating within the cinematic framework 
together with narrative to produce an emotional effect upon the spectator.      
Eisenstein believed that the spectator passed through a three-stage process 
when watching a film. Perception of an event triggers some motor activity, 
which in turn gives rise to an emotion and the emotion then launches a 
process of thought. Thus, the act of watching a film gives rise to a particular 
train of thought and an emotional response, a process which the director could 
shape. Eisenstein then went further and suggested that cognition would give 
rise to expressive movement: a primitive motor activity can form the basis of 
more refined effects. Movement can help with or form part of the 
visualisation process. In its fullest manifestation, as Bordwell observes, 
cognition becomes kinaesthetic (2005, p.125). Given the essentially mimetic 
nature of Eisenstein’s approach to film, which relied upon the presentation of 
narrative via largely visual effects, it is evident that an element of the 
spectator’s response to the sensual image is revealed by this kinaesthetic 
reaction to visual stimulus, an effect exploited by Eisenstein and many 
filmmakers since.
This manipulation of the kinaesthetic response represents the recognition of 
the presence of the sensual image and its use in cinema.  In particular it is an 
acknowledgement of the physical impact of the image and its use for 
purposes other than the purely narrational. As mentioned above, the narrative 
element in film as constructed by Eisenstein resided largely in the master 
narrative revealed by the director’s control of his materials, shaping these for 
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artistic effect, rather than a well-developed narrative strand within the 
diegesis of the film itself. Like Arnheim, Eisenstein took for granted the 
notion that his film had a plot that style would articulate (Bordwell, 2005, 
p.190). As Bordwell points out, whereas the narrative montage employed by 
others via analytical editing or cross cutting would yield a depictive effect, 
Eisenstein’s imagistic montage is kinetic and expressive, tending to 
generalize the narrative (2005, p.179) and that for Eisenstein montage did not 
necessarily have to be linked to the story, but was there for expressive effect 
(2005, p.123). 
1.3.2 The classical film theorists - realism    
Notwithstanding the development of the cogent formalist theories of the 
cinematic image outlined above, film has arguably always been seen as 
tending towards the depiction of the real world, hence towards realism and 
away from the manipulation of the raw material of realism into a distinct art 
form. Whilst there is no doubt that the dominant theoretical trend during the 
first decades of the twentieth century was formalism, there remained a 
counter-current representing the photographic or realist tradition. As early as 
1913 films were advertising themselves as showing “life as it is” (Andrew, 
1976, p.103). Early filmmakers such as Vigo and Vertov, for example, were 
keen to establish their realist credentials. Whilst much of the call for realism 
from such quarters was based upon a political agenda which saw fictional 
cinema as the new opiate of the masses, the theoretical developments in this 
area came from a different direction, lead primarily by Andre Bazin.
As will be discussed below, Bazin’s emphasis on the importance of the long 
take and the increased ambiguity or “mystery” of the cinematic image which 
results is important in the context of spectacle in that is acknowledges the 
existence of aspects of the cinematic image that are not strictly focussed on 
the narrative. Having taken this step, however, Bazin does not go on to 
consider what else might be contained within in the cinematic image apart 
from the narrative itself. Bazin acknowledges the existence of the concept of 
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spectacle but does not go on to examine that concept in any detail or to 
consider how it might fit into his realist aesthetic.
Bazin’s approach to the relationship between the object being photographed 
and its cinematic image should be set in the context of the theory developed 
by the philosopher CS Peirce in relation to signs, a theory which is important 
not only in the context of the realist aesthetic discussed below but also, 
through Peirce’s development of what he called “semiotics”, an important 
element together with Saussure’s “semiology” that contributed to the shift 
towards the study of film upon a linguistic basis in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Peirce defined a sign as something that stands for something else, and 
proposed three kinds of relation that may exist between a sign and the object 
it represents: iconic, indexical and symbolic. An iconic relationship exists 
where the sign looks like its object (such as the wiring diagram for a 
household plug). An indexical relationship refers to a sign that has a causal 
relationship to its object (such as smoke being the sign of a fire). A symbol 
denotes a sign that has a purely arbitrary relationship with its object. 
Language is an example of a symbolic relationship: the word “tree”, for 
example, has no natural connection to the object growing in my garden 
(Short, 2007, pp.207 to 234). As Peirce observed, a photograph has both an 
indexical and an iconic relationship to its object since it both resembles its 
object and it was caused or created by its object via a mechanical and 
chemical process involving light rays reflected from the object striking light-
sensitive film (Cited in Easthope, 1993, p.1).  Consequently, since film bears 
an obvious relationship to still photography (though this relationship is being 
eroded steadily by the use of Computer Generated Imagery, which requires 
no original object to exist in order to reproduce it on the screen) it can be 
argued that film too bears both an indexical and iconic relation to reality.
Bazin relied upon the camera’s apparently inextricable link to intrinsic 
realism, its indexical and iconic status, as the cornerstone of his work. The 
mechanical means of photographic reproduction assured the essential 
objectivity of film and for the first time, as Bazin suggested, “an image of the 
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world is framed automatically, without the creative intervention of man” 
(1967a, p.13). Since the photochemical process entails a concrete link 
between what Stam describes as the “photographic analogon and its referent” 
the resulting indexicality of photography was presumed to show 
unquestionably things as they actually are (2000, p.74).  
Bazin approaches the quest for realism on a mythical basis. Realism was the 
realisation of what he called “the myth of total cinema” (the opposite in many 
ways of Arnheim’s “fallacy of the complete film”). In “The Myth of Total 
Cinema”, an essay written in 1946, he suggested that this was a guiding myth 
which inspired the invention of the cinema, an invention which itself was the 
culmination of the search in the nineteenth century for “an integral realism, a 
recreation of the world in its own image, an image unburdened by the 
freedom of interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time” (1967b, 
p.21). 
Bazin is not, however, a naïve realist: he was not suggesting that cinema 
should only film what was actually present in a documentary fashion. He was 
well aware, for example, that the Italian neorealist films were every bit as 
carefully constructed as any other film (Bazin, 1971). He was, rather, seeking 
a realist aesthetic based upon a more subtle formulation which related not to 
the presentation of reality, but its re-presentation on the screen in such a way 
that the spectator could view the image in the same way that he or she could 
view reality; that is, by making a choice about what to treat as important or 
significant. The introduction of deep focus photography, long takes and 
multiplanar activity within the shot as pioneered by Renoir and Welles was 
important for Bazin because it allowed the spectator an uninterrupted gaze 
over a continuous space rather than fragmenting that gaze through editing. 
Importantly, composition of deep focus sequences allowed the spectator to 
watch activity on several planes within the shot and to choose which one to 
concentrate upon (Bazin, 1967d, p.92; Bazin 1971, p.28; Andrew 1976, 
p.147). 
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Bazin’s objection to narrative editing was that it presupposed that a piece of 
reality or an event has only one sense at any given moment and that by 
specifying the meaning of the raw material editing conflicts with our usual 
ambiguous relationship with reality. He maintained that there exists a deeper 
psychological relationship with reality which must be preserved in realistic 
cinema, namely the spectator’s freedom to choose his or her own 
interpretation of events (1967c, p.36). The idea of the ambiguity of reality is 
central to Bazin’s aesthetic and in fact Andrew suggests that this is almost a 
moral argument: the spectator should be forced to wrestle with the meanings 
of a filmed event because he or she should wrestle with the meanings of 
events in empirical reality (1976, p.163). 
Bazin’s consideration of narrative is primarily focused on how in technical 
terms that narrative is expressed to the spectator, whether this be through the 
unrealistic medium of montage and the invisible editing practiced by 
Hollywood in the 1930s, both of which sought to impose a meaning on the 
information being presented to the viewer, or via the more realistic approach 
adopted by directors such as Welles, Wyler and Renoir, who used long takes 
and deep focus to allow the spectator’s gaze to move over what Bazin called 
the undifferentiated homogeneity of space (Andrew, 1976, p.157; Bazin 
1967c, pp. 27 and 28).  Bazin suggests that montage was the language of the 
silent cinema, being the manipulation of images to provide a narrative. He 
does not consider the image as an element of the cinematic experience in 
itself free of its narrative content (1967c, pp. 24 to 26). Interestingly, Bazin 
mentions spectacle in the context of a discussion of filmed theatre as being 
something entirely separate from the narrative, but does not seek to define 
what that distinction might be (1967d, p.82). 
Bazin’s realist aesthetic is therefore in fact primarily an approach to the 
presentation and structuring of narrative in films through an examination of 
the way in which the image is presented in that there is no explicit 
differentiation between the narrative content in any given sequence and 
anything else that might also be happening in that sequence at the same time. 
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There was no need to consider directly the implications of spectacle. 
Implicitly, the realist aesthetic concerned itself solely with narrative:
We would define as ‘realist’ then, all narrative means tending to bring 
an added measure of reality to the screen (emphasis added) (1971, 
p.27).
Consequently anything (undefined) which was not concerned with the 
advancement of the narrative was implicitly non-narrative and does not 
therefore contribute to the realist aesthetic.
Indirectly, however, the issue does raise its head. It can be suggested that the 
shift from an approach to film which relies on some form of editing practice 
and fairly narrow fields of focus to a style which allows for long takes and 
deep focus in fact represents a significant extension of the visual information 
potentially available to the spectator. In constructing a narrative montage, for 
example, the spectator is being guided by the director to draw particular 
conclusions. Presented, however, with a long take and deep focus sequence, 
the spectator has more choice about what to watch. Of course, the director 
will in any event seek to ensure that there is sufficient information on the 
screen or the soundtrack to enable the spectator to follow the narrative, but 
there is an increased ambiguity or “mystery” to the image because that image 
is more realistic in the Bazinian sense (1967c, pp. 37 and 38). Bazin therefore 
acknowledges that his realist aesthetic allows for the intrusion of aspects of 
the image that are not strictly focussed on the communication of the narrative, 
but does not follow this through to its conclusion: that the ambiguity or 
mystery inherent in the image will allow for multiple meanings not all of 
which will be strictly narrative-driven. Whilst, as discussed above, Bazin 
acknowledges that the narrative is there to be wrestled from the image, he 
does not go on to consider what else might be there as well, lurking in the 
mystery that his realist aesthetic reveals.    
Whereas Bordwell sees all elements of a film (other than those which he 
classes as residual or excess) as being focused upon the narrative drive, 
Bazin’s requirement that the spectator wrestle with the meaning of events 
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admits of the possibility that a significant element of the information 
transmitted to the spectator by the film will not be directly concerned with the 
narrative. Not only does this not undermine or lessen the film, and not only is 
it not excess or residual material, it is in fact central to the realist aesthetic 
because it presents (or represents) the experience of life as it actually is rather 
than the neatly organized process envisaged by Neoformalism. 
To summarise therefore at this stage, Munsterberg recognised the emotional 
impact that the cinematic image might have and the transformative effect of 
the image from a mimetic process to a work of art, but he did not see the need 
to differentiate between the narrative content of any such image and its other 
elements, possibly because at the time he was writing cinema was in the 
process of the narrativisation that will be discussed further in the following 
chapter and the industrialised Hollywood studio system was yet to emerge 
fully. Eisenstein’s multifarious writings reveal a belief in the power of the 
sensual image and that the narrative would emerge as part of the creative 
master narrative exerted by the director over his materials. As a result, whilst 
Eisenstein again acknowledges the emotional power of the image and the 
possibility that the cinematic experience need not be narrative-centred, he 
does not dwell upon the nature and purpose of spectacle as an element of the 
cinematic experience distinct from any other. 
In contrast, as discussed above Bazin refers in passing to spectacle, which he 
sees as lurking outside the narrative fold, and is prepared to admit that a 
consequence of his realist aesthetic is the freeing of multiple meanings in the 
image, at least some of which may not be concerned with narrative. He does 
not however follow this train of thought through to its conclusion and 
consider what those other elements might be and how they would function 
alongside the narrative content of the image.
1.3.3 The structuralist approach  
The possibilities offered by the mysterious image conjured by the Bazinian 
realist aesthetic were not developed but instead, following a significant shift 
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in direction in film theory in the 1960s, they were overtaken by the study of 
cinema as a language, propelled by Pierce’s semiotics and Saussure’s 
semiology, a trend which was to occupy a central place in film theory 
throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s (Bukatman, 2006, pp. 72 and 73). 
This led to a concentration on narrative theory and the film as text and 
therefore away from any non-narrative aspect of the cinematic experience 
(Easthope, 1993, p.1). Although the study of narrative was a central part of 
the new structuralist approach and the subject of considerable study from 
Metz on, there seems little attempt to set it in the context of the balance with 
spectacle or to define spectacle itself (Andrew, 1984, pp. 78 to 88). The 
structuralist approach, which sought to analyze the various codes into which 
the cinematic experience could be reduced, dwelt upon the details of the way 
that narrative was structured so as to suggest verisimilitude and other 
narrative effects but did not seek to examine the operation of spectacle as a 
concept, coded or not. This does not mean, however, that notions of spectacle 
were not present. Rather, the difficult issue of the threat that spectacle offered 
to structuralist and psychoanalytical film theory was considered by Laura 
Mulvey in her famous essay on “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”. As 
Bukatman points out, if the gender issues in Mulvey’s essay are temporarily 
ignored, what emerges is “an intriguing theory of spectacle, produced at a 
moment when film studies still operated in the shadow of narrative theory” 
(2006, p.71). In fact, “visual pleasure” in Mulvey’s essay is spectacle, and it 
is clear that spectacle causes structuralist and psychoanalytical film theories 
some difficulty.
Mulvey’s approach was to look at the apparently gendered nature of the 
spectator’s gaze in the context of “classic” Hollywood cinema. In her view 
the films of the classical period were organised around an active and central 
male presence given a position of mastery by the film. The woman 
interrupted the smooth coherence of the film’s structure by serving as the 
spectacular object of the male gaze, a gaze that the spectator was invited to 
identify with and participate in so that the implicit ideological viewpoint of 
such films was that of the male voyeur gazing at the female object of desire. 
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The presence of the woman as spectacle in this narrative context had a 
significant effect:
The presence of woman is an indispensable element of spectacle in 
normal narrative film, yet her visual presence tends to work against 
the development of a story line, to freeze the flow of action in 
moments of erotic contemplation (2004, p.841).
Here is the notion that in some way narrative is separate from spectacle and 
that narrative comes to a halt while a spectacular event occurs. Mulvey treats 
spectacle as an aberration within a primarily narrative system, but spectacle 
cannot simply be ignored or marginalised: it has to be contained. Mulvey’s 
agenda, of course, must be seen in the light of the period in which it was 
written (1975) and in the context of structuralism and the academic study of 
film that focussed almost exclusively on narrative and narrative theory. 
Mulvey’s was also a radical agenda, seeking to break entirely from the 
pleasures offered by the mainstream cinema: “It is said that analysing 
pleasure, or beauty, destroys it. That is the intention of this article” (2004, 
p.839). 
Bukatman has analysed Mulvey’s essay in the context of theories of spectacle 
and narrative. He suggests that in fact Mulvey’s approach to visual pleasure 
reflects the pervasive suspicion of excess which has haunted critiques of 
spectacle since the time of Aristotle, although as discussed above this may be 
a misreading on Bukatman’s part of Aristotle’s distinction between the epic 
poem and the staged tragedy. As Bukatman observes, Mulvey, however, goes 
further:
Spectacle, by actively disrupting narrative coherence, threatens the 
stability of the narrative system. Mulvey’s essay emphasises the way 
that narrative contains spectacle by the film’s end, re-asserting the 
status quo. One consequence of Mulvey’s emphasis on narrative 
closure is that the priority of narrative over spectacle remains an 




In Bukatman’s view this leads to an over-investment in the power of 
narrative, and particularly closure: “It is possible that narrative, with its 
concomitant gesture towards closure, represents only one system competing 
for the viewer’s attention, and thus the ending may not be as deterministic as 
Mulvey would have it” (2006, p.76). In fact, Mulvey’s essay could therefore, 
in Bukatman’s view, mark the beginning of the recognition of the limits of 
narrative theory in explaining cinematic form through the presence of 
“something else that exists in cinematic form” (emphasis in original) (2006, 
p.77). That something else is spectacle. 
Mulvey sought to demonstrate the disruptive power of spectacle (at least in 
the context of a narrative-based theory of cinema) whilst at the same time 
refusing to dismiss it as extraneous because of its apparently non-narrative 
aspect. “Mulvey posited that spectacle was fundamental to the construction of 
cinematic meaning, so fundamental that within the particular system of 
Classical Hollywood Cinema, its dangerous potential needed to be tamed and 
contained” (Bukatman, 2006, p.80). In contrast Bordwell, as discussed above, 
is also aware of the potentially disruptive power of spectacle but seeks to 
contain it instead by pulling it within the definition of mimetic narration as far 
as possible and dismissing the remaining more problematic elements of 
spectacle as excess material.
Mulvey is forced to confront spectacle because she is considering issues of 
spectatorship, a topic that will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
She is forced to acknowledge the presence of spectacle, which is seen as 
disruptive because her model of spectatorship, like Bordwell’s from a very 
different perspective, is narrative-centred. As Bukatman suggests, her attempt 
to confine spectacle within the terms of narrative closure is unconvincing, not 
least because the spectator may not actually be solely interested in narrative 
closure, even in the context of the narrative progression of the classical 
Hollywood cinema that Mulvey was considering. Consequently, in its 
historical context we can place the development of Bordwell’s Neoformalism 
as a response to structuralism and psychoanalysis, returning to the narrative 
theories of the Russian Formalists and adopting a cognitive approach, both 
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elements expressly absent from the psychoanalytical and structuralist models 
then prevalent. 
In conclusion, as the review undertaken in this section shows, those 
theoretical approaches that have concerned themselves with the cinematic 
image have struggled with the idea of spectacle. Eisenstein’s concept of the 
montage of attractions and Bazin’s mysterious image hint at the presence of 
spectacle in the background, but the implications of their proposals are never 
developed into a fully-articulated definition of spectacle. This may be because 
there was simply no need to do so at the time given that the theoretical basis 
for critical thinking about film was the image itself rather than its constituent 
elements. The development of narrative theory in the wake of the rise of the 
structuralist/psychoanalytical model in the 1950s and 1960s permitted 
theorists to ignore the notion of spectacle when considering the film as text 
but also simultaneously allowed spectacle to change from being a concept 
that haunted classical film theory from a convenient distance to a far more 
obvious and threatening presence capable of destabilising the tidy narrative 
progression of classical Hollywood cinema. As such, Mulvey sought to 
contain the disruptive notion of visual pleasure, but with limited success. The 
attempt in itself highlights the limitations of the narrative theory model upon 
which it is based. Spectacle is either the ghostly presence haunting film 
theory, distant but always there, or the Other of narrative-based theoretical 
paradigms, conjured into a more tangible and threatening existence by virtue 
of the fact that it is somehow seen as opposed to narrative. 
1.4 Research questions and methods
On the basis of the review undertaken above, there is clearly a gap in existing 
film theory in relation to the understanding of the nature and function of 
spectacle and an appreciation of the fundamental role that it plays in the 
cinematic experience. In order to address this gap, it will first be necessary to 
acknowledge the existence of the sensual image, a more fully-developed 
concept of the cinematic image which recognises its emotional and 
physiological impact. Secondly, a definition of spectacle must be formulated 
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which can then be applied to the cinematic experience to begin the process of 
outlining an aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema. The absence of any 
sustained attempt to define spectacle in the past may be explained by the 
widely-held view that it is a difficult concept to pin down and indeed has 
proven to be “notoriously resistant to analysis” (Neale, 2003, p.54). 
Spectacle has been considered in the contexts of the propaganda and the 
historical film by Neale and Brown respectively (Neale, 1979; Brown, 2008).  
In addition, Brown has noted a number of pithy but ultimately limited 
definitions of the term, many of them derived from Mulvey’s phrase “to-be-
looked-at-ness” and emphasising the element of display inherent in spectacle 
(2008, p. 158).  Neale has suggested that a workable definition is 
“presentational prowess” (Neale, 2003, p.54). This is an interesting approach 
to defining spectacle in terms of its impact on the cinematic image, but its 
very pithiness leaves a number of questions unanswered in relation to the 
characteristics and function of spectacle. Given its importance to the 
cinematic experience, an importance which will be demonstrated in this 
thesis, spectacle deserves a fully-considered definition.
The aim of this thesis is therefore to answer the following fundamental 
questions:
 How can spectacle in mainstream cinema be defined rigorously?  
 How does spectacle operate in and contribute to the cinematic 
experience such that it is possible to sketch an outline of the 
aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema? 
In answering these two fundamental questions, a number of subsidiary issues 
arise:
 Is it possible to construct a model of spectatorship which will 
accommodate the presence of both spectacle and narrative?
 To what extent can existing cognitive theories accommodate the 
presence of spectacle and is it necessary to go beyond these theories 
in order to do so?
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 What is the relationship between spectacle and technology, using 
technological developments as a way of historicising spectacle, and 
what does this relationship tell us about spectacle and about the use of 
technology in mainstream cinema?
 What is the relationship between spectacle and mise-en-scene and 
how can we characterise spectacle in the context of the manipulation 
of the cinematic image that mise-en-scene represents? 
In answering these questions this thesis aims to change our understanding of 
the cinematic experience arising out of an appreciation of the central role that 
spectacle plays in film.
  
The methodology used to undertake this exercise will be to establish a 
theoretical contextualisation of spectacle and an historical model which 
supplies the specific conditions giving rise to spectacle and to review these 
consecutively, showing how one interacts with the other. As explained in 
more detail in the Introduction, the historical review undertaken in Chapter 
Two will therefore be framed against the theoretical approach established in 
Chapter One. This will be followed in Chapter Three by a consideration of 
the cognitive basis of current narrative-driven film theory and whether this is 
adequate to cater for the revised concept of spectacle now being proposed. 
This exercise will draw out not only the essential characteristics of spectacle 
but also the nature of the interaction of spectacle with the spectator, 
emphasising the emotional engagement and response which spectacle seeks to 
elicit. Chapters Four and Five will then apply this revised definition of 
spectacle to certain elements of the cinematic experience, being technology 
and mise-en-scene, to develop the beginnings of an aesthetics of spectacle in 
the mainstream cinema. 
It is, however, first necessary to consider the fundamental basis upon which 
this investigation will be undertaken. The very language of critical writing in 
this area is imbricated with the historical concepts of narrative and spectacle, 
which themselves imply judgements about what these concepts mean and 
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their relationship to each other, the most fundamental assumption being that 
they are somehow separate. The basic methodological approach to adopt must 
be to start afresh with a new model which is free of these preconceptions and 
which can accommodate the co-existence of spectacle and narrative rather 
than the antagonistic relationship which is implied in existing narrative-
centred models. The preliminary exercise which I have undertaken prior to 
commencing the investigations described in Chapters Two and Three is 
therefore to consider how such a model might be constructed. 
As indicated above, existing discussions of narrative and spectacle take place 
in the context of terminology that implies a number of assumptions about 
these concepts: first that they are capable of being seen as distinct concepts in 
their own right; secondly that they are therefore only capable of operating in 
isolation to each other and, thirdly, that they are in fact in some way the 
opposite of each other. The concentration upon narrative as, at least in theory, 
a concept capable of systematic and orderly categorisation and understanding 
conjures up the opposite in the case of spectacle: a messy, unquantifiable 
element that does not fit within the narrative-centred paradigm with its 
concomitant suggestion that the narrative acts to unify the spectator’s 
understanding of the film. As Bukatman suggests above, this presupposes that 
film is or should be subject to a neat narrational closure. This is not always 
the case and arguably it does not necessarily reflect what the spectator might 
actually want from a trip to the cinema. 
The other element missing from narrative theory, and from Neoformalism, is 
the equally messy concept of emotion. As discussed above, early theorists 
such as Munsterberg and Eisenstein had no problem with the idea of the 
sensual image: that the image itself generated an emotional response. Given, 
however, that a characteristic of narrative theory is its dispassionate approach, 
emotion is shunted off with spectacle and often identified is being a 
characteristic element of spectacle itself (which is quite correct).
Consequently, in order to construct a model capable of allowing narrative and 
spectacle to co-exist it is necessary to ask a fundamental question about the 
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cinematic experience: what happens when a spectator goes to the cinema and 
watches a film? In short, I suggest, the film transmits information to the 
spectator. Prior to categorising the nature of this information, it is necessary 
to recognise that, at the most fundamental level, this is what happens when a 
spectator goes to the cinema.  I have called this model of the cinematic 
experience the transmission model. 
     
To a certain extent, the transmission model proposed here is a more simplistic 
version of an earlier concept developed within the field of mass 
communication. Although I am not taking the transmission model used in this 
thesis from mass communication theory, it is nevertheless useful to 
understand how the transmission model of mass communication theory 
operates since this throws further light on the characteristics of the model 
proposed here. 
In the field of mass communication theory the transmission model was an 
early and dominant paradigm. Early descriptions of the media receiver 
conceived a passive spectator, possibly because the opportunity to participate 
in the communication process prior to the advent of the internet and 
interactive computer games was relatively small or entirely absent other than 
in the form of feedback (Westley and Maclean, 1957). The receiver of the 
communication was seen as part of a large aggregate audience but with little 
or no contact with fellow members of the audience and little direct knowledge 
of who they were. The early dominant paradigm known as the transmission 
model developed against this background out of information theory, 
concerned with the technical efficiency of communication channels for 
carrying information (McQuail, 2005, p.69).  Research carried out in this field 
by Shannon and Weaver posited a model for analyzing information 
transmission which saw communication as a process beginning with a source 
which selects a message, which message is then transmitted in the form of a 
signal over a communication channel to a receiver, who transforms the signal 
back into a message for a destination (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). This 
model was not in fact directly concerned with mass communication but was 
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popularized as a versatile model for articulating many communication 
processes.
Subsequent research, particularly by Westley and MacLean, developed and 
refined this initial model so that its linearity was questioned. It was 
recognized that the model in fact often required the interpolation of a 
“communicator” between “society” and “audience” and that this 
communicator relayed information rather than creating the information itself. 
The model was more self-regulating and interactive than at first appeared to 
be the case.  Westley and MacLean’s model therefore had three important 
features: first, mass communicators select the information they relay to the 
audience rather than just passing it on in an undifferentiated fashion; 
secondly, this selection is made according to an assessment of what the 
audience will find interesting, and thirdly that the communication is not 
purposive beyond the goal of making it interesting to the audience: the media 
does not typically aim to persuade, educate or even inform. This model 
recognises that the feedback from the audience (whether direct feedback from 
a questionnaire or such as can be derived from subsequent viewing figures, 
for example) is therefore important in shaping the subsequent selection of 
information made by the communicators. 
This model was further questioned by the theories of Stuart Hall, who 
developed a reception model of communication via a process known as 
encoding and decoding (Hall, 1980, pp.128 to 138). Hall portrays a media 
text (originally a television programme) as a meaningful discourse which is 
encoded according to the meaning structure of the mass media production 
organization and its main supports but then decoded according to the different 
meaning structures and frameworks of knowledge of differently situated 
audiences. This encoding often takes place through the use of established 
genres such as “news”, “detective stories” or “sports reports”. In addition to 
Hall’s work, other models of mass communication arose to challenge the 
dominance of the transmission paradigm. 
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Clearly, Westley and MacLean’s model shares some similarities with the 
process of making and showing a film, particularly as regards the recognition 
that the information transmitted is selected by the filmmakers (in the present 
case) largely on the basis of what the feedback shows the audience wants. 
This is a fairly accurate summation of the process involved in planning an 
average big-budget Hollywood blockbuster. It may well be the case also that 
the intention behind this communication is not to persuade, educate or inform, 
but it is clearly intended to entertain. As such this is a limitation on the 
transmission model, recognised by McQuail, who suggests that the 
transmission model is largely now equated with older institutional contexts 
such as education, government or propaganda (2005, p.74). This is on the 
basis that the receiver of the communication essentially enters into a cognitive 
process when receiving the information which does not necessarily involve 
any emotional response on the part of the receiver. From that perspective a 
more helpful paradigm would be the ritual or expressive model suggested by 
Carey (1975) which emphasises the intrinsic satisfaction of the receiver (and 
sender) as its goal (McQuail, 2005, p.70). 
Seen in such terms, neither the transmission nor the ritual/expressive model is 
entirely appropriate and indeed McQuail recognises that it is not in reality 
possible simply to pick one model to the exclusion of others (2005, p.75). In 
summary, however, as the review above shows, there is a precedent of 
establishing the transmission model as the basis for the enquiry to be 
undertaken in this thesis. In fact, the adoption of such a model for the 
purposes of analyzing the spectator’s experience when watching a film is not 
new: it was used by Barthes in developing his theory of structural 
narratology.  In an essay entitled “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Narratives”, published in 1966, Barthes considers narrative as a transmission 
from sender to receiver (Barthes, 1977a). This resulted in a change from a 
static, tabular approach to a more flexible concept emphasizing the process of 
linguistic activity. It is also interesting to note the use of a paradigm mass 
communication model in this context, although not acknowledged expressly 
by Barthes as such. There is perhaps a certain poetic symmetry to utilising the 
59
same basic transmission paradigm that Barthes used for his theory of 
narratology to help in defining spectacle.
At their most basic, therefore, films transmit information to the spectator. 
Seen as a process, this can be characterized as “transmission”. The 
information transmitted constitutes the entirety of the film.  This information 
is of course subject to and adjusted through the spectator’s cognitive 
processes, as recognized by Hall and others, so that it may not be perceived 
entirely as the filmmakers intended. The information may be directly relevant 
to the plot or it may be incidental to it (a particularly interesting wallpaper 
pattern in a living room, for example, which has no bearing on the rest of the 
film at all) or it may derive from entirely extra-diegetic considerations on the 
spectator’s part (such as the fact that the two lead actors have just commenced 
an affair in real life which mirrors their relationship on the screen). 
Information can of course be visual or aural.
For the purposes of this thesis, the transmission of information which takes 
place can broadly be divided into two categories: narrational transmission and 
non-narrational transmission. This division and terminology is chosen in 
recognition of the fact that mainstream cinema is seen as essentially a 
narrative medium, though it is by no means certain that narrative is always 
the primary purpose. Narrational transmission is that element of transmission 
which is aimed solely at providing the spectator with information about the 
plot or story, directing the spectator’s attention to the elements of the film that 
advance the narration. Non-narrational transmission is everything else: the 
sum total of the rest of the information transmitted, whether intentionally or 
otherwise, to the spectator.  
Mainstream cinema, by virtue of its apparent narrative emphasis, tends to 
favour narrational transmission but given that the process of transmission 
continues throughout the film (indeed it is the film) narrational and non-
narrational transmission are happening simultaneously all the time.  
Consequently, we should not attempt to identify whether any particular 
sequence is narrational or non-narrational transmission but recognize instead 
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that in any given sequence there will be a balance between the two. It is a 
question of recognizing where this balance lies at any given point in the film. 
It would be fair to say at this stage that, very broadly, spectacle represents a 
balance that favours non-narrational over narrational transmission and 
narrative will lie somewhere towards the other end of the spectrum.
Within this model, narrative and spectacle are not, therefore, distinct concepts 
which identify particular sequences in isolation to others: they are terms used 
to describe particular balances between narrational and non-narrational 
transmission. This is a helpful approach because it emphasizes that it is 
misleading to suggest that a narrative sequence contains no spectacular 
elements and vice versa. Spectacle is not something which lies outside or 
interferes with the narrative drive and a narrative sequence will contain many 
elements which contribute towards the spectator’s enjoyment of the film but 
which are unrelated to the narrative itself. Furthermore, this approach seeks to 
put narrative and spectacle on an equal footing and to contradict the notion 
that narrative is somehow superior to spectacle, a notion that is in any event 
belied by the consumerist account of mainstream cinema (Maltby, 1995, 
pp.323 and 324). Finally, of course, this approach emphasises that far from 
being in some way the opposite of narrative, spectacle is part of the same 
process as narrative.  They have been seen as opposites because the bundling 
of certain characteristics into narrative has implied the concentration of other 
characteristics into spectacle. 
The adoption of the concept of transmission also resolves the problem posed 
by excess as discussed above. A consideration of the historical and 
ideological bases of spectacle and excess emphasises their differences but, as 
is apparent from the review undertaken above, they are treated in a very 
similar fashion in the Neoformalist model. It is also clear that they both 
remain problematic and resistant to precise definition. This difficulty arises, 
however, as long as the Neoformalist approach is maintained, since that 
inevitably gives rise to problems with concepts that escape the unifying force 
of the narration. If the transmission model is adopted these difficulties 
disappear. Spectacle should properly been seen as a shifting point in the 
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balance between narrational and non-narrational transmission and excess can 
be seen in the same way. It is only excess material if it is seen in the context 
of a restrictive framework which classifies elements of the cinematic 
experience strictly within certain boundaries rather than advocating the more 
fluid, inclusive approach suggested by the transmission model. When seen in 
that light, excess ceases to be a rhetorical flourish executed only in art-house 
movies. In fact the concept of excess disappears altogether since it cannot be 
excess to anything in particular. Instead the material previously characterised 
as excessive joins spectacle as one of the resources available to a film to 
communicate with the spectator. 
It is not of course possible to say precisely on a scale of one to ten where the 
balance between narrational and non-narrational transmission will result in a 
narrative sequence or a spectacular sequence and indeed this is to miss the 
point. The process envisaged by the transmission model proposed here is a far 
more dynamic and flexible exchange between the elements that comprise 
transmission. The purpose of this reformulation has been to move away from 
previously fixed concepts and to recognize this greater flexibility. The 
transmission model therefore offers a methodology to start the enquiry 
proposed in this Chapter without adopting existing preconceptions about what 
narrative and spectacle mean. It will be convenient shorthand to use these 
terms, but these terms can now be applied on the understanding that they do 
not imply the historical distinctions usually implicit in their more traditional 
usage.
The establishment of the transmission model is the first of two preliminary 
steps that need to be undertaken to allow the formulation of a workable 
definition of spectacle in mainstream cinema. The second step that needs to 
be taken to clear the ground for the exercise proposed in this thesis is to 
consider how film theory moved out of the impasse reached after 
Neoformalism. Caught between the psychoanalytical gaze and the clinical 
processes of Neoformalism, what was required was a fresh approach that 
appreciated not only the narrative elements in the cinematic experience but 
also the affective elements which had long been associated with spectacle but 
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which narrative theory had overlooked. The way forward for film theory and 
the consequent implications for the development of a model of spectatorship 
that accommodates the transmission model and the presence of spectacle as 
well as narrative will be examined in Chapter Two.
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Chapter Two 
The act of looking;
Spectacle and spectatorship
2.1 Introduction
The review of film theory undertaken in Chapter One arrived at the 
conclusion that in order to account properly for the presence of spectacle in 
film, and to attempt a definition of that term it is first necessary to 
acknowledge the presence of the sensual image as an important element of 
the cinematic experience and to abandon the notion that there are such things 
as spectacle and narrative elements of a film which exist in isolation to each 
other. Instead we need to see these terms as part of a larger process, called 
“transmission” for our purposes, which accounts for the sum total of all the 
information transmitted by a film to the spectator. Transmission can be sub-
divided into narrational and non-narrational transmission, emphasising that 
these processes are occurring simultaneously throughout the film and are 
intimately linked to each other. The transmission model, however, cannot 
exist in isolation as an adequate explanation of the concept of spectacle. It is 
also necessary to set this formulation in its context by proposing a model of 
spectatorship which accounts for the presence of spectacle. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to propose a model of spectatorship 
for mainstream cinema that accommodates the presence of spectacle. This 
model will cater for the direct, emotional and visceral response which 
spectacle generates in the spectator, emphasising the embodied, active 
experience which occurs when spectacle is included within the spectatorial 
model. The starting point in this exercise is to define spectatorship in more 
detail so as to understand its purpose and function. This will inform a review 
of competing models of spectatorship relevant to the issue of spectacle in its 
historical and social context. 
The act of looking which is central to spectatorship embraces not just the 
conditions in which the spectator watches a film in the cinema but also the 
64
wider historical, social and cultural conditions in which that act of looking 
takes place. As Mayne suggests:
Spectatorship is not only the act of watching a film, but also the ways 
one takes pleasure in the experience, or not; the means by which 
watching movies becomes a passion, or a leisure time activity like any 
other. Spectatorship refers to how film going and the consumption of 
movies and their myths are symbolic activities, culturally significant 
events (1993, p.1).
Whilst spectatorship encompasses the act of looking not only in the cinema 
itself, but also outside the cinema before and after the film occurs, it is also 
specific to each film since it will depend upon what the spectator takes or 
wants from the film they are watching (Mayne, 1993, pp.2 and 3). As Mayne 
suggests, when drawing a distinction between what she calls “critical” 
spectatorship and one based on a purely non-critical enjoyment of the 
experience: “One kind of spectatorship makes me think and reflect, while the 
other makes me act out and forget” (1993, p. 3).
It is interesting to note here that the example given by Mayne of the second, 
non-critical kind of spectatorship which she is considering is the films of 
Arnold Schwarzennegger, the archetypal action movies of the 1980s and 
1990s. Mayne’s reference to “acting out” and “forgetting” when watching 
these films perhaps reveals something of the direct physical and emotional 
response to such films which is typical of the spectator’s response to 
spectacle and which may be less prevalent when watching films that invite a 
more cerebral or critical response.
This response also emphasises the importance of the way that spectators 
imagine themselves as much as the way in which films construct themselves 
(Mayne, 1993, p.32). Thus the act of looking is not one way: the spectator 
engages in a relationship with the film which involves not just the observation 
by the spectator of the diegetic world created by the film, but the direct 
communication by the film to the spectator. The spectator’s willing 
involvement and investment in the experience offered by the film is central to 
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the act of looking and, as will be discussed below, this is primarily an 
emotional experience.   
Having considered the definition of spectatorship, this chapter then examines 
the model of spectatorship which existed when cinema was in a form in 
which it is clear that the narrative drive was not predominant. This is 
generally regarded to be the era of early cinema from approximately 1895 to 
1907. Examining this era in more detail establishes the social and cultural 
context which gave rise to a particular form of spectatorship in which early 
cinema developed. This will facilitate an understanding of a model of 
spectatorship which takes non-narrational transmission into account. The next 
step will then be to consider the corporealised or embodied spectator, a 
concept which is central to the construction of this model of spectatorship. 
This exercise will require a review of apparatus theory, a model of 
spectatorship which exerted considerable influence in the 1970s when it was 
first proposed and which still represents a significant contribution to the study 
of spectatorship. The apparatus model will then be compared to the 
development of the embodied spectator proposed by Crary. The embodied 
spectator is actively involved in a direct and physical way in the viewing 
experience which runs contrary to previously-held theories regarding the 
detached, disembodied observer of classical Renaissance art. Whilst this 
theory was originally proposed in the context of the changes that took place in 
relation to the arts generally during the nineteenth century, it is equally 
applicable to the birth of cinema as a manifestation of the advent of 
modernism at the end of the nineteenth century. The principle of the 
embodied spectator also forms the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological approach, which will also be considered in the context of 
its contribution to this issue. 
The model of spectatorship proposed in this chapter also needs to be 
developed through a consideration of early cinema itself, the stage in the 
history of cinema when the narrative drive was less prominent than it 
subsequently became in the era of classical Hollywood cinema. This chapter 
will review the manner in which early films dealt with the treatment of 
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spectacle and narrative to show how the social and cultural contexts already 
established fed into the model of spectatorship now proposed which caters for 
the presence of spectacle. In this context Tom Gunning’s formulation of the 
Cinema of Attractions offers not only a way of recognising the historical 
context of spectacle, acknowledging the effect of the sensual image in early 
cinema, but also a way to move film theory forward from the impasse it had 
reached between the clinical processes of Neoformalism and the 
psychoanalytical gaze discussed in Chapter One. Gunning’s reference to the 
act of looking as an aspect of the Cinema of Attractions is a helpful starting 
point when considering the act of looking undertaken by the spectator in the 
cinema. As this term suggests, the cinematic spectator is not a passive 
receptacle of the sounds and images that appear in front of him or her: there is 
a more complex process involved, a transmission of information by the film 
which is received and then interpreted by the spectator. 
It will be shown that the model of spectatorship established in the context of 
early cinema can be extrapolated to encompass a model sufficient to account 
fully for the presence of spectacle as well as narrative or, in our terms, the full 
spectrum of transmission. In establishing this model, the division of cinematic 
history into early, classical and late (or post-classical) is thrown into question 
given that this categorisation is based upon the premise of a narrative-driven 
cinema, a premise not supported by a consideration of the presence of 
spectacle throughout. Periodising in terms of spectacle affords a different 
perspective on the historical development of the cinema from that usually 
derived from a narrative-centred approach. A consideration of spectacle in 
this way emphasises the continuity of the concept as much as any differences 
of detail. 
What is therefore revealed by this approach is a number of fundamental 
features of spectacle that will aid in its definition allied with the periodisation 
of spectacle, the way that the detailed characteristics of spectacle alter as 
cinema develops. Crucially it is also clear that not only should spectacle and 
narrative be seen as elements of transmission in a fluctuating relationship 
with each other, but further that the presence of one actively promotes the 
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impact and effect of the other. Thus spectacle serves to amplify and increase 
the narrative impact and the narrative allows empathy and character 
identification to increase the direct, emotional impact of spectacle. 
This approach repudiates the narrative-driven classical cinema model 
proposed by Bordwell, not only in terms of the idea that there is a clearly 
definable era of narrative cinema at all but also on the basis that Bordwell is 
dealing with only one aspect of the cinematic experience whilst marginalising 
the equally important presence and function of spectacle. Narrative–centred 
models such as Neoformalism are voyeuristic in that they concentrate upon 
that element of the film which is directed at establishing the diegesis whereas 
spectacle, which is directed out towards the spectator, thus acknowledging the 
spectator’s presence, is by definition exhibitionistic. A model of spectatorship 
must therefore encompass both the voyeuristic and exhibitionistic elements of 
the spectator’s experience. 
2.2 The emergence of modern spectatorship
In this section I will demonstrate that inherent in the model of spectatorship 
which emerged concurrently with the development of cinema at the end of the 
nineteenth century is an element of mobilised physicality, a spectator 
emotionally and physically involved in and being part of the event which he 
or she is watching. This new model of spectatorship is central to an 
understanding of the part that spectacle plays in the development of the 
cinema at this time. It arose out of the cultural changes that were taking place 
at the end of the nineteenth century as well as the changes in the methods of 
perception of the spectator which had in fact been taking place since the early 
part of the nineteenth century. These changes gave rise to the concept of the 
embodied spectator, a concept that I shall examine in more detail in the next 
section.
As is well-known, early cinema developed principally in France and in 
Britain, the best-known early cinematic practitioners being the Lumiere
brothers and Georges Melies. Technological innovations such as cinema do 
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not, however, instantly create their own audience as they appear: instead the 
acceptance of a new technology depends upon a readily receptive audience. 
In other words, the prevailing social context has developed to a point where 
that new technology can be accepted. Consequently, the development of 
cinema depended upon the presence of spectators attuned to a model of 
spectatorship, or the acceptance of a particular set of viewing conditions, 
required to enable cinema to flourish. As will be discussed in further detail 
below, many theorists are of the view that the conditions which allowed early 
cinema to develop are inextricably linked with or indeed are the same as those 
which heralded the “modern” era or gave rise to the advent of modernity. 
Cinema may be both a reflection and a creation of modernity and one of its 
most visible representations.  Whatever may be the case, cinema was not the 
result of a linear, teleological process which saw it emerge from a clearly 
defined predecessor, either technologically or socially. As Gunning has 
stated: “…cinema…has its origin in a morass of modern modes of perception 
and new technologies which coalesced in the nineteenth century. To trace 
back cinema’s origins leads not to a warranted pedigree but to the chaotic 
curiosity shop of early modern life” (2004a, p.102).  
If any one location can be identified with the reception of the very first forms 
of cinema, it is late nineteenth century Paris although, as is apparent from a 
review of this area, the conditions necessary to create the “cinematic 
spectator” extended also at least to Britain and probably the United States at 
the same time. Given that the phenomenon of modernity was, at least in its 
early stages, confined to urban areas, it is not surprising to also see it 
developing at an early stage in London and New York (Charney and 
Schwartz, 1995, p.3). Paris, described as the capital of the nineteenth century, 
was particularly susceptible to the conditions which gave rise to modernity 
(Benjamin, 1999, pp. 3 to 26). Consequently, it has been the subject of 
particular study by Schwartz, looking at the cultural and social conditions 
which paved the way for the reception and development of early cinema 
(1994; 1998).
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Schwarz suggests that rather than seeking to understand cinematic 
spectatorship “through a universal and timeless theory of psychic 
spectatorship constructed in direct relation to the cinematic apparatus or as an 
idealized vision produced through discourses about perception and embodied 
in technological innovations” (1994, p. 87; 1998, pp.7 and 8 and 178 and 179) 
it is more useful to frame this issue within a particular social and cultural 
context, acknowledging that theory does not exist in a vacuum. Whilst, as 
suggested above, technological innovation clearly plays a part, it can only 
develop if it has a ready audience.  Consequently, Schwarz proposes that 
cinema flourished in late nineteenth century Paris precisely because it 
incorporated so many elements that could already be found in so-called 
modern life. Charney and Schwartz in fact identify six elements that are 
central to both the cultural history of modernity and modernity’s relation to 
cinema: 
The rise of a metropolitan urban culture leading to new forms of 
entertainment and leisure activity; the corresponding centrality of the 
body as the site of vision, attention and stimulation; the recognition of 
a mass public, crowd, or audience that subordinated individual 
response to collectivity; the impulse to define, fix, and represent 
isolated moments in the face of modernity’s distractions and 
sensations, an urge that led through Impressionism and photography 
to cinema; the increased blurring of the line between reality and its 
representations; and the surge in commercial culture and consumer 
desire that both fuelled and followed new forms of diversion (1995, 
p.3).
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to review all of these issues in 
detail, many of these will be discussed further below in the context of the 
model of spectatorship which is developed in this chapter.   
A notable feature of Parisian culture in the late nineteenth century was the 
mass consumption of spectacle, whether this was the newly-constructed Eiffel 
Tower, the catacombs or some other attraction. Another element was the 
recreation of everyday life as spectacle, as evidenced by the extraordinary 
popularity of the Paris Morgue, which displayed its dead bodies in tableaux or 
panoramas. The aim of the presentation of the bodies at the Morgue and the 
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creation of tableaux at the wax museum in the Musee Grevin was to achieve 
as much verisimilitude as possible (the “reality effect” which has been noted 
as one of the defining characteristics of early cinema) (Chanan, 1980, pp. 271 
and 272). The Musee Grevin went to extraordinary lengths to reinforce the 
reality of its displays, relying not just on the lifelike appearance of the figures 
themselves but also on other devices such as the use of genuine artefacts 
associated with the scene being depicted. So, for example, the model of 
Victor Hugo held Hugo’s real pen, the tableau of Marat’s murder included the 
actual bathtub and Zola’s model was wearing a suit donated by the author 
(Schwartz, 1994, p.95).
This activity represented a form of mass entertainment, mass consumption of 
a spectacular sight intended to shock, amuse or thrill. The dead bodies in the 
Morgue or the tableaux in the wax museum represented a form of 
presentation or mimetic narration, particularly in the case of the stories 
depicted in successive tableaux in the museum, such as a series describing a 
murder and the subsequent apprehension and execution of the murderer by 
the authorities described by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1994, pp.99 to 105). 
Embedded within even a single tableau such as a body at the Morgue was a 
basic narrative structure supplied not so much by the tableau itself as by the 
public’s pre-existing knowledge of the story surrounding the body on display 
or the wax recreation of a particular scene. This knowledge derived from 
newspapers and other sources of information. Consequently, a feature of this 
form of entertainment was its reliance upon the spectator’s knowledge of the 
context in which the event was presented. As will be discussed below, early 
cinema functioned in much the same way, relying upon the audience’s pre-
existing knowledge of the storyline being shown on the screen or the routines 
or characters being portrayed by the actors, many of whom were already well-
known figures from the stage or vaudeville. In this way, the melodramatic 
theatrical spectacle, a popular form of mass entertainment at the end of the 
nineteenth century examined by Flanders, paved the way for the cinematic 
spectacle and the rise of the melodrama as a cinematic form in the early years 
of the twentieth century (Flanders, 2006, pp. 252 to 291). The audience for 
early cinematic spectacle and the melodramatic serials of the 1910s and 1920s 
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was already in existence when the coincidence of technology and other social 
and cultural factors allowed the cinema to develop.
Singer in his book on the cinema of melodrama in the early twentieth century 
remarks upon the similarities between the raucous, interactive nature of late 
nineteenth century popular theatre and the behaviour of the early cinema 
audience. In the same way, as Gunning has pointed out, (1994, p.118) that 
early cinema audiences were prepared to participate in a willing suspension of 
disbelief whilst simultaneously acknowledging the fact of the technology 
used to produce the cinematic illusion, so audiences of stage melodrama may 
have found the conspicuous mechanical contrivance of such theatrical 
productions to be part of the attraction rather than a distraction from the event 
itself (Singer, 2001, pp.177 to 179). Singer’s comment on this somewhat 
paradoxical relationship between artificiality and realism applies equally to 
the relationship enjoyed by the early cinema audience with the new medium: 
“Its pleasures were based on the flux between absorptive realism (or perhaps 
only apperceptive realism) and the enjoyment of overt theatricality” (2001, 
p.178).
Melodrama as a genre of film, one of the first to develop out of the early 
cinematic period, relied upon the use of spectacle for its impact and appeal 
and it is worth noting that Singer identifies that as a genre melodrama 
“activates various kinds of excess in the spectator’s visceral responses” 
(2001, p.39). Here we see articulated the link between spectacle and a direct, 
visceral response in the spectator, a relationship developed in the popular 
theatre which passes through into early cinema. Melodrama tended to thrive 
on generating agitation in the spectator, whether through a sense of moral 
injustice, powerful sentiment or pathos or situations of extreme peril. A 
popular device was the race against time or chase sequence, a powerful 
melodramatic sequence since Griffith’s day (Singer, 2001, p.40).   
In addition, melodrama’s emphasis on and consequent need to supply the 
sensational, the shocking and the emotive inevitably lead to it acquiring an 
episodic nature, or what Singer describes as its “nonclassical narrative 
72
structure” (2001, p.46). This involved a departure from the narrative structure 
of cause and effect that was developing at the time and a reliance instead 
upon coincidence, implausibility, convoluted plotting and “episodic strings of 
action that stuff too many events together to be able to be kept in line by a 
cause-and-effect chain of narrative progression” (Singer, 2001, p.46). The 
response that critics displayed to the cinematic melodramas of the early 
twentieth century, as noted by Singer (2001, p.47) bear a striking similarity to 
the response of later critics to the action movies of the 1980s and 1990s, 
lamenting the apparent demise of cinematic narrative. 
Another element to note in relation to the model of spectatorship adopted by 
early cinema is the manner in which these displays showed the story to the 
audience rather than presenting them with a detailed narrative structure which 
was essentially self-contained. As noted above, the understanding of the 
narrative context of the displays depended upon the spectator’s pre-existing 
knowledge and it was therefore left to the tableau in question to show or 
display the scene rather than to explain it all to the spectator. This has echoes 
of Bordwell’s mimetic narration, the presentation of a story by showing the 
spectator what is happening rather than telling them. 
The popularity of tableaux in waxworks museums suggests that an element of 
the spectacle was the capturing of life and, importantly, the increasing 
popularity of detailed panoramas and dioramas towards the end of the century 
noted by Schwartz depends upon capturing and representing (or re-
presenting) life in motion (Schwartz, 1994, p.105). As Schwartz suggests, the 
development of increasingly detailed panoramas and dioramas incorporating 
movement does not point to the inevitable technological development of the 
cinematic apparatus, but rather that the public taste for the blurring of reality 
and fiction and the spectacular presentation of that fictionalised but detailed 
reality creates the conditions in which cinema can emerge (1994, p.110). As 
explored in further detail below, this atmosphere was accompanied by 
changes in the nature of spectatorship, changes which had their origins in the 
earlier nineteenth century, which also allowed the concept of the mobilized 
gaze of the spectator to be embodied in a physical observer participating more 
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fully in the process of viewing than contemplated by the more traditional 
view of the disembodied, detached observer. It is notable in this context that 
the crowds flocking to the Morgue and the wax museum were not the solitary, 
detached observers of the classical spectatorial model, but people 
congregating to participate fully and emotionally in a form of mass 
entertainment based around the presentation of spectacles designed to shock, 
astonish and thrill.  
The spectator at the Morgue or the wax museum was by definition mobile, 
passing by the bodies on display in the Morgue or the tableaux in the 
museum. The spectator’s gaze becomes mobilised, linked to the ability of the 
spectator to move from one spectacle to the next. This newly-mobilised 
spectator is also represented by the flaneur, a term now virtually shorthand 
for the mobilized gaze of the pre-cinematic spectator but also, of course, 
referring specifically to a particular cultural activity in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Paris observed and analysed in the writings of, 
amongst others, Walter Benjamin and Charles Baudelaire (Benjamin, 1999; 
Baudelaire, 1982).
The flaneur (originally always a man but subsequently, Freidberg argues, 
women as well once the department store enabled them to walk in public 
unchaperoned without being taken for prostitutes or women of “low virtue”) 
wandered the streets of nineteenth century Paris in a daze of dreamlike 
distraction, observing the sights and spectacles of his urban environment 
(Friedberg, 1994, p.62). Friedberg sees him as “the quintessential paradigm of 
the subject in modernity” (1994, p.61). The flaneur is celebrated in 
Baudelaire’s collection of poems Les Fleurs du Mal, which was itself the
cornerstone for Benjamin’s uncompleted Arcades project, an examination of 
the Parisian arcades with their displays of commodities in shop windows 
available for the consumption of the strolling crowds. Thus the mobilised 
gaze of the spectator, evident in the crowds at the Morgue and the wax 
museum and the flaneur strolling through the streets, is one thread in the 
cultural and social matrix which enabled the early cinema to develop.   
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In addition to the spectacles attended by the Parisian crowds, Friedberg 
documents the popularity of the shop window display and its increased use as 
a vehicle for the presentation of tableaux as a means of selling commodities 
to newly-moblilized female shoppers (as well as drawing a direct analogy 
with the cinema screen itself) (1993, pp.65 and 66). Benjamin also traces the 
path of the flaneur from the arcades into the department store, noting that the 
department store itself makes use of the concept of flanerie, relying upon the 
consumer’s distracted stroll past the shop windows or though the shop itself 
whilst “just looking”, to sell its goods (Friedberg, 1994, pp. 61 and 62). 
The mobilised gaze of the spectator combines in Friedberg’s formulation with 
the virtual gaze of the visual arts, a representational activity which stretches 
back to cave painting but finds its most significant development in 
photography. The combination of these two elements leads to what Friedberg 
terms the “mobilised virtual gaze” (1993, p.2).  It is the increased centrality of 
this concept, articulated first in cinema and then television and other media, 
that evidences for her the transition from the modern to the postmodern. 
The development of panoramas and other such displays, however, marks a 
significant change in the spectatorship model from the later nineteenth 
century crowds at the Paris Morgue or the window shoppers in turn of the 
century New York. The spectator at the panorama is immobile and is 
presented with the illusion of movement whereas the spectator at the Morgue 
or the window shopper is mobile and is viewing a static display. Physical 
movement is substituted by the illusion of movement. This effect was 
reproduced in the cinema, exchanging physical movement for the illusion of 
movement but extending this illusion of movement through not only space 
but also time.
The mobilized gaze of the spectator, developed through the nineteenth 
century and enhanced by the rise of activities such as tourism and shopping
thus combines with the virtual gaze of photography to produce the mobilized 
virtual gaze crucial for the development of the cinema. This model of 
spectatorship initially finds expression in the appreciation of static spectacle 
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such as the morgue and the wax museum, but as the century draws to a close 
increasing efforts to produce ever more realistic presentations (or rather re-
presentations) of reality allied with technological advances result in the 
moving panoramas and dioramas in which the spectator exchanges actual 
movement for the illusion of movement. As Friedberg neatly summarizes:
The same impulses that sent flaneurs through the arcades, traversing 
the pavement and wearing thin their shoe leather, sent shoppers into 
the department stores, tourists to exhibitions, spectators into the 
panorama, diorama, wax museum, and cinema (1993, p.94).
Charney and Schwartz emphasize the close connection between cinema and 
modernity, and that cinema did not “simply provide a new medium in which 
elements of modernity could uncomfortably coexist.” Cinema “forced” 
elements of modern life into active synthesis with each other. Consequently 
cinema 
...must not be conceived simply as the outgrowth of such forms as 
melodramatic theatre, serial narrative, and the nineteenth century 
realist novel, although all of these modes influenced its form. Nor can 
technological histories sufficiently explain the emergence of cinema. 
Rather, cinema must be reunderstood as a vital component of a 
broader culture of modern life which encompassed political, social, 
economic, and cultural transformations (1995, p.10).
Inherent in the model of spectatorship described above, in the excited crowds 
at the Morgue or the museum, the shoppers and the flaneurs and even those 
immobile spectators at the panoramas and dioramas, and particularly those 
who went to the vaudeville theatre or the sideshows at the funfair, is the 
element of physicality, of a spectator emotionally and physically involved in 
and being part of the event he or she is watching. Again, this is different from 
the classical model of the disembodied, detached observer who has no direct 
link in this way to what is being observed. 
In fact, the detached observer as a spectatorial model belongs more to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had been changing and developing 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century, finding its expression in 
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developments in the visual arts later in that century. The model of 
spectatorship that existed at the end of the nineteenth century, and upon 
which early cinema developed, was based upon the embodied spectator who 
was engaged emotionally, far more intimately and physically involved in the 
viewing process than more traditional models of spectatorship would suggest. 
Changes in the methods of perception of the spectator which had been taking 
place since the early part of the nineteenth century have lead to a rethinking 
of the importance of the material, visceral effect of cinema as part of the 
cinematic experience. This visceral impact is central to a definition of 
spectacle.
2.3 The embodied spectator
The concept of the embodied spectator is a prerequisite to the reconsideration 
of the spectatorial model necessary to allow spectacle to achieve its proper 
place as part of the cinematic experience. It will therefore be helpful to 
consider the various models of spectatorship based upon the concept of the 
embodied spectator and to review the strengths and weaknesses of these 
models to conclude which is most suited to a spectatorial model sufficient to 
cater for the presence of spectacle. I will commence this review by 
considering the clearest exposition of what can be described as 
institutionalised spectatorship: the model proposed by Baudry, known as 
apparatus theory. As I will show, this tends to lead to rather abstract 
conclusions that do not seem to accord with the more open, pragmatic 
approach necessary to create a model which accords with the actual historical 
conditions of spectatorship as described in the previous section. I will 
therefore go on to consider other models, principally those advanced by Crary 
and Sobchack, which afford a more open and historically-grounded approach. 
I will conclude that Crary’s approach in particular is more suited to the actual 
conditions of spectatorship at the time and in the context of the newly-created 
cinema.
What came to be called the apparatus model was developed in the context of 
the psychoanalytical and ideological theories of the 1970s and explored the 
77
parallels between film viewing in the cinema (that is, sitting still in a 
darkened cinema before a screen) and situations central to psychoanalytical 
theories of the subject related to dreams and regression in particular (Mayne, 
1993, p.20). The apparatus saw cinema as an institution, both in its literal 
sense and as part of the machinery intended to reinforce existing social and 
political positions. Thus the apparatus can be seen as a model of spectatorship 
which is based on psychoanalytical and ideological bases. As Mayne points 
out, virtually every major theorist of the 1970s used apparatus theory given 
that it provided a model of spectatorship which accorded so precisely with the 
theoretical concerns of the time:
The apparatus which thus emerges as so central to institutional models 
of spectatorship is a technological system with psychic ramifications, 
concerning fantasies of regression and affirmations of the imaginary 
order (1993, p.44).
Whilst apparatus theory was implicit in the writings of Mulvey, Metz and 
Bellour, it was foregrounded by Baudry, who significantly developed the 
model in two essays: “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic 
Apparatus”, published in 1970, and “The Apparatus: Metapsychological 
Approaches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema”, published in 1975. In 
these essays, Baudry argues that the cinema produces an ideological position 
through its very mechanics of representation and the spectator’s immobile 
position situated before a screen. Ideology is not imposed upon the cinema; it 
is already implicated in it (Mayne, 1993, p.45).    As Rosen points out, “the 
apparatus” is not just the machinery of the cinema itself but also this 
machinery in the context of a larger social and/or cultural and /or institutional 
machine “for which the former is only a point of convergence of several lines 
of force of the latter” (1986a, p.282).  In fact, although the term “apparatus” 
appears in both essays, it is a translation of two different words, the first 
referring to the entirety of the institutional mechanism and the second, more 
akin to “arrangement”, referring to the machinery of projection itself (Rosen, 
1986b, p.317, footnote 2).     
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In Baudry’s view cinema does not deliver a representation of the spectator’s 
ordinary impressions of reality, but something that is more-than-real, an 
intense effect arising out of the peculiarly charged relationship between 
spectator and film. This effect arises not out of the films in themselves but is 
the product of the apparatus in which the spectator becomes, in Hansen’s 
words, “the transcendental vanishing point of specific spatial, perceptual, 
social arrangements” (Hansen, 1991, p.4). It is the totality of these 
arrangements, rather than what is being screened, that accounts for this 
impression-of-reality effect. Baudry proceeds to draw a series of analogies 
between dreams and the apparatus on the basis that both experiences 
engender a highly-charged impression of reality. In psychoanalytical terms, 
both dream and film give an impression of reality through a regressive 
mechanism whereby the spectator is reduced to an earlier psychosexual stage, 
that of primitive narcissism where the self is apparently not differentiated 
from the other and perception is not differentiated from representation:
Thus the spectator identifies less with what is represented, the 
spectacle itself, than what stages the spectacle, makes it seen, obliging 
him to see what it sees: this is exactly the function taken over by the 
camera as a sort of relay (1986a, p.295).
In Baudry’s formulation, the identification the spectator makes is both 
psychoanalytical but also ideological: that is, with the dominant ideology 
itself. Baudry is here not concerned with a model of spectatorship that 
envisages communication solely between film and spectator but instead with 
the cinema as a mechanism for the preservation of the dominant ideology:
The cinema can thus appear as a sort of psychic apparatus of 
substitution, corresponding to the model defined by the dominant 
ideology. The system of repression (primarily economic) has as its 
goal the prevention of deviations and of the active exposure of this 
model (1986a, p.296).
It is interesting to note Baudry’s use of the term “spectacle”. Baudry does not 
give any consideration to the distinction between narrative and spectacle or to 
consider film in that way: he is concerned with larger, sweeping issues in 
relation to ideology and psychoanalysis. His use of the term is clearly largely 
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dismissive in terms of the content of what is seen on the screen; a spectacle 
that is by definition not capable of critical analysis.  Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the shift to a semiological analysis of 
cinema in the 1960s meant a concentration on narrative methods and, as 
Mayne points out, there was a “common interface” between narrative and 
psychoanalysis which meant that it was almost inevitable that theorists of the 
1970s would concentrate on narrative to the exclusion of spectacle: “…the act 
of storytelling needs to be understood as one of the most fundamental ways in 
which one constructs an identity, in both cultural and individual terms” (1993, 
p.24).
Consequently, Baudry’s use of the term “spectacle” may owe far more to the 
ideological connotations of spectacle advanced by Debord in The Society of 
the Spectacle, which argued that the consumption and contemplation of 
images has replaced all forms of human communication. Consequently, 
cinema is quite literally a training ground for acculturation to the spectacle, 
again seen as a way of enforcing the dominant ideology (Mayne, 1993, p.28). 
It is therefore perhaps hardly surprising that concentration on narrative allied 
with the pejorative connotations of spectacle in the 1970s meant that little 
attention was paid to seeing spectacle as a subject worthy of serious study in 
itself other than as a threat to narrative coherence, as discussed in Chapter 
One.
Famously, in a metaphor mentioned in the 1970 essay and developed fully in 
the 1975 essay, Baudry compared the spectator’s position in both the dream 
and the cinema to that of the prisoners’ in Plato’s myth of the cave, chained in 
a darkened vault and only able to see the shadows of others moving behind 
them projected on the wall in front as those others pass between them and the 
flames beyond. The prisoners mistake these shadows for reality, the basis for 
Plato’s disparaging estimation of the ordinary person’s knowledge of the 
world being in fact based on illusion (1978, pp. 316 to 325). For Baudry, 
however, the cave analogy arises from the same fundamental psychic 
conditions and regressive desires that drove the development of cinema: “We 
can thus propose that the allegory of the cave is the text of a signifier of 
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desire which haunts the invention of cinema and the history of its invention”
(1986b, p.307).
As Hansen points out, whether theorised in terms of Plato’s cave, the 
metaphor of the mirror stage, the principles of Renaissance perspective or the 
ideological self-effacement of classical continuity conventions, the apparatus 
refers to the general conditions and relations of cinematic reception. As such, 
whilst avowedly not about real, individual spectators, Hansen acknowledges 
that the apparatus spectator is “a somewhat abstract and ultimately passive 
entity”, a far cry from the physically engaged spectator of early cinema 
(1991, p.4). Mayne also acknowledges that the cinematic subject of 
psychoanalytical theory does not refer to real people, who may in the real 
world react to films in any number of unpredictable ways “but rather to 
positions constructed by the various and interconnecting institutions of the 
cinema” (1993, p.33). 
Apparatus theory has been the subject of some criticism ranging from a 
detailed critique of the basis upon which the theory is founded to criticisms of 
the limitations of the theory in terms of its failure to deal adequately with 
either sound or gender issues (Carroll, 2004; Creed, 1998). In addition, many 
of the conditions in which the apparatus is said to work would in any event 
hardly apply to modern domestic viewing conditions. Its attraction lies in the 
way in which it provides an overarching spectatorial model of the cinema as 
ideological institution which married perfectly with the predominant concerns 
of film theory in the 1970s.  Arguably, the tendency towards the sweeping 
generalisation and the lack of any real historical specificity in Baudry’s 
essays proves to be one of its major weak points. Of equal concern, Baudry 
was studying classical narrative cinema and as such gave no consideration to 
a cinema which was not as narrative-centred (Mayne, 1993, p.50). As 
discussed above, the study of spectacle as anything other than a dangerous 
threat was unlikely at the time and consequently the apparatus model fails to 
deal with the implications of spectacle and its emotional impact. Finally, the 
immobile and largely passive observer of the apparatus bears no relationship 
to the emotionally and physically involved embodied spectator sketched by 
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Crary and apparent from the historical context discussed below. Although in 
historical terms psychoanalysis, the development of consumer culture and 
cinema all developed at about the same time at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the psychoanalytically-based apparatus does not provide an adequate 
spectatorial model to account for the presence of spectacle in the cinema 
other than possibly as an overarching ideological construct which applies 
more to society as a whole than films in particular.  
Central to a more revisionist view of the modes of spectatorial perception in 
the nineteenth century is the work of Crary, particularly Techniques of the 
Observer, (1990) in which Crary sets out his contention that there was a 
fundamental change in the conditions of the spectator (or “observer” as Crary 
has it, using a more Foucauldian term) which has its roots in the early 
nineteenth century and which is the real precursor of the development of 
modernist painting and visual arts towards the end of that century. Similarly, 
the notion that the camera obscura led inexorably to a series of technological 
developments via photography to the cinema is misleading. The camera 
obscura as a central metaphor for the spectator is displaced early in the 
nineteenth century:
My contention is that a reorganisation of the observer occurs in the 
nineteenth century before the appearance of photography. What takes 
place from around 1810 to 1840 is an uprooting of vision from the 
stable and fixed relations incarnated in the camera obscura…In a 
sense, what occurs is a new valuation of visual experience: it is given 
an unprecedented mobility and exchangeability, abstracted from any 
founding site or referent (1990, p.14).
Given Crary’s Foucauldian approach to this issue, much of his discussion 
turns upon the “industrial remapping” of the body in the nineteenth century as 
a function of the exercise of power and control. The delinking of sight from 
the sense of touch, which had been an integral part of classical theories of 
vision in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, led to a prioritisation of 
sight, a historical condition necessary for the “rebuilding” of the spectator or 
observer able to appreciate the “tasks of ‘spectacular’ consumption” which 
are briefly reviewed above as these developed in the late nineteenth century. 
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Crary also points out that that this “empirical isolation” of vision not only 
allowed it to be quantified and homogenized (and, presumably, more capable 
of control through standardisation and manipulation of images), it also 
enabled the new objects of vision, whether these be commodities, 
photographs or the act of perception itself, to “assume a mystified and 
abstract identity, sundered from any relation to the observer’s position within 
a cognitively unified field” (1990, p.19). Again this traces the conditions 
necessary for the appreciation of the spectacles of the late nineteenth century, 
the commodity-led experience of the shop window, the experience of the 
Morgue, the wax museum, the panorama or, eventually, the cinema.  
Though not explicitly so stated in his book, Crary’s work directly challenges 
the concerns of apparatus theory. Central to Crary’s consideration of the 
effects of this change in perception, and implicit in the notion of the 
mobilized virtual gaze set out above, is the abandonment of the detached, 
immobile and disembodied spectator predicated by the classical theories of 
spectatorship or the passive, immobile spectator of apparatus theory. The 
mobilized virtual gaze implies a physicality, an ability to move through space 
and time, and consequently the focussing of the spectatorial experience in the 
body of the spectator. Again, as Crary notes, this is explicit in Benjamin’s 
writings on the flaneur: “Perception for Benjamin was acutely temporal and 
kinetic; he makes clear how modernity subverts even the possibility of a 
contemplative beholder” (Crary, 1990, p.20). The conditions of modernity 
dictate that uninterrupted access to a single object capable of pure 
contemplation is impossible.
For Crary, this embodiment of the spectator, inherent in the physicality of the 
mobilized gaze, was in fact prefigured in changes in scientific enquiry at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. At this time, the development of the 
science of vision resulted increasingly in the investigation of the physiology 
of the human subject rather than the mechanics of light and optical 
transmission which had interested scientists in earlier centuries and which, 
therefore, did not concern itself with the physical attributes of the perceiver. 
Consequently, the visible moves from the disembodied realm of mechanics 
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and optics, from the order of the camera obscura, to the unstable corporeality 
and temporality of the human body (Crary, 1990, p.70). Developments in this 
area reflected a larger project undertaken during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, which amounted to an exhaustive inventory of the body, a 
transfer of subjective mental life to a quantitative, empirical plane and the 
fragmentation of the holistic subject into specifically identifiable mechanical 
or organic systems (Crary, 1990, p.81). Vision thus emanates from the 
spectator and becomes controllable via the images observed. Arguably, we 
may see this process as part of the commoditisation of reality, enabling its 
subsequent consumption by the audience, the way that experience is, in 
Schwartz’s terms, “configured into moments and events” (Schwartz, 1998, 
p.11) and becomes translated into spectacle (Schwartz, 1998, p.200).   
One of the results of the shift documented by Crary was that the functioning 
of vision became dependent upon “the contingent physiological makeup of 
the observer, thus rendering vision faulty, unreliable, and even, it was argued, 
arbitrary” (Crary, 1995, p.46).  This gave rise to the idea of subjective vision, 
that the quality of perceived sensations depends less upon the nature of the 
stimulus and more upon the make up and functioning of the sensory 
apparatus. The notion of subjective vision was, in Crary’s view, one of the 
conditions for the historical emergence of notions of autonomous vision, for 
the severing of perceptual experience “from a necessary and determinate 
relation to an exterior world”. This disintegration of the indisputable 
distinction between interior and exterior became a condition for the 
emergence of “spectacular modernising culture” (1995, pp.46 and 47). The 
notion of subjective vision leads inexorably to issues relating to control, given 
Crary’s view of the function of the management of vision in the nineteenth 
century.
Part of the cultural logic of capitalism, in Crary’s view, “demands that we 
accept as natural the rapid switching of our attention from one thing to 
another” (emphasis in original) (1995, pp.47 and 48). Thus whilst attempts 
were made to create a relatively stable notion of a distinct subject/object 
relation, ultimately attention came to be seen as “only a fleeting 
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immobilization of a subject effect and an ephemeral congealing of a sensory 
manifold into a cohesive real world” (1995, p.51).  The instability of 
attention, its lack of fixity in the conditions imposed by the modern world, 
perhaps points to the importance and popularity of spectacular events such as 
the Morgue and the wax museum and, as the century progresses, ever more 
realistic and dramatic spectacles in the theatre and, eventually, the cinema. 
Inherent in this description is, of course, the assumption that this condition is 
ongoing, that the need to address the instability of attention continues to 
require ever more novel and spectacular distractions. In many ways, it can be 
argued, this need provides the basis for most mainstream cinema, let alone the 
other audio visual experiences now available such as theme park rides, 
television, interactive computer games and so on. This also points us to 
another central characteristic of spectacle: that in order to continue to 
astonish, amaze and entertain it must continually change.
Insofar as one can take Baudry’s analogy between Plato’s prisoners and the
film spectator’s experience beyond the psychoanalytical and the ideological, 
it is notable that apparatus theory is essentially voyeuristic in that there is a 
distinct separation between the observer and that which is being observed and 
no direct interaction between the two. Crary’s embodied corporealised 
observer, in common with the mobilised virtual gaze of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, is not immobile, but quite the opposite and is 
directly and physically involved in the viewing process. The interaction 
between the observer and the observed in Crary’s model is therefore 
exhibitionistic in that the structuring of the event being observed by the 
observer (or spectator) involves a direct address to the observer, a direct 
communication arising out of the physical involvement of the observer. This 
physicality of direct involvement also implies a more emotional response to 
the event being witnessed than that suggested by the disembodied, detached 
observer.  
The separation between observer and observed and the solipsistic self-
absorption of the psychoanalytical model upon which the apparatus is based 
is, as stated above, essentially voyeuristic. Consequently, it is suggested, it 
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must be inherently incomplete in that it fails to take account of the clearly 
exhibitionistic elements of the early cinematic experience, elements 
particularly prevalent in spectacle and the sensual image discussed in Chapter 
One. This distinction between the disembodied, detached spectator of 
apparatus theory (and, indeed, the traditional spectatorial model criticized by 
Crary) and the physically engaged embodied cinematic spectator is equally 
valid even if the increasing immobility of the cinematic spectator during the 
classical era is taken into account. The crucial difference lies in the 
physicality of spectatorial engagement, not the mobility of the spectator.   
Kennedy points out that the effect of the camera obscura model of vision, 
which was supplanted in Crary’s view by the corporealised 
spectator/observer, was to create a “centered subjectivity” as a model for 
spectatorship, a model which was reinforced by psychoanalytical film theory: 
“The classical model of spectatorship, in its prioritisation of ideology and 
psychoanalysis has always prioritised a decorporealised, distanced, 
monocular eye, unimplicated in the experience of an image” (Kennedy, 2000, 
p.55). The psychoanalytical gaze allows no room for the experience of 
astonishment, of absorption created by the experience of spectacle in the 
cinema and, as such, is unable to accommodate an aesthetic of spectacle. 
Kennedy suggests that Crary’s approach allows different models of 
spectatorship to emerge which move away from a concern with visual 
representation or psychoanalytical theory and instead allows her to posit an 
“aesthetics of sensation” based upon Deleuzian principles (2000, p.53).
Crary’s is not the only theory that posits an embodied spectator. Another 
alternative to the psychoanalytical model is offered by Sobchack’s 
phenomenological approach (Sobchack, 1992 and 1994). Referring back to 
Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack suggests that “More than any other medium of 
human communication, the moving picture makes itself sensuously and 
sensibly manifest as the expression of experience by experience” (1994, 
p.37). The cinema is a “lived-body” experience, “in the activity of embodied 
consciousness realising itself in the world and with others as both visual and 
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visible, as both sense-making and sensible” (1994, p.39). The film experience 
is therefore:
…a system of communication based on bodily perception as a vehicle 
of conscious expression. It entails the visible, audible, kinetic, aspects 
of sensible experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and haptically. 
The film experience…presents the direct and reflective experience of 
a perceptual and expressive existence as the film (emphasis in 
original) (1994, p.41).
Utilizing the metaphor of formalist, Realist and psychoanalytical theories as 
seeing the cinema screen as a frame, a window and a mirror respectively, 
Sobchack argues that all three of these approaches are inadequate because 
none of them take account of the spectator as a physical presence: all are 
focussed upon the screen itself and see the screen as a static viewed object, 
thus perpetuating the subject/object distinction of the classical spectatorial 
model: “The exchange and reversibility of perception and expression (both in 
and as the film and spectator) are suppressed, as are the intrasubjective and 
intersubjective foundations of cinematic communication” (1994, pp.45 to 50). 
There is a physical, embodied interplay between spectator and film, a meeting 
between the spectator’s vision of the film and the film’s vision of itself. This 
lived and embodied experience outside the diegesis of the film also underlies 
the exhibitionistic nature of the experience, the direct communication 
between film and spectator. 
 Consequently we can see the embodied spectator - utilising a mobile virtual 
gaze, actively participating in and being an inextricable part of a spectatorial 
experience on an emotional and intellectual level - emerging as a more 
suitable model for the visceral, material encounter inherent in the experience 
of early cinema, a product of the social and cultural processes that had been in 
play for most of the nineteenth century. Prior to considering the extent to 
which we can apply this model to present day cinema, and the extent to which 
this model assists us in a definition of spectacle, it will be worth considering 
in more detail the nature of early cinema itself. This will enable us to review 
the spectatorial model discussed so far in cultural and theoretical terms in the 
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context of the development of early cinema and to consider the issues arising 
in the application of his model to the cinematic experience at that time. 
2.4 Early cinema
Early cinema (1895 to approximately 1907) was for some time considered to 
be rather primitive or to represent a pre-narrative stage in development when 
the technology available to filmmakers and the early stages of cinematic 
development meant that the medium was struggling towards a properly 
developed narrative construction. These assumptions have now largely been 
dismissed and early cinema has been recognised as a phase of cinematic 
development, a different kind of cinema as Hansen suggests, when the 
priority of filmmakers lay elsewhere and the necessity to provide a well-
formed narrative was not paramount (1995, pp.362 and 363). 
Analysis of early films has shown that many features which were taken as 
primitive, such as simultaneous playing areas, editing within the frame or 
tableau scenes arose in fact as conscious stylistic choices by filmmakers. 
Furthermore, the unit of early cinema is the autonomous shot or scene, where 
actions and events are continuous and spatial coherence is of paramount 
importance. Consequently, the shot’s objective was to present not a small 
fragment of a larger sequence, as would be the case later when scenes were 
fragmented by editing, but rather the totality of an action unfolding in a 
homogenous space. Spatial anchorage prevails even over temporal logic. 
There is evidence that films as early as 1899 employed cross cutting (such as 
Henley Regatta by Smith and Williamson) hence it seems that the single shot 
film or a film which allowed for action to take place in various parts of the 
same scene represent a choice by the filmmaker, not ignorance or a lack of 
resource, in the same way that the use of multiplanar activity by Renoir and 
Welles arose as a conscious stylistic decision (Elsaesser and Barker, 1990, pp. 
12 and 13).
The notion that early films represented some primitive form of attempt to 
arrive at a fully-realised narrative cinema is in fact based upon preconceptions 
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deriving from a familiarity with classical narrative cinema, which enables the 
spectator to gather all the information necessary to interpret and understand 
the film from the film itself. In the same way that it is not unusual for modern 
films to refer to other films or even to the personalities of the actors 
themselves, so the early cinema often referred via the use of well-known 
theatrical or vaudeville performers to those performers’ acts on stage or to 
other social and cultural information familiar to the audience at the time but 
something of a mystery to the present day spectator.  In fact, Popple and 
Kember suggest that instead of being seen as a primitive and half-successful 
attempt to achieve the status of classical Hollywood cinema, early film “can 
be seen as the apex of nineteenth-century entertainments – even as the 
epitome of representational media at the fin-de-siecle” (Popple and Kember, 
2004, p.34). 
Consequently, the conditions of exhibition and reception of early films and 
their development in the context of the forms of mass entertainment at the 
turn of the nineteenth century play a crucial part in understanding their 
content and the stylistic choice made by the filmmakers. Whilst it is clear that 
such filmmakers were limited by the technology available to them, stylistic 
choice may have been dictated by the context in which the film was to be 
shown. It may have been made as part of a programme of other short films or 
stage or vaudeville entertainments so that the context of its reception dictated 
its form. Early film depended upon a much more direct relationship between 
the audience and the material upon which the film was based, the performers 
and even the projectionist than classical cinema expected. Audiences were 
likely to know the story or anecdote the film represented already, they were 
probably familiar with the screen actors, who might well be reprising their 
already famous stage routines, and there was a level of communication 
between audience and the lecturers or showmen who often introduced such 
films which would be alien to a classical and post-classical cinema audience, 
trained to view a film from something of a distance in relatively disciplined 
conditions of silence and attention. Early cinema was a mass entertainment 
medium, reflecting far more the interactive behaviour of the crowds that 
gathered at the theatre, in the morgue or the wax museum than those queuing 
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patiently for the next screening. As Popper and Kemble note, in historical 
terms, early cinema can be seen as the vehicle through which the mass 
entertainment media of the nineteenth century were transformed to the 
essentially individualised screen entertainments of the twentieth (2004, p.85; 
See also Hansen, 1991, pp.1 to 19). 
It is important to note the essentially interactive nature of early cinema. The 
actors would often turn and look directly at the camera, directly at the 
audience. Melies in his films would perform magic tricks directly to the 
camera, lecturers and showmen would address the audience in person and, 
according to reports, the audience would respond. Chanan points out that 
early cinema, like music hall (and stage melodrama), was not naturalistic. 
Direct addresses to the camera were acknowledged (again, replicating the 
direct address to the theatre audience in many stage melodramas) although the 
camera was still required in such circumstances to film the scene as 
naturalistically as possible, contributing to the “reality effect” of the 
cinematic image. It was only with the development of the more distanced 
classical narrative model with its voyeuristic approach that the direct address 
to the camera began to decline (Chanan, 1980, pp.271 and 272).
It can therefore be argued that early cinema as a medium is exhibitionistic: it 
acknowledges the audience and addresses it directly outside the diegesis of 
the film itself. A relationship is established between the filmmakers and the 
audience outside the self-contained world of the film because the film 
explicitly recognises the existence of the audience. This is to be contrasted 
with the classical narrative structure which many commentators have 
described as voyeuristic because no such communication with the audience 
outside the diegesis of the film occurs. In fact, this is an over-simplification of 
the position, which arises out of a narrative-driven analysis of film and the 
effect of the psychoanalytical approach to film studies. Even narrative-driven 
films can in certain circumstances address the spectator directly outside the 
diegesis of the film. These circumstances arise primarily during moments of 
spectacle because it can be argued on the basis of the above that it is a 
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characteristic of spectacle that it is exhibitionistic rather than voyeuristic in 
nature. 
In film theory terms, commentators such as Bazin approached the analysis of 
early film as a first step in a development that would lead to a fully developed 
cinematic experience (inevitable in Bazin’s case given the teleological basis 
of his Realist aesthetic) (Bazin, 1967c, p. 27). Noel Burch argues that early 
cinema (up to 1906 in his view) produced a “Primitive Mode of 
Representation” (PMR) in contrast to the more developed and sophisticated 
“Institutional Mode of Representation” (IMR) produced by the classical 
Hollywood cinema.  Both of these represented a stable system each with its 
own inherent logic and durability, but the PMR exhibited characteristics 
different from the IMR and need not be seen as a stepping stone to the more 
developed form. Although Burch considers the PMR to be “unquestionably 
semantically poorer” than the IMR, much of his discussion of the differences 
between the two modes centres on devices (such as closure) that relate to an 
explicit narrative structure, a characteristic of a narrative driven cinema but 
not necessarily early cinema, which does not privilege narrative to the same 
extent (Burch, 1990).  
It is clear that early cinema did not privilege narrative above all else, but that 
does not mean that the films contained no narrative content at all. Even single 
shot films contained a narrative element notwithstanding the view that a 
characteristic of narrative is the use of editing. It has been argued by 
Deutelbaum that single shot films such as Sortie d’usine, Arrive d’un train or 
Demolition d’un mur, all by the Lumiere brothers, are not in fact plotless but 
highly structured, reflecting a number of carefully chosen decisions about 
sequential narrative (Elsaesser and Barker, 1990, p.15).  More pertinent 
perhaps is the approach taken to narrative structure by early cinema, which 
reflected the existing knowledge and conventions of the early cinema 
audience and which only gradually developed into the patterns of narrative 
structure associated with the classical period. Gaudreault’s formalist account 
suggests that early cinema combined theatrical traditions of performance 
(particularly predominant in the first ten years of cinema) with more literary 
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traditions of narration as the development of more sophisticated story telling 
evolved, no doubt assisted by technological developments in the editing 
process (1990, pp.68 to 75). Popple and Kember suggest that in essence 
during the period 1895 to 1914 the cinema developed from a position where 
film audiences - like theatre audiences, flaneurs and the crowds at the Morgue 
and the wax museum - were shown what was happening to a position where 
they were told what was happening (2004, p.99).  Again, there is in this 
description an echo of Bordwell’s distinction between mimetic and diegetic 
narration. It is also worth noting that Gunning identifies the period 1907 to 
1913 as that of the “narrativisation” of cinema: the period during which the 
voyeuristic, distancing effects of a narrative structure became predominant 
(Gunning, 1990, p.60). 
It is against this background that Gunning has articulated his theory of the 
Cinema of Attractions. Gunning’s theory draws precisely upon the 
exhibitionistic nature of early cinema, seeking to develop a coherent view of 
early cinema avoiding the “hegemony of narrative films” which coloured 
earlier attempts to construct a coherent theory of early cinema (Gunning, 
1990). In Gunning’s view it was precisely this “act of showing and 
exhibition” which the pre-1906 cinema displayed most intensely. The films 
did not lack narrative content as such but instead filmmakers saw films “less 
as a way of telling stories than as a way of presenting a series of views to an 
audience, fascinating because of their illusory power” (1990, p.57). 
Knowledge of the technology involved and of the fact that this was an illusion 
did not lessen the enjoyment of the experience: in fact it was part of the 
experience, part of the extra-deigetic relationship established between the 
filmmakers and the spectator. The cinema was itself an attraction in the early 
years of cinema, and the notion that the audience will go to the cinema to see 
the latest technology on display has persisted through the history of the 
medium, from the earliest projectors to those who flocked to see the 
capabilities of CGI in films such as Terminator 2: Judgement Day (1991). 
Gunning emphasizes that the Cinema of Attractions is an exhibitionistic 
cinema, as opposed to the voyeuristic cinema examined by Baudry, Metz and 
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others, based upon its ability to show things rather than to tell the audience 
about them:
…the cinema of attractions directly solicits spectator attention, 
inciting visual curiosity, and supplying pleasure through an exciting 
spectacle – a unique event, whether fictional or documentary, that is 
of interest in itself (1990, p.58).
The notion of the direct display to the audience as a vehicle for shock or 
surprise therefore dominates over the need for narrative drive and, 
importantly, the establishment of a direct extra-diegetic relationship with the 
spectator is central:
Theatrical display dominates over narrative absorption, emphasizing 
the direct simulation of shock or surprise at the expense of unfolding a 
story or creating a diegetic universe. The cinema of attractions 
expends little energy creating characters with psychological 
motivations or individual personality. Making use of both fictional 
and non-fictional attractions, its energy moves outward towards an 
acknowledged spectator rather than inward towards the character-
based situations essential to classical narrative (1990, p.59).
This experience was not based upon an attempt to convince spectators that the 
images were real, but to astonish them with the transformation from the static 
photographic image to the illusion of movement:
Rather than mistaking the image for reality, the spectator is astonished 
by its transformation through the new illusion of projected motion. Far 
from incredulity, it is the incredible nature of the illusion itself that 
renders the viewer speechless. What is displayed before the audience 
is less the impending speed of the train than the force of the cinematic 
apparatus. Or, to put it better, the one demonstrates the other
(Gunning, 1994, p.118).
What is being described here is one of the effects of spectacle upon the 
spectator: the simultaneous astonishment at the illusion but also at the display 
of the technical virtuosity involved in producing the spectacle itself. This 
sense of self-conscious display also extended to the manner in which these 
early films were presented, involving the promoter addressing the audience 
directly before the film began and even working them up into a state of 
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excitement and apprehension about the effect of the display they are about to 
witness (Gunning, 1994, p.120).  Much of this technique of showmanship was 
carried over from the vaudeville or fairground tradition, which is the real 
precursor of cinema, notwithstanding the early theorists’ attempts to distance 
cinema from the theatre and align it more with a literary pedigree (Tredell, 
2002, pp.15 to 19; Eisenstein, 1949b). 
“Cinema of Attractions” alludes to the fairground attractions from whence 
cinema developed and also to Eisenstein’s montage of attractions, intended to 
shock the spectator into a new ideological awareness:
The aesthetic of attraction addresses the audience directly…Rather 
than being an involvement with narrative action or empathy with 
character psychology, the cinema of attractions solicits a highly 
conscious awareness of the film image engaging the viewer’s 
curiosity. The spectator does not get lost in a fictional world and its 
drama, but remains aware of the act of looking, the excitement of
curiosity and its fulfillment (Gunning, 1994, p.121).
Gunning goes on to make the point that this element of the cinematic 
experience did not die when the narrative form became dominant:
However, even with the introduction of editing and more complex 
narratives, the aesthetic of attraction can still be sensed in periodic 
doses of non-narrative spectacle given to audiences (musicals and 
slapstick comedy provide clear examples). The cinema of attractions 
persists in later cinema, even if it rarely dominates the form of a 
feature film as a whole. It provides an underground current flowing 
beneath narrative logic and diegetic realism, producing those moments 
of cinematic depaysement beloved by the surrealists (1994, p.123).
Whilst it is clear from this passage that the Cinema of Attractions refers to a 
particular sort of spectacle in its historical context and does not account for all 
cinematic spectacle, and also that Gunning assumes that this type of spectacle 
is “non-narrative”, the model offered by the aesthetic of astonishment 
provides an attractive way out of the predicament presented by the twin 
demands of Neoformalism and the psychoanalytical gaze in that it allows for 
a more direct and emotional involvement on the spectator’s part beyond the 
cognitive processes of Neoformalism and acknowledges the importance of the 
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emotional aspect of the cinematic experience which had been overlooked by 
psychoanalysis. It emphasizes those aspects of the spectatorial experience that 
have been overlooked and can be read as a particular formulation of the effect 
of the sensual image discussed in Chapter One. In addition, it perfectly 
describes aspects of cinema that have been undervalued by recent theory. In 
fact, as Williams observes, the readiness with which this concept has been 
taken up over the last decade perhaps pointed to the willingness to find an 
alternative to the existing paradigms (1994, p.12 and footnote 13). 
It can be argued that Gunning is also suggesting that there was a particular 
way of experiencing the Cinema of Attractions and that that way of seeing 
still persists, albeit subsumed to the dictates of the need to read the dominant 
filmic narrative. Notwithstanding this, the Cinema of Attractions is capable of 
coexisting alongside the dominant narrative mode and expressing itself from 
time to time in the form of a particular type of spectacle. There are notions 
here which I will discuss below and which are important to an understanding 
of an aesthetic of spectacle, albeit I will argue that this aesthetic will go 
beyond Gunning’s view as expressed above.
The first point to make is that spectacle in mainstream cinema involves a 
particular way of seeing, implicitly different from the way we see (or read) 
narrative. That particular model of spectatorship evolved in the early cinema 
in the context of developments in the nineteenth century, as discussed above. 
Given that the element of spectacle contained in those early films has 
remained a component of film throughout its history, there are clear 
continuities between early cinema and the cinema of the present day, 
particularly marked by the resurgence of films with a high degree of 
spectacular sequences which form the basis of much mainstream cinema. The 
second element to note is the relationship between spectacle and technology 
which is as much part of the pleasure of watching spectacle as the images 
themselves. Spectacular films both use and advertise the technology that has 
gone into the production of their spectacular effects and are marketed as 
vehicles for the display of those effects as much as for their plot or storyline, 
as will be discussed further in Chapter Four. The spectator may go to see a 
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film simply because he or she wants to see the technology on display. The 
third point to draw out from Gunning’s comments is the idea of the 
coexistence of the Cinema of Attractions and the dominant narrative mode 
during the course of a film. This co-existence generally reflects the 
relationship between narrative and spectacle, or narrational and non-
narrational transmission, proposed in the transmission model. 
In Hansen’s formulation, early cinematic displays solicit the viewer in a more 
direct manner than “classical” cinema “as a member of an anticipated social 
audience and a public, rather than an invisible, private consumer” (1991, 
p.34). This comment points back to the mass entertainment element of early 
cinema, carrying over from the other forms of mass entertainment at the end 
of the nineteenth century discussed above. These displays are the variety of 
“competing spectacles” available in the cinema of attractions, in contrast to 
the coherent narrative of classical cinema into which the spectator is absorbed 
by way of a “unified spectatorial vantage point” (Hansen, 1991, p.34). As this 
quote indicates, Hansen suggests that a coherent spectatorial model could 
only be established once a narrative structure was in place, a development 
which occurred during the period 1907 to 1917. Consequently, as Hansen 
acknowledges, the development of a narrative structure involved the creation 
of a voyeuristic relationship between the spectator and the film which did not 
exist in early cinema: “With their emphasis on display, early films are self-
consciously exhibitionist, whereas classical cinema disavows its exhibitionist 
quality in order to maintain the spell of the invisible gaze” inherent in the 
unified spectatorial vantage point and the classical narrative structure (1991, 
p.36).  
Consequently, to evaluate early cinema in terms of the transmission model, 
there is a predominance of non-narrational rather than narrational 
transmission but by no means an absence of narrational transmission. Further, 
the predominant mode of narrational transmission is, in Bordwell’s terms, 
mimetic rather than diegetic, based upon showing an audience what is 
happening rather than telling them. Whereas many modern films cross refer 
to other films, early cinema cross refers to other forms of popular mass 
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entertainment. In addition, it is important to note the exhibitionistic nature of 
early cinema, linking directly to emotions and visceral sensations which 
appear to have been overlooked by the voyeuristic, psychoanalytically-based 
approach to cinema or the hermetically contained approach of Neoformalism 
with its emphasis on narration. It is therefore arguable that the study of early 
cinema when contrasted with the more narrative-centred classical cinema 
demonstrates that a concentration on narration leads towards a more 
voyeuristic medium which tends to exclude any prospect of a direct 
relationship with the spectator and yet it is precisely this direct relationship 
which is established by spectacle.
Bordwell argues that the construction of a complex narrative structure and a 
narrative-driven cinema inevitably entails the construction of an unseen 
observer (represented by the unified vantage point of the camera). This 
applies whether, in Bordwell’s terms, the narration is mimetic (when the 
presence of the camera-as-observer structures the approach) or diegetic. The 
unseen observer implies the disembodied, detached subjective viewer of the 
classical approach, the voyeuristic spectatorial experience which does not 
accord with the more complete model associated with the embodied spectator 
with its exhibitionistic elements. Consequently, an issue with the
Neoformalist approach in this respect is that it may lead to an incomplete 
picture of the spectator’s experience because it excludes the visceral 
sensations and the extra-diegetic relationship that the film establishes with the 
spectator through the exhibitionistic display offered by spectacle. Spectacle is 
exhibitionistic because it engages the spectator directly rather than through 
the medium of the diegesis of the film itself. It plays directly upon the 
spectator’s emotions of shock, surprise, excitement and sometimes fear and, 
as Gunning suggests, its energy is directed outward toward the spectator 
rather than inward towards the characters in the film. Because of this change 
in focus and energy, soliciting a direct response from the spectator, the 
tendency has been to view the spectacular event as a wholly exhibitionistic 
display which sits uncomfortably with the essentially voyeuristic and self-
contained structure of narrative-driven cinema. It can be argued, however, for 
the reasons set out in Chapter One that spectacle, as a balance of narrational 
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and non-narrational transmission, contains elements that contribute to the 
narrative. Our enjoyment of a spectacular sequence and our emotional 
involvement in it does not derive solely from the excitement of the action but 
also from our empathy with the characters. Empathy leads to an emotional 
investment, and empathy is most likely to be created by the narrative. 
Consequently, narrative and spectacle do not work independently of each 
other but, in fact, usually work together in a complimentary manner if they 
are to work effectively. Spectacle arguably therefore also works with the 
narrative to amplify the spectator’s emotional response to the film beyond that 
which, working separately, spectacle or narrative might otherwise achieve. It 
may be that the phrase “empty spectacle” in reality denotes a spectacle in 
which the spectator has little or no emotional involvement, either because the 
narrative has been ineffective or there is perhaps insufficient narrational
transmission to create the desired effect. 
Singer points out that attempting to contrast the cinema of attractions as an 
historical event confined to early cinema up to, say, 1907 with the classical 
cinema thereafter is overly deterministic and creates a false dichotomy 
between attractions (which he defines more broadly than Gunning as “any 
element prompting sensory excitation”) and the cinema of narrative 
integration:
To reiterate a point that has been made innumerable times already, 
attractions were not rendered extinct by the onset of narrative 
integration; rather, arousing spectacle became an important 
component of narrative film. Moreover, there is no reason to think that 
the emergence of “formal operations” designed to improve narrative 
comprehension and effectiveness would have mitigated the impact of 
attractions. On the contrary, it is more likely that classical narration 
amplified the stimulating capacity of attractions by endowing them 
with strong dramatic and emotional significance (2001, p.129).
Singer emphasises that spectacle, seen as a larger phenomenon than just 
Gunning’s cinematic depaysement, did not go underground but integrated 
itself, as Gunning suggests, into the unified classical narrative structure. This 
is, however, once again a narrative-driven view of events. It might be more 
accurate to say that, historically, the narrational transmission element 
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increases with the development of cinema after 1907 so that the balance of 
narrational and non-narrational transmission is altered more in favour of 
greater narrational transmission over the course of films taken as a whole. 
Even this is to generalise too far since clearly genres such as melodrama, 
Westerns and war films by definition maintained a different transmission 
balance to, say, romances or musicals, but at least it does move away from the 
idea that first there was spectacle and then narrative came along and pushed it 
into the shadows. 
What has actually happened is that whilst spectacle has existed as a 
component of film throughout what has been termed early, classical and post-
classical periods, film theory has chosen to concentrate upon the implications 
of the voyeuristic, narrative-based elements of film and in the process has 
chosen to ignore or marginalise the function of spectacle. In fact spectacle, 
and indeed other reasons to go to the cinema such as the desire to see a 
favourite film star on the screen, have always been an integral part of the 
spectator’s experience. As such there are more continuities than differences in
this approach: so-called differences are in reality simply reflections of the 
fluctuating balance between narrational and non-narrational transmission. As 
King has pointed out, when discussing the enduring appeal of the spectacular 
blockbuster, a genre which has been around for almost as long as cinema 
itself (Neale, 2003):
Once reasonably coherent narrative became established as a primary 
basis of organisation (by the 1910s) it was constantly subject to 
combination with all sorts of other appeals, ranging from the presence 
of larger-than-role star performers to the vicissitudes of melodramatic 
coincidence and the pleasures of large scale spectacular 
attraction…This may sometimes be foregrounded to an extra degree in 
the spectacular blockbuster, but the differences, generally, are relative 
and of a degree rather than absolute (King, 2003, p.125).
It is interesting to note that as narrative sophistication developed in early 
cinema, the process of deliberate incorporation of the spectacular into film 
was already under way: Popple and Kember point by way of example to The 
Long Strike (1911), a melodrama adapted from a stage play to which was 
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added a new scene in which one of the characters dives fifty feet into the 
water from the deck of a passenger liner (a stunt in fact performed by the 
film’s director) (2004, p.113). This sequence was heavily used in the 
advertising campaign for the film, an early example of reliance upon a 
spectacular effect to bolster interest in an otherwise lacklustre storyline, a 
tactic to which the studios have had recourse on many occasions since.
2.5 Conclusions
The review carried out above suggests that spectacle draws the spectator into 
a complicit and complex relationship based upon a direct, extra-diegetic 
communication. That relationship is established by appealing to the 
spectator’s visceral sense of astonishment or excitement, and the spectator’s 
complicity in recognizing that what they are watching is an illusion but their 
willingness in going along with it. In the same way that the early cinema was 
spectacular, so the technology employed in such sequences involves a direct 
relationship with the spectator in the material process of the filmmaking 
itself. In addition, the awareness of the physicality of the actions on the 
screen, of the stunt man jumping off a high building or leaping between cars 
travelling at high speed, for example, also establishes a direct link with the 
spectator that is outside the diegesis of the film. 
Far from spectacle being an element of the film that should be banished to the 
margins of the cinematic experience, as Neoformalism seeks to do, spectacle 
can be seen as working with narrative to heighten the emotional impact of the 
narrative structure of the film just as narrative emphasises the impact of
spectacle by generating empathy between the characters on the screen and the 
audience. This is a relationship that has existed throughout the history of 
cinema. What has altered is the balance between narrative and spectacular 
elements, between narrational and non-narrational transmission. From this 
perspective Gunning’s cinema of attractions may be seen as a useful historical 
model and corrective to the then-prevailing views regarding the emotional 
content of the cinematic experience, but overall it remains a theory grounded 
in its historical context and concerned with one facet of non-narrational 
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transmission, namely the sequences which survive in slapstick and musicals 
rather than the spectacular action sequence, for example. Singer’s wider 
definition is more helpful here in locating that element of the cinematic 
experience that needs to be brought back into the theoretical mainstream.
Spectacle can therefore at this stage be defined by reference to three essential 
characteristics: first, it is a balance of narrational and non-narrational 
transmission, predominantly but not exclusively non-narrational transmission; 
secondly, it constructs an exhibitionistic relationship with the spectator based 
upon a direct address to the spectator’s emotions - in Gunning’s formulation, 
the energy of the sequence flows out towards the spectator rather than inward 
towards the characters; thirdly, spectacle arouses shock, excitement, awe, 
astonishment and other emotional responses in the spectator, affecting the 
spectator in a physical, visceral manner. 
The first two propositions above can be stated reasonably objectively and, it 
is suggested, are consistent as elements of a definition of spectacle in 
mainstream cinema. The third characteristic, however, is far more difficult to 
define precisely because it is the most mercurial and subjective. Clearly, it is 
going to change over time, and change quite rapidly. This is evident from the 
history of film itself. Early cinema audiences were captivated first by the fact 
of the technology so that a film of, for example, a rowing boat leaving a 
harbour, would be sufficient to arouse interest and excitement. As film 
techniques develop and the advent of editing encourages the development of 
the chase format, so we see action, special effects and parallel editing being 
employed. Arguably all of these developments are aimed at keeping the 
audience interested and excited, progressing from equally technically 
adventurous and exciting spectacles constructed in the theatre and vaudeville. 
The search for what keeps the audience excited and astonished and coming 
back to the cinema in the face of competition from other sources of audio 
visual entertainment such as television and, more recently, computer games, 
fuels technological advancement, be that sound, colour, widescreen or CGI. 
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Consequently, it is too simplistic to suggest that early cinema contained a 
great deal of spectacle, that this subsequently all but disappeared during the 
dominance of the narrative classical period only to re-emerge again with the 
arrival of the revitalised action movie in the 1980s. The reality is that 
spectacle has remained an essential part of the cinematic experience, albeit 
that the precise delineation of spectacle has developed and changed over the 
course of the history of cinema as filmmakers seek to create the emotional 
response that spectators want from the cinematic experience. Spectacle alters 
dependent upon context but is always in the service of what will thrill, amaze 
and astonish. 
Having proposed a model of spectatorship sufficient to include spectacle, the 
next step is to consider its cognitive basis. Some existing cognitive models, 
concentrating upon a narrative-driven view of cinema, do not take this 
element sufficiently into account. Given that the Neoformalist approach 
appears to construct the idea of a narrative cinema apparently to the exclusion 
of spectacle and its attendant emotional impact it appears to be incomplete for 
our purposes.  The next chapter will therefore review cognitive approaches to 
this area to consider whether they adequately account for the presence and 
impact of spectacle. To the extent that they do not, a revised approach will be 






The development of the working definition of spectacle in Chapters One and 
Two has lead to a re-evaluation of the basis of the spectator’s cinematic 
experience, an understanding that emotion is an important and fundamental 
aspect of that experience and that films should be seen as communicating 
directly and exhibitionistically with the spectator. The transmission model 
invites us to see films holistically as involving a constantly fluctuating 
balance between narrational and non-narrational transmission. As a result, 
concepts such as narrative and spectacle, voyeurism or exhibitionism become 
more relational, interacting with each other as the film progresses. The 
transmission model and the act of looking described in the previous chapter 
tie, in Frampton’s words, “content, form and filmgoer together” so that the 
spectator experiences the film as an organic whole (Frampton, 2006, p.212). 
In such circumstances, the concept of spectacle as simply being antithetical to 
narrative vanishes as spectacle instead permeates the spectator’s cinematic 
experience, becoming one element of the dramatic forms used by film to 
communicate with the spectator. 
In order to consolidate the working definition of spectacle developed in the 
previous chapters, it is necessary to consider another facet of spectacle as an 
aspect of the transmission model, and that is the mental processes that 
underlie the spectator’s response to spectacle. This exercise will complement 
the theoretical and historical approaches taken in the previous chapters. The 
study of such mental processes and the spectator’s emotional response to film 
is a central concern of cognitive film theory.  This chapter will therefore 
consider the progress that cognitivism has made in delineating these mental 
and emotional processes and the extent to which, as a result, a cognitive 
model is able to accommodate the idea of transmission and the redefined 
concept of spectacle. This exercise will be valuable in tracing the contribution 
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that cognitive film theory has made to an understanding of the spectator’s 
mental processes and emotional responses to film. In addition, as an 
important approach to the examination of the mental processes underlying 
cinematic spectatorial activity, it is an area that must be carefully considered 
and addressed. It is therefore worth taking time to examine the most relevant 
cognitive theories carefully to see what they can reveal about the cognitive 
approach to spectacle and the idea of transmission and to consider whether as 
they stand they can accommodate the ideas proposed in this thesis. 
It will be argued that whilst existing cognitive theories have much to say that 
is useful in terms of understanding underlying mental processes, they have in 
certain respects reached something of a dead end in that they are developing 
along lines that do not allow them to reflect the direct and immediate 
experience of spectacle and the inclusive nature of the transmission model.  In 
order to cater for the presence of spectacle I will argue that we need to 
combine our intellectual and emotional responses to the cinematic experience 
in a theory sufficient to encompass the totality of the experience of watching, 
listening to and participating in a film. This inclusive approach supports the 
transmission model and the model of spectatorship outlined in the previous 
chapters.
Very broadly, cognition is the study of the mental processes underlying our 
ability to perceive the world (Andrade and May, 2004, p.1). Cognitive film 
theory is therefore primarily interested in how spectators make sense of and 
respond to films, together with the textual structures and techniques that give 
rise to spectatorial activity and response (Plantinga, 2002, p.23). The 
cognitive approach to film theory was originally developed in the mid-1980s 
with a series of books and essays questioning the then prevalent basis of film 
theory which, as discussed in Chapter One, utilised a combination of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism and Barthesian semiotics 
(Plantinga, 2002, p.17). Cognitive film theory was used in both Narration in 
the Fiction Film and The Classical Hollywood Cinema. Bordwell further 
clarified his methodology in 1989 in his essay “A Case for Cognitivism” and 
in 1990 in another essay “A Case for Cognitivism: Further Reflections”.  
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Critiques of the existing theoretical paradigms also appeared, in particular 
Carroll’s Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film 
Theory. Bordwell and Carroll’s Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies
continued the assault. These works represented a strand of film theory which 
stretched back to Munsterberg and Eisenstein and which focussed on the 
study of film from a cognitive rather than a psychoanalytical perspective.  
Given Bordwell’s close association with cognitive film theory, it is 
appropriate to start this chapter by considering the cognitive basis of 
Neoformalism and its relationship to spectacle before moving on to consider 
cognitive film theory and spectacle in general. 
Although Neoformalism has exerted a powerful influence since the 
publication of Bordwell’s Narration in the Fiction Film in 1985, it has also 
inevitably attracted criticism. It has been shown, for example, that the picture 
it paints of an industrialised film production system turning out largely 
homogenised products may be historically inaccurate (Cowie, 1998). It can be 
argued, however, that one of the main issues with the approach taken by 
Bordwell in Narration in the Fiction Film in the present context is that 
Neoformalism appears to allow no room for any emotional content in the 
spectatorial experience. When considering the nature and effect of spectacle, 
this renders Neoformalism an incomplete theory since it fails to take account 
of the presence of the direct, emotional impact of spectacle. Further, I will 
argue that narrative is not the end in itself which Neoformalism suggests. It is 
a means to an end, and that end is the spectator’s affective or emotional 
response when watching a film.
Since the advent of the Neoformalist approach, however, cognitive theory has 
sought to integrate emotion into a cognitive framework. A number of 
significant studies have been made which explicitly deal with the concept of 
emotion within a cognitivist framework. Thus, Smith has reviewed the issue 
of emotion in the context of character identification and Tan has addressed 
the question of whether the spectator watching a film experiences “authentic” 
emotion and, if so, the nature of that affective response. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive theory in this area since Narration in the Fiction Film is 
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Grodal’s work on emotion and cognition as expressed through a study of 
different film genres, most notably Moving Pictures: A New Theory of Film 
Genres, Feelings, and Cognition. These theories will be reviewed to consider 
the insights they offer into the experience of spectacle and the mental 
processes involved before moving on to examine a more inclusive approach 
which, I will argue, is more able to accommodate spectacle and the 
transmission model. 
As will become apparent, those cognitive theories that developed in the wake 
of Bordwell’s Neoformalism, whilst addressing issues of emotion that 
Bordwell neglected, still tend to adopt Bordwell’s categorisation of 
mainstream cinema as essentially narrative-driven, thus relegating apparently 
non-narrative elements such as spectacle to at best a secondary position. This 
suggests that we need to go further than simply seeking to adapt existing 
cognitive theories to fit the transmission model: we need to move beyond the 
cognitive approach altogether. In fact, taking this radical step forward in 
reality involves taking a number of steps backward, stripping away the layers 
of theory that have accumulated over the years to look again at the direct 
emotional impact of the cinematic experience. This is the approach adopted 
by Frampton, who relies significantly in his work upon early theorists such as 
Munsterberg and Artaud, who experienced cinema as a fresh, new art form 
unencumbered by pre-existing theoretical conceptions. 
This chapter will therefore outline the development of cognitive film theory 
and examine the cognitive basis of Neoformalism. A consideration of the way 
that cognitive film theory has dealt with the question of emotion will then 
follow, which will include a more detailed consideration of particular theories 
advanced by Smith, Tan and Grodal which seek to deal with emotional 
response in a cognitive context. Frampton’s Filmosophy will then be 
reviewed to see whether this offers an approach which can adequately cater 
for the transmission model and the presence of spectacle. This exercise will 
require a consideration of the models proposed by Smith, Tan, Grodal and 
Frampton in some detail to allow a proper understanding of the extent to 
which these models address, or fail to address, the presence of spectacle. It 
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will be argued that in order to deal adequately with the transmission model 
and spectacle, as that term should now properly be understood as central to 
the cinematic experience, existing cognitive theories are unsuitable and that 
the more holistic, intuitive approach suggested by Filmosophy is to be 
preferred. Ultimately I will argue that when all of these considerations are 
taken into account and the developments of previous chapters in this thesis 
are considered, it becomes apparent that in fact spectacle and narrative are 
two of a number of resources available to the film to provide the emotional 
impact that the spectator seeks and, in the case of spectacle, to amplify that 
impact. Given that this emotional impact is central to the spectator’s 
cinematic experience, it follows that spectacle itself occupies a central 
position in that experience. 
3.2 Neoformalism and Cognition
Given its importance to the issues raised in this thesis, as discussed in 
previous chapters, the starting point for an examination of cognitive theory is 
Bordwell’s Neoformalist approach. A critique of Bordwell’s approach has 
already been undertaken in Chapters One and Two, but it is necessary to 
return to this model in this chapter to consider it explicitly in the context of 
the cognitive theory that it adopts. Cognitivism holds that people’s 
perceptions, feelings and actions result substantially from processes which 
start as input to the senses but then give rise to mental activity via a series of 
mechanisms which can be described and observed. Such processes include 
prior mental representations which can be mapped onto the external world (as 
perceived by the senses) as a way of ordering it. This is often referred to as a 
“top down” approach – the imposition of preconceived mental patterns onto 
the observable world. In other cases, conclusions can be drawn directly from 
sensory input, colour perception being a good example. This is the “bottom 
up” approach. Bordwell suggests that both bottom up and top down 
processing are inferential “in that perceptual ‘conclusions’ about the stimulus 
are drawn, often inductively, on the basis of ‘premises’ furnished by the data, 
by internalised rules, or by ‘prior knowledge’” (1985, p.31). Broadly, in his 
view, whether such processes can be described as perceptual or cognitive, 
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they involve organised clusters of knowledge to guide the decision making 
process. These clusters are the schemata that Bordwell then uses as the basis 
for his Neoformalist account.
This approach therefore posits a dynamic interaction between the observer 
and the environment. In the context of film, as Bordwell puts it, the spectator 
thinks. There is, however, more involved when watching a film than just 
perceiving movement and sound and understanding these as representations 
of the veridical world. To make sense of a narrative film, the spectator must 
also understand the mechanics of story construction. This leads Bordwell to 
divide the narrative into plot and story, an approach originally devised by the 
Russian Formalists in the 1920s in the context of literary analysis. This route 
is taken because Bordwell is looking at a model of a narrative-driven film. By 
this he means a film that has a narrative structure. This is a reasonable 
distinction to make for the purposes of analysing the narrative element of 
mainstream cinema but ultimately it can be argued that it has the effect of 
implying that anything that does not contribute to the narrative is outside the 
boundary of Bordwell’s model. 
As a result, Bordwell’s approach becomes problematic when considering 
spectacle, as demonstrated in Chapter One. Furthermore, Bordwell seeks to 
treat emotion as being separable from the narrative, thus denying even the 
emotive effect of narrative let alone the presence of spectacle. Consequently, 
Bordwell deals with what he calls “affective features” in the context of 
cognitive processes as follows:
As a perceptual-cognitive account, this theory does not address 
affective features of film viewing. This is not because I think emotion 
is irrelevant to our experience of cinematic storytelling - far from it -
but because I am concerned with the aspects of viewing that lead to 
constructing the story and its world. I am assuming that a spectator’s 
comprehension of the film’s narrative is theoretically separable from 
his or her emotional responses (1985, p.30).
Bordwell is never less than careful with his definitions of terms. Here his 
framing of the issue is such that on its own there is perhaps not much to 
108
debate. The real issue is the extent to which an area has been so carefully 
fenced off that it in fact deals only with a part of the cinematic experience, 
leaving a very significant section outside the theoretical pale. It can be argued 
that whilst Bordwell does not suggest that emotion plays no part in the 
experience of cinematic storytelling, the passage cited above is structured so 
as to separate the emotional response from the narrative comprehension. As a 
proposed model, this seems abstract and distanced from what might be seen 
as the lived experience of going to the cinema. As described in the previous 
chapter, the narrative may increase our empathy for the characters in the film, 
thus adding additional emotional impact to a spectacular sequence in which 
they are involved, and the spectacle will often advance the narrative more 
than seems to have been admitted by the proponents of narrative-driven 
cinema. 
Secondly, as a result of the very wide definition of narration employed by 
Bordwell, this approach implicitly excludes any emotional response that 
arises from any non-narrational element of the film, such as the delight and 
pleasure that we might feel from a particular camera movement allied with an 
evocative piece of music (for example, the moment the camera rises over the 
railway station roof to follow Claudia Cardinale’s progress into the town in 
Once Upon a Time in the West (1969)). Such considerations play no part in 
Bordwell’s analysis. In fact, Bordwell suggests that psychoanalytical models 
may be “well suited” for explaining the emotional aspects of cinema. (1985, 
p.30) Given his dismissal of the psychoanalytical approach elsewhere in 
Narration in the Fiction Film, this seems like an attempt to relegate emotion 
to second class status.
Bordwell does review the emotional impact of narrative strategies, but again 
one has to question whether emotional impact arises as a by-product of 
narrative in this way:
When we bet on a hypothesis, especially under pressure of time, 
confirmation can carry an emotional kick; the organism enjoys 
creating unity. When the narrative delays satisfying an expectation, 
the withholding of knowledge can arouse keener interest. When a 
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hypothesis is disconfirmed, the setback can spur the viewer to new 
bursts of activity. The mixture of anticipation, fulfilment, and blocked 
or retarded or twisted consequences can exercise great emotional 
power. The formal processes of perception and cognition – as 
Eisenstein well knew – can trigger affect (1985, pp.39 to 40).
Bordwell’s description may work to some degree as a partial, albeit 
somewhat clinical, explanation of the emotional effect of narrative 
development, but it leaves out a significant element, being the emotional 
impact of spectacle addressed directly to the spectator. Whilst it is of course 
correct that Eisenstein was well aware of the emotional effect of perception 
and cognition, these processes can apply equally to spectacle as they can to 
narrative, and Eisenstein paid little attention to trying to split narrative off 
from spectacle, seeing the film instead as an organic whole. In fact it is 
Eisenstein who conceives of a cinema approached through the 
reconceptualisation of the cognitive process in terms of intellectual passion 
and activity (Frampton 2006 quoting Eisenstein, p.199). In essence, 
Eisenstein is working towards and seeking to create a “sensual cinema” a 
term which neatly encapsulates a cinema which properly accommodates the 
emotional impact of film and which forms the basis of the sensual image 
discussed in Chapter One. In addition, the fact that, in Bordwell’s terms, the 
organism enjoys creating unity does not seem an adequate explanation for 
what we feel when, for example, Eric Liddell wins the gold medal in Chariots 
of Fire (1981) or Brody kills the shark in Jaws (1975). This highlights a point 
made by Frampton when considering the cognitive approach as a whole: film 
experience is not totally understandable as a continuation of normal 
experience (2006, p.151). It is something else, something different not least 
because the film world is not reality; it is “a cousin of reality” (emphasis in 
original) (2006, p.1). It is constructed to engage with the spectator both 
intellectually and emotionally. 
Bordwell may subsequently have relaxed his position somewhat in relation to 
the emotional aspect of the cinematic experience, as evidenced by his nod 
towards the emotional aspect of cinematic representations in a more recent 
essay reviewed by Browne (2004). In fact, after Narration in the Fiction Film
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was published he responded to criticisms that his theory did not take 
sufficient account of the emotional aspect of the cinematic experience, 
referring to the passage cited above where he suggests that narrative is 
theoretically separable from the spectator’s emotional response and pointing 
out that this passage “speaks of a theoretical idealisation for the sake of 
explanatory specificity” and that whilst emotional qualities are a 
“controversial topic within cognitive theory” they are the subject of 
substantial work by other theorists such as Noel Carroll (1990, pp.107 and 
108). Whilst this may be correct as far as it goes, Bordwell does not really 
deny that Neoformalism does not seek to deal with the emotional content of 
the spectator’s cognitive engagement with film. As such given that, as argued 
in Chapters One and Two, emotion is central to the spectator’s cinematic 
experience, this again points to the limitations of Bordwell’s approach in this 
respect. Arguably, his comments above confirm that we cannot see his 
Neoformalist approach as being a comprehensive theory of narration in the 
fiction film if we take the approach that emotion is not separable from the 
spectator’s experience of the film, even when considering only the narrative 
content, let alone spectacle. When we go further and consider the 
transmission model and the interaction of narrational and non-narrational 
transmission, the limitations of this approach become even more apparent, for 
the reasons already explored in Chapters One and Two. 
3.3 Cognition and emotion
Having reviewed and critiqued the cognitive basis of Bordwell’s 
Neoformalist approach in the previous section, this section will examine other 
cognitive theories to consider the insights they offer in relation to the 
presence of spectacle and in the light of the transmission model. It will be 
argued that whilst there is much of value in these models, they do not of 
themselves cater for the idea of transmission or for the presence of spectacle 
as it is now understood following the arguments set out in Chapters One and 
Two. This limitation arises largely as a result of these models adopting the 
view of spectacle advanced by Bordwell in Narration in the Fiction Film. 
This enables certain issues to be considered and addressed but also prevents 
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these models from progressing beyond the limitations imposed by the 
Neoformalist approach in the context of spectacle. In addition, as will be 
discussed, these models have a tendency to over-analyse certain aspects of the 
spectator’s mental processes, creating a distance between the abstract model 
and the actual experience.  It will be necessary, to do justice to these 
cognitive models, to explain them in some detail to set them in the context of 
the issues being explored in this thesis.
As discussed above, the issue of the spectator’s emotional responses as part of 
the cognitive process arose at an early stage in the development of cognitive 
film theory.  Works published in the late 1990s and since have sought to 
incorporate emotion into the cognitive framework, arguing that in responding 
to films, thinking and feeling are intimately related (Plantinga, 2002, p.25). 
The most significant of these works for our purposes, by Smith, Tan and 
Grodal, will be considered below. The development of cognitive theories 
incorporating emotional response in the years after the publication of 
Narration in the Fiction Film was such that by 1999 it was possible to 
produce a work such as Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and Emotion, a 
collection of pieces dealing explicitly with the emotional aspects of the 
cinematic experience from a cognitive perspective. In the introduction to this 
work the editors pointed to what had traditionally been seen as the 
incompatibility between cognition and emotion, reflecting the basic Cartesian 
distinction between thinking and feeling which has underlain Western 
philosophy for a considerable period and which made it relatively easy for 
film theory between the 1950s and the 1980s simply to dismiss the emotions 
as incompatible with a proper theoretical approach to the study of film.
As Eitzen puts it in an essay included in Passionate Views: “What the average 
moviegoer wants most of all from movies is not narrative per se but strong 
and concentrated affective responses” (1999, p.91). This neatly emphasises 
the main point of the argument, namely that narrative is not the end in itself 
which Neoformalism suggests. It is a means to an end, and that end is the 
affective or emotional response the spectator gains from watching the film. 
As such, it is more useful to see narrative as existing within the context of a 
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sensuous cinema designed to deliver this emotional response where narrative 
is simply one of the methods by which that response is produced. Arguably, 
mainstream cinema in particular is created for this express purpose, as Tan 
and Fridja note: “The Hollywood movie, it has been observed by many, is 
thoroughly melodramatic in a wider sense, in that it is theatrical, excessive, 
and aims at enlarging emotions” (1990, p.51).  
Bordwell’s suggestion in Narration in the Fiction Film that emotion could be 
left to be dealt with by psychoanalysis is at least indirectly rebuffed by the 
editors of Passionate Views, who point out that psychoanalysis is
fundamentally incapable of dealing with the particulars of cinematic emotion, 
dwelling instead on subject positioning and the mechanisms of desire: 
“Psychoanalytic film theory, with its joint emphasis on identification and 
ideology, has tended to discuss the politics of identity in much more detail 
than it does the nuances of a film’s emotional appeal” (1990, p.11). In 
discussing cerebral concepts such as “desire” and “pleasure” psychoanalytical 
theorists could appear to be studying emotion without actually dealing with 
specific emotional content or response at all. In fact, as Plantinga suggests, 
the word “desire” “becomes a kind of clearinghouse for the entire panoply of 
unconscious drives, instincts and motivations” but cannot in fact account for 
emotions such as “suspense, anticipation, surprise, mystery, sadness, shock” 
and a number of other kinds of viewing affects and experiences (2007, pp.5 
and 6). Plantinga and Smith point out that current psychoanalytic theory 
situates spectator desire within specific historical and social contexts rather 
than utilising more overarching concepts of desire and pleasure (1990, p.12 
and footnotes 26 and 27). Notwithstanding this development a fundamental 
problem still remains in that Freudian theory itself did not deal in any detail 
with emotions. Freud saw emotion as a discharge phenomenon, a way of 
dissipating bottled up psychic energy. Instinct is the foundation of human 
behaviour hence emotion became less central to Freudian theory. Plantinga 
and Smith argue that this leads to the use of the broad concepts of pleasure 
and desire upon which psychoanalytic film theory proceeds but which are too 
general to deal with the specifics of emotional response necessary for a 
proper study of this area (1990, pp.12 and 13). 
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There are precursors to the idea of approaching the affective element of the 
cinematic experience from a theoretical perspective. One of the earliest is 
Munsterberg’s book The Photoplay: A Psychological Study, originally 
published in 1916 but which is still relevant to this area today.  Munsterberg 
deals with the expression of emotion and the emotional response of the 
spectator, dividing this into two broad categories: those identical with the 
emotions of the protagonist and those which may be entirely different or even 
opposite to the emotions displayed on screen and which spring from the 
spectator’s own affective response (2002, pp.99 to 108). For Munsterberg, the 
former, empathic type of emotion is far more prevalent (2002, p.104). The 
emotions elicited by a film are central because they bring “vividness and 
affective tone into our grasping of the [film’s] action” (Quoted by Plantinga 
and Smith, 1990, p.14). 
Further work in this area was carried out by V. F. Perkins in his 1972 book 
Film as Film: Understanding and Judging Movies, in which Perkins argues 
for a film criticism that takes account of and values the spectator’s 
involvement and emotional experience. Criticizing the psychoanalytical 
reliance on “identification” as being impossible to attain, he denies that 
emotional reactions submerge intellect and judgement: on the contrary, they 
often involve a kind of second-order reflexive response even while we 
experience them (1973, p.140). Most importantly, he emphasises the 
experience of going to see a film: it is not just an escape from our real lives 
but an addition to them (1973, pp.137 and 138).  
Whilst Bordwell’s Neoformalism may be open to the criticisms reviewed 
above in relation to its lack of emotional content, there is no doubt that 
Bordwell and others such as Branigan and Carroll paved the way for the 
current cognitively-based theoretical approach by both attacking the dominant 
psychoanalytical model and positing their own theories emphasising the 
cognitive activity of the spectator in the film experience. Carroll went on to 
provide one of the first studies of film and emotion in the context of the 
horror genre (The Philosophy of Horror). Since then there have been a 
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number of general studies of filmic emotion, two particular works of note 
being Murray Smith’s Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion and the 
Cinema and Ed Tan’s Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as 
an Emotion Machine.
Smith’s book is concerned with the issue of emotion in cinema as it arises in 
the context of the spectator’s “identification” with the characters in the film. 
In Smith’s view, the concept of “identification”, whilst often used as a way of 
describing our engagement with the film through our identification with the 
characters, is in fact a more complex phenomenon which fundamentally 
breaks down into two distinct concepts, or as he puts it, levels of 
“engagement”, which are often confused. The first of these is “alignment”, 
being the way in which a film gives us access to the actions, thoughts and 
feelings of the characters. The second is “allegiance”, being the way in which 
a film attempts to marshal our sympathies for or against the various 
characters within the diegesis (Smith, 1995, p.6). Clearly these concepts 
interact but are not interchangeable. Furthermore they can be complex in the 
way they interact with the spectator; so, for example, a film can seek to align 
us with an unsympathetic character, a situation which would have difficulty 
fitting into the undifferentiated concept of “identification”. Similarly, the 
notion of allegiance can become complex, particularly when considering 
characters other than those that are simply “good” or “evil”, but which may 
fall somewhere between these two poles. To these two levels of engagement 
Smith subsequently adds a third, “recognition”, which describes the 
spectator’s construction of character. These three elements together form 
what he terms the “structure of sympathy”.
Importantly for our purposes, Smith sets out early on a number of 
presuppositions upon which his approach is based. One of these is the concept 
of “classical cinema”, which he adopts from Bordwell, Staiger and 
Thompson. Whilst it is clear that Smith is avoiding too rigid a categorisation 
of films along classical lines, nevertheless this usage does signal the adoption 
of the narrative-based approach to this area with all of the preconceptions that 
such an approach entails, as discussed above (1995, p.11). Consequently, 
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characters for Smith exist within their narrative context and, it would appear, 
arise from the narrative element of the film. The issues Smith raises in 
relation to character spring from the narrative. The narration is “the force 
which generates recognition, alignment and allegiance, the basic components 
of the structure of sympathy” (1995, p.75). Each concept defines a level of 
narrative structure which relates to characters. Whilst it appears that 
characters are therefore delimited by narrative, the narrative itself may 
occasionally look elsewhere:
More radically, a narration may direct our attention to peripheral 
‘forceless’ objects, as in the lingering shots of rooms and doorways in 
the films of Straub and Huillet, or the so-called ‘pillow’ shots in the 
films of Ozu. Such cases border on the domain of non-narrative form, 
where the construct of character becomes irrelevant (Smith, 1995, 
p.76).
This passage reveals the familiar separation of the narrative from any other 
element of the film and the assumption that there will be no narrative content 
in such lingering shots. There objects become “forceless”, apparently almost 
redundant in the context of the narrative-driven cinema upon which Smith’s 
approach is based. Further, why is it the case that the construct of character 
becomes irrelevant in such non-narrative moments? Arguably, even if we 
adopt the view that there is no narrative content in such moments, 
nevertheless the characters may still be interacting with their environment or, 
even if there are no characters visible, the film is still interacting with the 
spectator. Do we actually need to have a character visible to learn something 
else about them? Their very absence from a scene may be enlightening in this 
regard. It is also interesting that these objects are classed as “peripheral”. 
Peripheral to what? They may, strictly, be peripheral to the narrative taken on 
its own, but not to the film as a whole. 
On the basis of the transmission model, it is clear that characters do not just 
exist in the context of the narration. We may learn a great deal about a 
character from, for example, the room in which they live, the clothes they are 
wearing and so on. We may learn something from observing a character’s 
reaction to events, spectacular or otherwise. Such elements of the film may 
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contain a great deal of non-narrational transmission, but they are still part of 
the spectator’s experience of the film and the fact that they may not contain a 
balance of narrational transmission does not rob them of importance or 
affective impact, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five. It is not necessary 
for all such elements to feed into the narrative in order for them to have an 
emotional effect on the spectator.  Consequently, from this perspective 
Smith’s approach whilst interesting and consistent within its own terms is 
limited given that it is based upon a Neoformalist view of the central purpose 
and function of narrative, a view which has been demonstrated already to be 
incomplete when the transmission model and the need to consider the 
presence of spectacle is taken into account.  
In the year after Smith’s book, Ed Tan published his work on cognition and 
emotion in the cinema: Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as 
an Emotion Machine. Tan’s central issue was whether a spectator watching a 
film experiences authentic emotion and, if so, the nature of that emotion. 
Again, Tan places narrative at the centre of his concerns:
Current film theory is concerned with the role of narrative in film and 
the way narrative determines film style and film technology. Concepts 
of narration in film are especially relevant for understanding emotion 
in the viewer, because narrative is a way to arouse emotion (1996, 
p.x).
Tan proceeds on the basis that film narration and the emotions felt by the 
spectator when watching a film are inextricably intertwined:
The notion that film narration and viewer emotion are actually two 
sides of the same coin provides us with a hypothetical answer to both 
parts of our central question. First, it assumes that films do evoke 
emotions, and second, it presupposes that film narration is responsible 
for a characteristic systematics in the emotion felt by the viewer
(1996, p.4).
The implication is that the emotions felt by the spectator arise exclusively 
from the narrative, although Tan suggests that the emotion generated by the 
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narrative may be amplified or emphasised by other elements of the cinematic 
experience:
The film as narrative…manipulates individual and easily observable 
characteristics of the medium in order to convey subtle meanings and 
produce highly specific effects. Film technology, including the acting, 
directing, and camera work, serve to present fictional works in such a 
way that they produce the intended effect on the viewer (1996, p.6).
Tan’s theory is in fact an attempt to create what Plantinga has referred to as a 
“global affect structure”; that is, an overarching theory of affect in film 
viewing (Plantinga and Tan, 2007, pp.1 and 2). For Tan the chief emotion 
aroused by film is “interest”. Interest in a film covers the entire span of that 
film although it may be punctuated by moments of higher emotional 
response, which are more memorable and enjoyable than the background 
emotion of interest. Interest is “the inclination to call on resources from a 
limited capacity, and to employ them for the elaboration of a stimulus, under 
the influence of the promises which are inherent in the present situation with 
respect to expected situations” (1996, p.86). As such interest dominates the 
emotional background to the film and acts as a global affect structure. It 
increases the intensity of the other emotional episodes in the film, which 
themselves feed back into the interest emotion. For Tan interest is defined as 
an emotion because it makes possible relational action even if that is 
cognitive and not physical action (2007, p.9).  The question of whether there 
is in fact a global affect structure for film is far from resolved, but the fact 
that the debate is currently taking place indicates the degree to which emotion 
has become the focus of discussion in cognitive film theory circles.  
Tan sees the cinematic experience as an active process involving both thought 
and emotion. Certain images and narrative devices are seen to trigger specific 
emotional effects on the spectator. Tan distinguishes between “fiction 
emotions” and “artefact emotions” (or F and A emotions, as he calls them). F 
emotions are linked to the diegesis and arise out of the spectator’s 
involvement with the fictional world of the film. A emotions involve 
recognition of the film’s construction or its artistry and would encompass for 
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example emotions arising out of the recognition of great acting or 
cinematography. Tan observes that a spectacular sequence would fall within 
this category when the fact of that sequence causes the spectator to become 
aware of the mechanics of its creation. Citing Bordwell, Tan points out that 
such displays of artistic motivation usually arise out of their fictional context 
and are intended to generate intense emotion. Consequently, we can see that 
Tan’s approach may account for the direct emotional effect of spectacle but 
only to the degree permitted by the Neoformalist model.  
In a traditional film of the sort Tan is studying (broadly Bordwell’s classical 
cinema) F emotions tend to dominate with A emotions largely hidden, 
principally because the narrative bias of the film results in a considerable 
degree of identification with and therefore emotional investment in the 
characters by the spectator. This is linked to the extent to which such 
emotions are empathic. It is easy to conceive of empathic F emotions, such as 
pity or sadness for a character, since such empathy arises out of our feelings 
for the character. It is, however, also possible to experience empathic A 
emotions arising out of, for example, delight in a particularly beautiful 
camera movement, as suggested by the example from Once Upon a Time in 
the West referred to above. The major A emotions are, however, 
nonempathic, relating to feelings such as enjoyment, admiration and 
astonishment. It is also possible to conceive of nonempathic F emotions, 
which would relate to, for example, fear arising when watching a sequence or 
desire to see a particular sequence, and the fear aroused by a character’s 
predicament or the desire to see that predicament resolved (1996, pp.81 to 
84). As a result of the diegetic effect all F emotions, whether empathic or 
nonempathic, are witness emotions; that is, the emotions that one would feel 
if actually witnessing the event depicted at first hand. Such emotions would 
include anger, joy, fear, pity, relief and gratitude. It is notable that when we 
consider the sort of emotions we might experience when watching a 
spectacular sequence, they seem to fall into both the A and the F emotion 
categories in that the spectacle may generate an empathic emotional response 
but we may also feel awe or excitement at the execution of a particularly 
spectacular stunt, for example. 
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How does spectacle fit into this categorisation of empathic and nonempathic 
A and F emotions? Tan’s remarks on spectacle are worthy of some 
consideration:
Spectacle in film is, as the term implies, appealing, simply because it 
is largely divorced from the fate of the protagonists. And there is a 
great deal of spectacle in films because the medium itself is 
spectacular. Few film plots are set in totally empty space, and there is 
always some aspect of the background to enjoy, from a breathtaking 
landscape to indoor spaces that most people have never been 
privileged to enter... (1996, p.83).
There are a number of points to take from the above. The first is Tan’s 
implicit definition of spectacle, which seems to be anything which is not 
directly related to narrative-driven character actions. Tan’s definition seems 
to imply a lesser status for spectacle than that afforded to narrative. The 
second point to consider is whether spectacle is really divorced from the 
protagonists’ fate to the extent Tan suggests. Whilst it is clearly the case that 
not all spectacle is closely linked to the fate of the characters (one has only to 
consider by way of example the opening of 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)), a 
substantial amount clearly is, and the interdependence between spectacle and 
narrative that has already been noted reinforces this position. 
Another question raised by the above extract is the nature of the emotion 
which Tan thinks is elicited by spectacle. Is it A or F emotion, empathic or 
nonempathic? The extract referred to earlier seemed to suggest that Tan 
regarded spectacle as falling within the realms of Bordwell’s artistic 
motivation and hence generating A emotion. I have suggested above that the 
range of emotions that seem to be generated by a spectacular sequence would 
appear to cover both A and F emotions. Tan subsequently suggests, however, 
that spectacle calls up nonempathic F emotion. When watching films that 
involve a substantial element of spectacle “watching fictional events is the 
prime attraction, almost divorced from their significance for the characters” 
(1996, p.175).   Nonempathic interest in such circumstances can be described 
as “fascination” with the spectacle itself. Nonempathic emotions are not 
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associated with the implications for the protagonist but rather with the actual 
witnessing of the event. As suggested above, the emotions aroused relate to 
what the spectator will feel when watching, say, a scene of horror or violence 
rather than empathic identification with the characters involved in the 
sequence. These nonempathic emotions are still F emotions because they 
arise out of the diegesis of the film itself. It is, of course, easy to imagine that 
such emotions could be accompanied by A emotions relating to the staging or 
technology involved in the spectacular sequence.
Notwithstanding the essential characteristic of the spectacular sequence as 
being nonempathic F emotions, Tan does acknowledge that such sequences 
will still have a certain significance for the characters and hence generate 
empathic F emotions. This rather restricted view of the emotional effect of a 
spectacular sequence may arise out of Tan’s implicit definition of spectacle. 
The implication of the intertwining of narrative and spectacle suggested in 
Chapter Two by virtue of involving the fate of the characters generates both 
empathic and nonempathic F emotions and thus is experienced more intensely 
by the spectator than a sequence which has less character involvement. This 
does not imply that this first example necessarily contains more narrational 
transmission than the second since it may not be the case that a character’s 
involvement in a spectacular sequence has to advance the narrative 
significantly. There is clearly room for further investigation here of the link 
between character involvement in spectacle and the emotions generated using 
Tan’s model. Indeed, the rise of the action movie in the 1980s and 1990s, 
with its increased emphasis on action as opposed to character development, 
might be seen in these terms as spectacle that concentrates primarily on 
nonempathic F and A emotions whereas earlier spectacular sequences (such 
as those in Lawrence of Arabia (1962) for example) incorporated a greater 
element of empathic F emotions by virtue of their comparatively better 
developed characters. 
For our purposes, the major issue with Tan’s formulation is his definition of 
spectacle.  One of the consequences of this definition is the suggestion that a 
spectacular sequence gives rise only to nonempathic F emotions. This would 
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seem overly reductive. Spectacle is for Tan something that is largely left over 
rather than a significant element of the cinematic experience:
The events of the narrative befall the character, not the viewer. Nor 
are viewers under the impression that these events touch them; the 
diegetic effect creates the illusion that one is present in the fictional 
world, but as a spectator or witness. In short, the situational meaning 
for the viewer always contains, in addition to the situational meaning 
for the protagonist, an element of spectacle (1996, p.190).      
“Situational meaning” here means the appraisal of a situation by the 
protagonist (or the viewer) in terms of its personal significance. “If it is to 
give rise to an emotion, the appraisal of a situation must contain certain 
critical meaning features. This is the law of situational meaning” (1996, p.45).  
Thus, the viewer whilst becoming absorbed in the film’s diegesis retains a 
certain objectivity, a certain distance from the events in the screen borne of 
the knowledge that they are not actually in the situation in which the 
characters find themselves: they are at best an invisible witness. 
Consequently, in addition to the identification with the characters’ emotional 
situation, the viewer experiences nonempathic F emotion (and possibly A 
emotion) arising out of this distancing. This appears to be categorised by Tan 
simply as “spectacle”, something to be experienced largely only on a 
nonempathic level. This has echoes of the centred point-of-view voyeuristic 
spectator of the Neoformalist model discussed in the previous chapter. 
Consequently, this would appear to be an incomplete definition for our 
purposes and, furthermore, leads Tan to underestimate the emotional 
complexity of a spectacular sequence, which encompasses the full range of 
emotions he considers, both A and F empathic and nonempathic emotions. As 
a result, although Tan’s categorisation does accommodate the presence of 
spectacle, his definition of the term leads him to perhaps limited conclusions 
about its emotional impact.   
In his concluding chapter, Tan describes film as “a conductor of fantasy 
which…produces emotions” (1996, p.236) through the spectator’s willing 
involvement in a series of multiple illusions which draw the spectator into the 
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film’s diegesis and create a genuine emotional response to the filmic events. 
Tan summarises his conclusions as follows:
…in general, narration may be seen as the systematic evocation of 
emotion in an audience, according to a preconceived plan. Narration 
by means of film is one way of doing this...The film generates, as it 
were, like a moving belt, for the entire 90 minutes, a continuous 
emotional situational meaning, programmed as part of its specific 
affect structure, that results in an ongoing, genuine emotional response
(1996, pp.250 and 251).
It is interesting to note a slight slippage in the above passage, which starts 
with a reference to how narrative evokes emotion but ends up talking about 
the effect the film has overall. It is true to say that it is the film that generates 
an emotional meaning, not just the narrative itself. Narrative is only one 
element of film: in fact Tan himself remarks that “the narrative does, of 
course, represent only one – highly abstract – point of view from which the 
film can be described” (1996, p.6).   
This brief discussion of Smith’s and Tan’s work has shown that whilst they 
can both contribute to a consideration of how spectacle and the transmission 
model may be considered in the cognitivist context, the applicability of their 
approaches remains limited given their adherence to Bordwell’s view of the 
nature and function of spectacle. Will other, cognition-based approaches be of 
more assistance? Perhaps the most complete model of filmic emotion from a 
cognitivist perspective to date is Torben Grodal’s Moving Pictures: A new 
Theory of Film Genres, Feelings and Cognition. This is a major contribution 
to this area of study and it will therefore be useful to consider Grodal’s work 
in more detail to see whether this can accommodate spectacle and the 
approach suggested by the transmission model. As will be argued below, 
whilst Grodal’s approach again offers valuable insights into the mental 
processes that underlie emotional and cognitive responses to films, some 
issues remain in relation to his treatment of spectacle as it is now understood 
following Chapters One and Two.  
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Grodal commences his book by stating his aim: “to describe the experience of 
viewing visual fiction and the way in which this experience is created by the 
interaction between fiction and viewer” (1997a, p.1). “Experience” as used 
here is a holistic approach to the way in which visual fiction is viewed, 
encompassing not only a cognitive approach but also expressly including (as 
his title suggests) the emotional aspect of the cinematic experience. Grodal’s 
theory encompasses disciplines well beyond the traditional reach of aesthetics 
and is (as he later suggests (Grodal, 2006, pp.1 and 2)) as much a scientific 
theory as an aesthetic approach:
My hypothesis is therefore that cognitive and perceptual processes are 
intimately linked with emotional processes within a functionally 
unified psychosomatic whole. Because visual fictions are experienced 
in time, a description of the interaction between cognition and 
emotion will be concerned with temporal flow. The theories and 
models for describing the flow of experiences must be brought 
together from several disciplines: film theory, first and foremost; and 
general aesthetics, narrative theory, neuroscience, physiology, and 
cognitive science (1997a, p.1).
In a subsequent article, Grodal defended this approach not only in terms of its 
substantial reliance upon scientific theories but also its stated intention to be 
an overarching theory of film (2006, pp.1 and 2). This may have been in 
response to a criticism made by one reviewer of the book, Eric Parkinson, 
who suggested that the book would have benefited from a more general 
discussion of how cognitive science and traditional aesthetics intersect, 
although Grodal’s article does not explicitly cite Parkinson’s review 
(Parkinson, 1997). In fact Grodal subsequently responded to Parkinson in 
some detail (1997b) suggesting that Parkinson’s criticisms were misplaced 
and that his theory could be read not only at a cognitive level but at a 
“psychological” level as well, as he had demonstrated by producing a 
“psychological” outline of his theories separately (reproduced in fact in 
Passionate Views).  
Central to Grodal’s project is a model of mental activity describing the 
reception of (primarily) visual information into the brain and its subsequent 
processing. This is seen as a flow from perception through emotional 
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activation and cognitive processing to motor action. Grodal subsequently 
described this as the PECMA flow (short for perception, emotion, cognition 
and motor action) (2006, p.1; 2009). The notion of then either facilitating or 
blocking this flow is used as a basis for sketching out a theory of  what he 
refers to as narrative and “lyrical” genres. “Lyrical” in this context refers to 
an experience of intense perceptions or “saturated networks of associations”, 
which in turn broadly means that the viewer will experience an intense (or 
“saturated”) emotional experience through the blocking of the PECMA flow 
by the presentation of emotionally salient images outside a “classical 
narrative” (in Bordwell’s definition of the term). 
In contrast to the “lyrical” mode, the classical narrative structure as defined 
by Bordwell involves goal-oriented characters acting coherently in a coherent 
space-time and thus affords opportunities for the emotional impact of the 
images to be discharged by the narrative structure, usually via the process of 
the attainment of the characters’ goals. Hence the steps of perception, 
emotion and cognition are undertaken and the desire for motor action relieved 
by the vicarious implementation of those action tendencies, usually by the 
screen character taking control of his or her situation. 
To summarise, the classical narrative structure as defined by Bordwell allows 
the PECMA flow to be completed, thus discharging the emotional effect of 
the images. In contrast, the lyrical mode impedes or blocks this flow as a 
result of its alteration of the classical narrative structure, resulting in an 
attempt by the spectator to deal with the emotional impact of these images by 
building up a series of associations and common denominators divorced from 
any narrative context: “Although the build up of emotionally-charged 
associations has no clearly focussed narrative meaning, such associations may 
produce an experience of perceptual, cognitive and emotional plenitude and 
deep meaning because of the complexity and emotional charge of the mental 
associations involved” (1997a, p.5). In other words, we do not need to rely 
upon a narrative structure to derive a strong emotional charge from an image: 
the image itself may be enough, via the associations with other images it 
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conjures in our minds, to create the requisite feelings without the need for 
these feelings to be explained by a narrative context.
It is notable that Grodal’s approach is predicated on the notion that cinema is 
primarily narrative-driven. As is clear from the brief explanation given above 
of the lyrical mode, the discharge of the PECMA flow is via a narrative 
process. Grodal suggests that the PECMA flow, certainly at its initial stages, 
does not distinguish between data drawn from the veridical world and that 
drawn from a film; that sorting process comes later (2006, pp.3 and 4). 
However, the theory proceeds on the assumption that the cognitive stage of 
the process will automatically look for a narrative structure and as in the real 
world so in films that structure will facilitate the full mental flow. Whether 
the real world is capable of disrupting the PECMA flow by becoming lyrical 
in the same way that, for example, art-house or avant garde films do is 
perhaps unanswerable, and indeed unnecessary to consider here, but it is clear 
that a fundamental presupposition about this mental process as it applies to 
cinema is that it distinguishes between narrative film on one hand and 
everything else on the other. What happens to spectacle in this scenario?
It is clear that the PECMA model is based upon a narrative flow and that 
Grodal is constructing a model to deal principally with this aspect, although 
his construction of the alternative lyrical model and his discussion of genres 
does cater for the possibility of divergence from the classical narrative model 
(1997a, p.39). Grodal touches briefly upon the visceral response to what he 
calls certain “physical” films, although he does not elaborate upon precisely 
what this term means (1997a, p.42). This recalls Eisenstein’s kinaesthetic 
response, part of the visceral response to spectacle discussed in previous 
chapters. Whilst Grodal does not elaborate upon this physical aspect of the 
spectator’s experience further, he does introduce the concept of “enaction”. 
Enaction is the barely suppressed motor activity which occurs when watching 
emotionally charged or exciting sequences or, as Grodal puts it: “a level of 
‘motor meaning’…which anchors the structuration of the relations of a 
subject to objects”(1997a, p.48). 
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To elaborate upon this point a little further, a film works by activating a range 
of psychosomatic dimensions in which mind and body work together. This 
includes perception, cognition, memory, emotion and enaction, embodied in 
the PECMA flow model.  As discussed above, the release of the stimulation 
of the motor reflex is carried out primarily vicariously. Interestingly, Grodal 
suggests that this release occurs as a function of the narrative, via a character 
taking control of a situation or attaining their goals. He does not appear to 
consider that a similar release may occur via a spectacular sequence, 
particularly if that sequence also involves narrational transmission, arguably 
another example of his narrative-centred approach. 
Grodal proposes that a film could activate one of two different mental 
processes: the associative, in which one image or phenomenon is linked to 
another by some likeness, and the sequential, in which each image or 
phenomenon follows on from the previous one. This is the basis for the 
lyrical and narrative modes respectively, discussed above. Implicit in these 
two mental processes is the narrative function inherent in the sequential 
process and the lyrical or non-narrative in the associative process. In fact, 
given that the PECMA flow moves “downstream” from perception to action 
(or vicarious action) the most exact analogous “downstream” flow in 
cinematic terms is what Grodal calls the “canonical narrative”. This is his 
term for Bordwell’s classical cinema. “Canonical” as Grodal uses the term 
does not therefore relate to a film that forms a part of an accepted “canon” of 
outstanding works (although a film could of course also fall within that 
category) but one which follows an essentially linear form, a form dictated 
not by abstract considerations but as a result of “real world constraints on the 
sequencing of events and… the “downstream” relations between motives, 
cognitions, and acts” (1997a, p.279). As described above, goal-oriented 
characters act logically and coherently to achieve their goals in a coherent 
time and space continuum in accordance with the well constructed narrative 
progression of the classical Hollywood cinema. In Grodal’s terms: “The 
typical time-structure is one of simple chronological progression, and the 
dominant enactions are voluntary and telic” (1997a, p.167). 
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As Grodal points out, the canonical narrative is “by far the dominant genre of 
visual fiction” (1997a, p.167).  It is one of a number of genres that he 
discusses in the third section of his book through an examination of the way 
in which these genres block or impede the PECMA flow. In the case of the 
canonical narrative, of course, it does neither of these things: instead it 
facilitates the PECMA flow and in fact represents as it were the base model 
against which the other genres can be judged by the extent of their deviation. 
Grodal’s genres are partly familiar but partly driven by his PECMA flow 
model, so that they are distinguished from each other primarily by the 
different ways in which they diverge from the standard canonical model. The 
genres identified are the lyrical “associative” form, the canonical narrative, 
obsessional narratives (when the actions of the characters appear to arise out 
of obsessive rather than logical goal-oriented behaviour), melodramas, horror, 
schizoid (where the spectator perceives the characters on the screen without 
fully identifying with them as the spectator would have done in a canonical 
narrative situation), comedy and metafiction, where the film deliberately 
communicates with the spectator outside its diegesis, the most obvious 
example being when a character addresses the audience directly or the film in 
other ways draws attention to its own substance or creation. Confusingly, the 
terminology adopted by Grodal appears to mix existing genres (melodrama 
and horror) with others that seem to have been coined by Grodal himself 
(schizoid and metafiction).
The issue of concern for our purposes is where to locate spectacle in Grodal’s 
work. Whilst cognitive film theory has now clearly acknowledged that the 
emotional impact of film is an integral part of the cinematic experience and 
an object worthy of detailed study and, furthermore, that mainstream cinema 
is largely geared towards providing that emotional impact, Grodal’s work 
does not really address the presence and effect of spectacle as such apart from 
a few tantalising hints in relation to “physical” films, as described above, and 
hints here and there in the concepts of “enaction” and  the “associative 
lyrical” mode. 
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The lyrical mode in its pure form is by definition non-narrative in that it 
depends upon the absence of any characters with which we can identify or 
empathise or objects which will carry (presumably narrative-related) 
associations. Consequently, lyricism is driven by “visual rhythm and 
oscillation, supplemented by motion from the represented world” (1997a, 
pp.164 to 166). The most common form of this sort of sequence is the music 
video, although Grodal points out that a lyrical sequence within a mainstream 
film is usually narrationally motivated, such as the hallucinations in Altered 
States (1980) or the “visions” in 2001: A Space Odyssey.
Considering this from the transmission model perspective, it is of course the 
case that both the hallucinations in Altered States and the visions experienced 
by Bowman at the climax of 2001 contain narrational as well as non-
narrational transmission which is distinct from their presence as sequences 
prompted by the narrative. It is therefore perhaps not entirely satisfactory to 
assign spectacle solely to the associative lyrical mode. It would appear to 
straddle the lyrical and canonical models at least by virtue of the fact that it 
has a narrative content. Interestingly, Grodal does not appear to consider 
whether the canonical narrative and associative lyrical modes could coexist 
simultaneously, as is suggested by the transmission model. In addition, it 
appears unclear as to whether the enactive effects noted as part of the 
canonical model would be experienced in the lyrical mode. Given that it 
appears that the lyrical mode blocks the PECMA flow at the second, emotion 
stage, this would appear not to be the case, and yet the experience of 
watching a spectacular sequence does arouse the kinaesthetic responses noted 
by Eisenstein and others (Grodal, 2006, pp.4 and 5). Consequently, it would 
appear either that the experience of spectacle is incompatible with being 
assigned to any particular place in Grodal’s structure or that, perhaps, it can 
be seen as a function common to both lyrical and canonical modes.
Grodal’s theory provides an extensive and detailed model for an analysis of 
cognitive and emotional processes, but the difficulty of finding a place for 
spectacle in his model, as argued above, and for accommodating the 
transmission model suggests that we need to look elsewhere. 
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Subsequent theories have developed upon Grodal’s work. For example, 
Frome posits a theory intended to deal not just with films but also other 
representational media, particularly videogames, by positing three types of 
emotion (developing from Tan’s theories) being world, artefact and game 
emotions, and two kinds of participation, being observer-participant (where 
the spectator responds to the artwork but doesn’t change it materially) and 
actor-participant (where the spectator does change the artwork materially, as 
in a videogame). Combining these three types of emotion with the two levels 
of participation allows Frome to construct a matrix of possible emotion inputs 
across a variety of situations not confined to film alone. It is recognised that 
these are not mutually exclusive categories, hence several may be 
experienced during any given sequence (Frome, 2006). At its most basic 
level, Frome’s approach is the mapping of an emotional structure onto a 
cognitive background intended to address and develop a number of scenarios 
beyond those discussed by Grodal. As such, whilst this is perfectly 
acceptable, the issues raised by the cognitive approach and the complexity of 
these theories when compared to the actual experience of watching a film can 
equally be applied to Frome’s work.  
As is the case with the other theories considered above, there is perhaps little 
to criticise in relation to the detailed working of the models proposed. Of 
more relevance is the fact that, given the Neoformalist narrative-centred 
approach adopted, it is difficult to locate adequate room for spectacle in these 
models without, at best, constructing a theoretical position which does not 
reflect the range of activities involved in the cinematic experience.
Is it implicit in the cognitive approach, with its analysis of the facilitating or 
impeding of the mental process, that it inevitably adopts a narrative-driven 
perspective, or is this a consequence of the pervasive influence of the 
Neoformalist account? Tan appears to give some consideration to the part 
spectacle plays in this activity but does not seek to define spectacle as 
anything other than that which remains when narrative is removed. As we 
have seen, this does not assist when attempting to formulate a comprehensive 
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view of the role that spectacle plays in cognitive theory. Grodal and Frome 
posit complex models that concentrate upon establishing processes that 
explain the emotional response to films, based upon the fundamental 
cognitivist premise that the spectator’s emotional response to texts (such as a 
film) is dependent in part on how they evaluate and assimilate textual 
information (Plantinga, 2002, p.24). Whilst this is a perfectly acceptable 
strategy, I would argue that the resultant abstract models create a distance 
between the model and the lived experience of film which needs to be bridged 
at least to an extent to do justice to the impact of spectacle as it is now 
understood following the arguments advanced in Chapters One and Two. 
What is required is a framework (in the broadest sense) that can reflect the 
spectatorial model discussed in Chapter Two and accommodate the presence 
of spectacle and the transmission model. This will allow a more complete 
working definition of spectacle which can then be applied in the following 
chapters to certain elements of the cinematic experience.  
The way out of this conundrum may therefore be to move beyond the 
cognitive approach.  Arguably we may see the development of film theory 
from a semiotic base through psychoanalysis to cognitivism as a process of 
moving closer to the actual experience of watching film as layers of 
theoretical constructs obscuring the experience itself are gradually removed. 
The cognitive approach to the issue of spectacle, however, suffers from two 
important limitations. The first is the tendency of cognitive theorists working 
in this area to base their approach on Bordwell’s narrative-centred model in 
Narration in the Fiction Film and the second is the tendency towards an 
abstract and reductive approach which once more begins to remove theory 
from the experience of watching a film in the cinema. Consequently, the 
models considered above do not accommodate the concepts of spectacle and 
transmission. This requires a more inclusive approach which attempts to 
mediate directly between the spectator and the film and which recognizes the 
interrelationship between narrative and spectacle. 
131
3.4 Filmosophy
The previous section discussed the approach taken by various cognitive 
models and the insights that these could offer to the issue of the extent to 
which cognitive film theory can cater for spectacle and the transmission 
model. The conclusion reached was that whilst these models have much to 
recommend them, they do not adequately cater for the presence of spectacle 
as it is now understood following the reassessment undertaken in Chapters 
One and Two, neither do they permit the more flexible and inclusive 
approach taken by the transmission model. Cognitive film theory has, in this 
respect, reached something of a dead end. The way to move beyond this 
position, however, is to reconsider earlier theories which were more aware of 
the direct and emotional impact of the film upon the spectator and to look at 
ideas which move self-consciously away from cognitivism. The rest of this 
chapter will examine this approach. 
This new approach potentially supplies a conceptual framework within which 
spectacle and the transmission model can be accommodated. This section will 
therefore examine the approach proposed by Frampton in his book 
Filmosophy. It will be argued that the reframing of the various concepts that 
underlie Frampton’s model align with the basis of the transmission model as 
showing that film should not be seen as primarily a narrative-driven medium. 
Transmission then becomes a way of describing the communication between 
film and spectator that is the basis of Filmosophy. In addition Filmosophy can 
adequately accommodate spectacle, locating spectacle along with narrative as 
one of a number of dramatic forms available to the film to communicate with 
the spectator. 
Frampton’s book, which he describes as “a manifesto for a radically new way 
of understanding cinema”, arises out of two main preoccupations: first, the 
manner in which much film criticism and discussion centres on what he sees 
as overly-complex layers of  philosophically based approaches, obscuring the 
emotional impact of film, or on a vocabulary that creates a false link between 
the technical aspects of film (jump cuts, edits, tracking shots and so on) and 
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the film’s emotional impact; and secondly that film has reached a stage where 
the availability of digital technology has made the image infinitely malleable 
and the increasing use of the point of view shot and the unreliable narrator 
has made film become increasingly subjective. As a result there is a need for 
a language of film criticism and analysis which is both adaptable to these new 
conditions and “poetic” in its approach (2006, p.6).
As has been pointed out by McKibbin in  his review of Filmosophy, 
Frampton is really calling for a new form of critical approach to film, an 
approach that allows for a more direct, empathic and poetic feel for what the 
film is communicating rather than filtering this through layers of structural, 
post-structural or psychoanalytical theorising (McKibbin (2007)). The basis 
of Frampton’s model, which he calls the “filmind”, is a way of describing a 
particular approach to thinking about how and what films communicate to the 
spectator. It is revealing that Frampton tends to use the verb “thinking” rather 
than “analysing” when describing the interaction between film and spectator. 
This underlies his more intuitive and philosophical approach and that film is 
an interaction which implies direct, exhibitionistic communication between 
film and spectator. In fact he suggests in an essay which predates the 
publication of Filmosophy that his use of the term “philosophy” in this 
context is “a more ruminative thinking about film, with a healthy distrust of 
inherited terms and concepts, and the setting about, where necessary, of 
forming new words and concepts to open up and reveal the working of film” 
(1996, p.86).
Filmosophy is a study of film as thinking, as an entity in its own right 
communicating the film to the filmgoer through the way in which it presents 
the film on the screen. The filmind is Filmosophy’s concept of “film-being”, 
the theoretical originator of the sounds and images experienced by the 
filmgoer, and “film-thinking” is Filmosophy’s theory of film form, whereby 
an action of form is seen as the dramatic thinking of the filmind. Thus, seeing 
the film as “thoughtful” allows us to understand the ways in which film can 
communicate both meaning and effect. It also allows us to approach issues 
such as the digital image, which falls into neither the realist nor the formalist 
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school of film theory, and the unreliable narrator, where the film appears to 
know more than the spectator, with a new critical framework unencumbered 
by notions of Bazinian realism or theoretical constructs: “The filmgoer 
experiences film more intuitively, not via technology or external authorship, 
but directly, as a thinking thing” (2006, p.8).
It follows that Frampton’s  approach is not narrative-driven: “…to say that 
film can only present ideas in terms of story and dialogue is a narrow, literary 
view of film’s possible force and impact” (2006, p.9). The narrative is an 
element of the film, a way in which the film communicates with the spectator, 
but by no means the only one. Further, Frampton’s creation of the film-being, 
the originator of the images and sounds experienced by the spectator, 
highlights that something creates these sounds and images “beyond or prior” 
to the creation of the narrative or any possible narrator. In fact, the notion of a 
“film-being” is not new to Frampton, and he duly surveys those thinkers that 
have to some degree or other suggested such a theoretical being in the past. It 
is notable that whilst Frampton is influenced in the creation of Filmosophy 
particularly by thinkers such as Perkins, Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty (as 
interpreted by Sobchack) and Cavell, he also relies frequently upon writers 
such as Artaud, Balacz and Munsterberg, those who experienced film at its 
inception as a vital new force and approached it unencumbered by the weight 
of theory to come.  
In taking film on its own terms Filmosophy also removes film from the 
ideological or political sphere and from the realms of the auteur theory. 
Filmind exists beyond and before narrative hence includes all the elements of 
the film; in our terms the filmind encompasses the totality of transmission, 
narrational and non-narrational. Frampton sees it in fact as a “rhetorical 
extension” of Deleuze’s “spiritual automaton”, identifying that the cinema is 
more than an “eye” just mechanically recording what it sees but is also a 
brain, possessed of content and structure and a working nature. Filmind is 
therefore a “psychomechanics” with its own logic, a “union of the material 
and the spiritual” (2006, p.74). 
134
This approach does not exclude the input of the filmmakers into the process 
but seeks to emphasize that, from the spectator’s point of view, it is the film 
that communicates to the audience, not the filmmaker. Although he does not 
explicitly deal with this point as such, we may see this approach as a response 
to the sort of problems that Hall posited with the transmission model referred 
to in Chapter One: the issue of what the filmmakers put into the film matters 
less than what the spectator takes away from the film. If the spectator sees 
something which may not have been consciously inserted by the filmmaker, 
Frampton will say that nevertheless that is what the film has communicated to 
the spectator, hence is part of the filmind. Concentrating upon what the film 
communicates rather than the intentions of the filmmakers “reinvigorates the 
experience of film” (2006, p.75).
Again, in emphasising the totality of the filmind, the totality of transmission, 
Frampton is not creating something entirely novel but is in fact echoing the 
experiences of those who encountered film early in its development and felt 
its full emotional force. Frampton refers to Eisenstein’s concept of the cinema 
as “sensuous thought”: feelings, thoughts, concepts and action are on the 
same level of imagistic thinking. Hence, as Frampton suggests, film thinking, 
or image structuring, can be seen as both logical (narrative and dialogue) and 
prelogical (colours and movements) (2006, pp.59 and 60). It is apparent that 
Frampton’s approach is capable of accommodating narrative and spectacle 
and integrating these together into the filmind as devices through which the 
film communicates with the spectator. It is not necessary to attempt the 
elaborate structural adjustments needed to incorporate spectacle into, for 
example, Grodal’s cognitive analysis as discussed above. The transmission 
model is simply a way of describing the communication that passes between 
the film and the spectator.
Consequently, film-thinking is not read but felt. Frampton characterises most 
film-thinking as emotional or sensuous, although he does not rule out the 
possibility that the film may intend a more structurally rigorous approach 
towards its characters and objects. There is a sense here that the mental 
processes suggested by Bordwell’s Neoformalism are reversed: the spectator 
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does not approach the understanding of a film through the cognitive analysis 
suggested in Narration in the Fiction Film, resulting in a reading of the film’s 
narration with any emotional content left to artistic motivation or 
psychoanalysis. Instead the spectator experiences the film emotionally and 
directly through the devices the film uses to communicate, some of which 
may be narrational and others purely imagistic. The spectator’s involvement 
with the film experience is not therefore voyeuristic but rather predominantly 
exhibitionistic: the film communicates directly with the spectator rather than 
using some sort of theoretical construct such as the imagined observer of 
narrative theory as a conduit through which the film’s narrative is filtered 
(2006, p.38). There is the first suggestion here that not only can Filmosophy 
accommodate the transmission model, it may allow a broader re-evaluation of 
the concepts that have governed this enquiry so far: it is possible to argue that 
instead of seeing spectacle as something which has to be fitted into a 
narrative-driven cinema, we could see narrative as a device which can be 
incorporated into an essentially sensuous, emotionally-driven cinema. The 
historical dimension to Frampton’s analysis emphasises that early 
commentators such as Munsterberg and Balacz saw cinema in far more direct, 
emotional terms than later theorists and it may be now with the development 
of more malleable, subjective images and the decline in narrative driven 
cinema that we are coming to the end of a particular era in film when 
narrative was dominant: 
The concept of narration tells us that a certain moment of style is 
assisting the plot, the concept of the filmind tells us that this moment 
of style is a dramatic imaging of the story (2006, p.113).
Importantly, Frampton adds: “The filmind’s basic film-thinking is structure, 
which can be either non-narrative…or narrative…or moving from one to the 
other” (2006, p.113) or, we can add, which can be both at once as anticipated 
by the transmission model. 
The spectator’s understanding and interpretation of the film therefore arises 
from what the film communicates but also the spectator’s experience of the 
film:
136
The filmosophical filmgoer engages the film with their personality, 
backed by concepts that tie form to thinking, to build an interpretation 
of the film that responds to the whole film, colour and dialogue, shifts 
and plots (2006, p.174).
It follows that as Frampton puts it Filmosophy encourages an “opinionated 
and personal form of film interpretation” in which we can again see the 
emphasis on the subjective and empathic approach, the direct communication 
with the spectator (2006, p.178). This is also apparent in Frampton’s 
comments on the action movie: “Pleasurable, kinetic adventure films are ripe 
for this kind of personal recounting, as they often deny overly plot-led 
interpretations” (2006, p.179). In such circumstances, the experience of the 
film feeds its interpretation. Interpretation and understanding are not therefore 
linked solely to narrative or indeed to any other single element of the film, but 
instead to the experience of the film as a whole, including all narrational and 
non-narrational elements. From this perspective, the spectator’s interpretation 
of film will arise from the totality of the transmission, whether it is intended 
or otherwise by the filmmakers and whether it bears upon the narrative drive 
or not. The film is experienced holistically and interpreted subjectively and 
emotionally; indeed, Frampton characterises Filmosophy as “emotional 
intelligence” (2006, p.196):
Seeing film as ‘thinking’ ties content, form and filmgoer together, 
such that the filmgoer perceives an organic whole of the film thinking 
about its characters and events through dramatic forms, rather than 
layers of story and style (2006, p.212).
Frampton advertises Filmosophy as a manifesto and as such perhaps there are 
ideas here that need to be worked through in more detail. Certainly a number 
of reservations were expressed about precisely how, in philosophical terms, 
the concept of filmind would work: the presence of a mind does not of itself 
connote intelligence and more would be needed to prove that film can be seen 
as some sort of autonomous mind (Nowell-Smith, 2006). Frampton has 
responded in detail to a number of issues raised in reviews of Filmosophy
(Frampton, 2008). Having said this, the fresh approach suggested by 
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Frampton does allow analysis of a film’s mood rather than an approach which 
concentrates either on the technical aspects of a film or buries it in theory. 
Perhaps of more interest are the comments made by McKibbin in his review 
of the book for Senses of Cinema (McKibbin, 2007). He points out that 
insofar as Filmosophy is really about the critical analysis of film, many 
respected film critics such as Raymond Durgnat, David Thomson and Pauline 
Kael have been practising this form of criticism for many years, so to that 
extent Filmosophy feels like “yesterday’s news offering itself up as 
tomorrow’s world”. McKibbin suggests that Frampton might in fact present 
the work as volume one of a two part study (echoing Deleuze) with part two 
being either a survey of or extracts from precisely the sort of informed and 
involved criticism which Frampton advocates and which is in fact already in 
existence. (Frampton’s response can be found at Frampton 2008, p.369.) 
There is some force in McKibbin’s observations and it may be fair to 
characterise Filmosophy as a work that straddles philosophy and criticism, 
with one discipline informing the approach taken by the other. This is not a 
criticism of Filmosophy and indeed there may be much to recommend an 
approach which blends the theoretical rigour of philosophy with an informed 
and imaginative critical analysis. It may well be that this is the very approach 
required to accommodate the idea of transmission and the revised definition 
of spectacle proposed in this thesis. 
The crux of Filmosophy is about how the spectator can approach film not as a
made thing but as a “perceptual opportunity”. Frampton may take his dislike 
of the technical approach too far; instead of dismissing it outright McKibbin 
suggests it could instead be broken down so that technical language can 
describe not just the film’s making but also the viewer’s perceptions. After 
all, it may be just as legitimate to describe a camera movement as a “tracking 
shot” as in any other way, and useful shorthand into the bargain. What is to be 
avoided is the automatic assumption made by much writing in this area that 
there is a straightforward correlation between technical skill and emotional 
effect. The language of the tracking shot and the dolly and so on becomes if 
not redundant then at least partially meaningless when considering wholly 
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animated or digitally created films, where no such camera movements 
actually take place, but only appear to do so. In such circumstances, technical 
language can perhaps be used to describe what a sequence does, but we must 
allow that such language can be used affectively as well as technically. 
Interestingly, although McKibbin does not make this point, this is a 
conceptual difficulty that existed long before digital imaging became 
widespread: it has been at least a theoretical issue for as long as animated 
features have been in existence.
Filmosophy is valuable in pointing the way to a more holistic approach to the 
experience of film which not only accommodates the transmission model but 
also suggests that we can see mainstream cinema not as a medium that is 
necessarily narrative driven and into which we need to find a place for 
spectacle, but as a medium that primarily has a direct, emotional 
communication with the spectator and in which narrative is only one of a 
number of devices used by the film to communicate with the spectator. Of 
equal weight (although the precise balance will of course vary from film to 
film and indeed sequence to sequence within a film) are the images and 
sounds which may not bear directly upon the narrative drive but which go to 
form the organic whole. 
The concept of the organic whole reinforces the conclusions reached in the 
previous chapters that it is unhelpful in any event to attempt to label certain 
elements of the film experience as narrative or spectacle, or as being 
voyeuristic or exhibitionistic, since these distinctions erect false barriers in 
the way of an understanding of the film experience as a whole and historically 
emphasise false distinctions between types of cinema – classical or early or 
late – when a more inclusive approach would emphasise continuity. Frampton 
offers a way to move beyond these distinctions and, for our purposes, to 




At the beginning of Chapter One, when reviewing what film theory had to say 
about spectacle, if anything, it appeared that spectacle formed a relatively 
minor and self-contained element of the cinematic experience. Fitting 
uncomfortably within the narrative-dominated approach adopted by most 
major film theories, spectacle was excess material to be marginalised or 
overlooked or was the Other, a dangerous threat to narrative unity to be cast 
into the shadows. The hegemony exercised by the narrative-driven view of 
film, however, hides the fact that spectacle can be seen as the core of the 
cinematic experience: the direct, emotional relationship between the spectator 
and the film. An examination of issues of spectatorship in Chapter Two and 
the discussion of a model of spectatorship sufficient to cater for spectacle 
with reference to the social and cultural conditions that surrounded the 
development of early cinema demonstrated that the theoretical approaches 
described in Chapter One have erected a series of largely false distinctions 
between concepts such as spectacle and narrative, voyeurism and 
exhibitionism that result in a distortion or at best compartmentalisation of the 
cinematic experience which does not do justice to that experience as a whole. 
The transmission model proposed in Chapter One represents a way to develop 
beyond these restrictive concepts to accommodate the more expansive and 
inclusive approach which is reinforced by the exercise undertaken in Chapter 
Two.
Chapter Three then deals with these issues in the context of cognitive film 
theory and the extent to which cognitivism can accommodate the 
transmission model and the redefined concept of spectacle. The purpose of 
this chapter has been to consider the cognitive framework adopted by much 
current film theory and whether it is adequate to accommodate the 
transmission model. As has been shown, Bordwell’s Neoformalism does not 
prove an adequate model in this regard for a number of reasons. Later 
cognitive models, whilst seeking to deal specifically with emotion as a 
component of the cinematic experience, have taken matters further but are 
generally still overly analytical in their approach. 
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Frampton’s approach in Filmosophy offers a fresh insight into this area, 
largely by suggesting that much of this theoretical framework is not required 
and indeed does not allow for a full understanding of the experience of film. 
Frampton constructs his “manifesto for a radically new way of understanding 
cinema” via the creation of a filmind, the notion that the film thinks for itself 
and communicates with the spectator through the devices open to it. These 
devices may include narrative (and usually will in mainstream cinema) but 
narrative is by no means the only element of the film that should be taken into 
account. It is simply part of the overall experience. 
Frampton therefore avoids the baggage of much contemporary film theory 
and emphasises the holistic, subjective and essentially emotional nature of the 
spectator’s engagement with the film. The totality of the film, expressed as 
the filmind, can accommodate the transmission model, which may itself be 
seen as the communication which takes place between film and spectator 
without the intentionality implicit in the filmind’s communication with the 
spectator. As such, the transmission model does not posit the presence of an 
autonomous film mind but does propose that a film transmits the totality of its 
information to the spectator, who then interprets that information for him or 
herself, and that this information will be narrational and non-narrational, the 
precise balance altering from sequence to sequence.  
It follows that in order to provide a more complete picture cognisance needs 
to be taken of non-narrative elements and those aspects of cinema that are not 
voyeuristic in nature. In fact, we need to go further and dispense with such 
categories altogether. The voyeuristic model is a by-product of the narrative-
driven approach and when that falls away, so does the notion of an implicit 
voyeurism. Describing spectacle as essentially exhibitionistic in its direct and 
emotional rapport with the spectator is useful when distinguishing it from the 
narrative model but unnecessary when we dispense with that model and 
recognise also that it is the film as a whole that communicates directly and 
emotionally with the spectator. The film may do so via narrative or other 
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devices, and we have seen in Chapter Two how in fact narrative operates to 
reinforce the impact of spectacle and vice versa.  
In such circumstances, it is time to acknowledge that in reality cinema itself 
is, in Eisenstein’s formulation, “sensuous thinking”, an essentially direct, 
emotional experience which may be expressed by the film through any 
number of devices, some of which are narrational and others not. The only 
gloss to be added to Frampton’s formulation in these terms is to acknowledge 
that not only is it the case that the filmind’s basic film-thinking is structure, 
which can be non-narrative or narrative or move from one to the other, but 
that in fact the structure of film-thinking can encompass non-narrative and 
narrative thinking simultaneously, as predicated by the transmission model. 
As such we can see cinema as an essentially emotional experience which 
accommodates narrative and spectacle as dramatic forms employed by the 
filmind to communicate with the spectator.  Spectacle and narrative are two 
of a number of resources available to the film to provide the emotional impact 
that the spectator seeks and, in the case of spectacle, to amplify that impact. 
Given that this emotional impact is central to the spectator’s cinematic 
experience, it follows that spectacle itself occupies a central position in the 
cinematic experience. 
Notwithstanding this broad reformulation, it is still necessary to utilise a more 
precise working definition of spectacle so as to apply this to the elements of 
the cinematic experience considered in Chapters Four and Five. Drawing 
together the various arguments advanced in Chapters One and Two therefore, 
spectacle can be defined as, first, a point or series of points in the spectrum of 
transmission in which there is a preponderance of non-narrational as opposed 
to narrational transmission; secondly, as essentially exhibitionistic in nature, 
communicating directly with the spectator, appealing to the spectator’s 
emotions in a direct, visceral way; and thirdly, that this appeal to the 
spectator’s emotions is intended not only to provoke an emotional response in 
the spectator but also, insofar as spectacle works with the narrative as 
described in Chapter Two, to amplify the spectator’s emotional response to 
the film as a whole. The spectator and the film enter into an interaction 
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whereby the spectator, whilst willingly suspending judgment and disbelief, is 
nevertheless aware that technology is harnessed to create an illusion on the 
screen, but it is an illusion willingly entered into by the spectator.
In Tan’s memorable phrase, films are “emotion machines” expressly intended 
and designed to provide an emotional experience, whether this be by way of 
narrative, spectacle or otherwise. When we seek to define spectacle we are 
also defining how we see films, why we see them and the effect they have 
upon us. Spectacle, far more than narrative, reflects the fundamental 
cinematic experience.
It follows that far from being narrative-driven, mainstream film is emotion-
driven. Narrative will contribute to the emotional drive of the film, but it is 
only one of the devices that film employs to achieve the emotional fix the 
spectator is seeking. Spectacle represents another device. Spectacle may 
appear to be more amorphous and resistant to definition precisely because it 
is not as self-contained as narrative and because it bears so closely on the 
very basis of the filmgoing experience. The survey carried out in Chapter 
Two showed how the corporealised spectator, involved in a direct and 
physical way in the spectatorial experience of early cinema, is not confined to 
a periodised early cinema but remains a consistent feature throughout the 
history of the medium. It is necessary to create a working definition of 
spectacle but in one sense, if the fundamental shift in the basis of the 
cinematic experience described above is accepted, spectacle as an Other 
marginalised on the fringes of theory disappears as being all but 
indistinguishable from the cinematic experience itself.
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Chapter Four 
Formation, Assimilation and Formalism:
Spectacle and Technology
4.1 Introduction
In January 2004 journalist Dan Brown wrote a piece for CBC news online 
headed “Special effects become Mannerist” (Brown, 2004). This referred to 
an observation made by one of Brown’s interviewees, screenwriter Mark 
Rosenthal, that in his opinion effects created by computer generated imagery 
(CGI) had by that time reached a stage similar to that experienced in painting 
in the sixteenth century: painters had become so proficient at producing 
realistic figurative art that they began to experiment, resulting in a 
deliberately exaggerated, distorted art-form known as Mannerism. The article 
was written in the context of a review of the latest developments in CGI 
noting that, following over a decade of development of the CGI image 
integrated seamlessly into its optical background, films such as The Matrix 
(1999) and Hulk (2003) began to include almost abstract sequences or images 
which clearly were not intended to be seen as realistic. CGI, in at least some 
films, had entered a Mannerist stage. To put this development in another way, 
and with reference to existing historical divisions of film theory, CGI had 
moved from Realism to Formalism. 
These observations did not of course encompass all CGI being created at that 
time. The article does however point to a particular relationship between 
technology and the cinematic image which finds its most obvious incarnation 
in the presentation of spectacle, that aspect of film most often associated with 
technology. The notion of formalist spectacle suggests both earlier and later 
stages of development in that relationship. Further, it also offers a way of 
historicising spectacle by examining its ongoing relationship with 
technological development. An examination of this relationship will be 
revealing not only in terms of spectacle but also the use of technology in the 
cinema.  I will argue below that a consideration of this relationship leads to 
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the formulation of a number of types of spectacle linked to the use of 
technology at any given time and that an examination of these types of 
spectacle is helpful in beginning to formulate an aesthetics of spectacle in 
mainstream cinema. 
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the link between 
spectacle and technology as a way of historicising spectacle so as to develop 
our understanding of the more theoretical considerations undertaken in the 
first three chapters of this thesis. This chapter will therefore proceed by 
investigating three particular technological developments in cinema: colour, 
widescreen and CGI, although brief consideration will also be given to more 
recent developments in the use of the Imax format. This investigation will 
enable the formulation of a number of propositions about the relationship 
between spectacle and technology, the developmental arc followed by the 
technologies under discussion and the way that these two elements broadly 
link with each other. I will argue that it allows us to see how certain types of 
spectacle evolve out of this ongoing relationship with technology. 
Building on the comments made in Brown’s article, this chapter proposes a 
model which shows that the spectacle associated with the use of technology 
passes through three stages. The first of these stages is where the use of the 
technology in question drives the film’s structure such that in many ways the 
film exists to promote and foreground the technology in question. At this 
stage the technology is often relatively crude and, by virtue of its own 
limitations, obtrusive. I have called this the formative stage, hence the 
spectacle associated with this stage is formative spectacle. 
In the second stage, the technology becomes less obtrusive not only because 
its technical limitations have been addressed but also because it is no longer 
seen as a novelty, something which the film exists to promote. Consequently, 
the technology in question is used to assist in the creation of spectacular 
sequences or the film’s mise-en-scene generally without drawing attention to 
itself as something inherently spectacular in its own right. In other words, 
there is no spectacle at this stage that is expressly related to the overt presence 
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of the technology itself. The technology has become assimilated into the 
film’s fabric, hence I have called this is the assimilated stage. 
The third and final stage in this process is where the filmmakers choose for 
aesthetic reasons as discussed in Brown’s article, or because the technology 
has developed significantly, to highlight the use of that technology again. 
This is not, however, a return to the formative stage because the film does not 
exist solely to promote the new technological development. In addition, the 
pressure exerted to make films as realistic as possible, within the accepted 
cinematic definition of what is real as opposed to realism in the veridical 
sense, means that in order to draw attention to itself this new technological 
development will deliberately distort the film’s constructed realism in an 
abstract or Mannerist fashion. For the reason set out above, I have called this 
the formalist stage and the spectacle associated with it formalist spectacle. 
It can be argued that in its formative and formalist stages technology is a 
spectacle in itself irrespective of whether the films in question employ any 
other spectacular sequences (which may be the case). Spectacle associated 
with technology passes through the formative and assimilated stages and may 
move on to the formalist stage depending upon the aesthetic choices of the 
filmmakers, the drive for novelty which underlies the development of 
spectacle generally and, as always, the economic imperative in mainstream 
cinema to attract the spectator to the film. An alternative way of describing 
this process is to say that the technologies under discussion in this chapter 
follow a developmental arc in which they are at first visible, then become 
invisible and may in some circumstances become visible again. To 
differentiate the first and third stages, the third stage can better be described 
as “prominent”. Broadly, the formative stage equates to visible technology, 
the assimilated stage invisible technology and the formalist stage prominent 
technology. 
I will argue that the fact that the technology in question is capable of being 
first visible, then invisible and then prominent suggests that spectacle in this 
context does not in fact reside in the technology itself, but in the presentation 
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of that technology. It is for this reason that not all technological developments 
are spectacular per se but have to be presented as spectacle by the film. 
Developments in lens technology, for example, have not been heralded as 
spectacular in their own right although they have undoubtedly helped to 
improve the quality and impact of spectacle and film generally.
Analysing the relationship between spectacle and technology using the 
concepts of the formative, assimilated and formalist stage allows a 
consideration of the historical perspective in relation to the aesthetics of 
spectacle. It also enables us to consider the changes in the presentation of 
spectacle in the context of the development of its underlying technology. It is 
apparent that the nature and characteristics of spectacle change not only as a 
result of economic or market forces or the demands of novelty, but also the 
dictates of technological development, which is also driven by the same 
forces.
The three stages through which spectacle passes will be examined by 
reference to each of the three technologies identified above.  Although each 
of these represents a distinct technological development in the history of 
cinema and each follows a broadly similar trajectory in terms of development 
and subsequent use, as will be discussed below there are many differences 
between the technologies beyond the obvious in relation to their application 
to certain aspects of the cinematic experience. Both colour and widescreen 
had been experimented with from virtually the beginning of cinema itself, 
although ultimately colour was introduced as a viable commercial prospect 
some twenty years before widescreen cinema. The technology required to 
create CGI was not available in any meaningful form until the 1980s and 
again early experiments with its use were not commercially successful so that 
its eventual introduction into the mainstream market did not take place until 
the early 1990s. 
Colour and CGI may both be described as characteristics of the cinematic 
image whereas widescreen cinema needs to be split into its function as a 
method of film presentation, involving developments in lens technology that 
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led to changes in the screen size and shape and the introduction of more 
sophisticated sound systems, and the adoption of a particular style of film 
image composition consequent upon the use of film screen ratios different 
from the Academy ratio that had been the accepted norm until that time. For 
convenience we can describe these as its “presentational” and its “cinematic 
image” aspects.  As such, in its presentational aspect widescreen enjoyed its 
heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, although as discussed below we may be on 
the brink of a resurgence in widescreen presentational aspects given the 
increase in the use of the Imax format. Widescreen’s legacy remains in its 
cinematic image aspect in the use of the 70mm widescreen format and the 
opportunities for more extensive lateral composition of the elements in the 
image that this allows.
It is overly simplistic to suggest that there is a clear chronological progression 
from formative spectacle to formalist spectacle and from visible to invisible 
to prominent technology.  Formative spectacle arising from the promotion of 
visible technology will arise first, or at least at a point in time at which the 
economic driver behind film production dictates that the promotion of that 
technology on a mass scale is required. The assimilation and increasing 
invisibility of that technology and consequently the disappearance of this type 
of spectacle may however then take place at the same time as the 
development of prominent technology through formalist spectacle. In the 
context of colour, for example, Everett points out that the early use of tinting 
and toning prior to the invention of Technicolor was “an aesthetic or 
symbolic device for strengthening the narrative” rather than contributing 
towards the “realist imperative” and it is clear that there has been an aesthetic 
tension between the realist and abstract use of colour for almost as long as 
cinema has existed (Everett, 2007a, pp. 18 and 19 and 2007b, p.108). 
Similarly, as will be discussed below, CGI has, in the context of developing a 
tendency towards hyperrealism, concurrently demonstrated both assimilated 
technology and formalist spectacle. 
An issue relevant to the relationship between spectacle and technology is the 
apparent paradox between the conflicting drivers for technological change. It 
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will be helpful to an overall consideration of the relationship between 
technology and spectacle to review this issue since it has a bearing on the way 
in which spectacle develops, particularly in the context of the tendency 
towards, or away from, realism in the cinematic image. 
It is clear from even the cursory review set out above that all three 
technologies affected the way the image was constructed and consequently 
the manner in which spectacle was presented to the spectator. As will be seen, 
there are also similarities in the way that these technologies were developed 
and marketed. As Enticknap has put it:
…a pattern emerges whereby a significant technological 
advance…tends to happen in two stages: the research and 
development which makes the process technically viable, and the 
changes to economic and industrial practice which enables its 
widespread, commercial use (2005, p.16).
Comolli has suggested that the lag between technological development and its 
widespread use was the lag between technology and ideology, between the 
point at which the technology became available and the point at which the 
ideological basis for the deployment of that technology arose (Quoted in 
Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, 1985, p.358). Enticknap proposes that this 
might more accurately be characterised as the lag between technology and 
commerce, the point at which it becomes economically viable to use the 
technology extensively without making films prohibitively expensive to 
produce.
Buscombe reviews this issue in the context of similar comments to 
Enticknap’s made by Gomery to the effect that economic theory can explain 
the coming of sound. Buscombe was of the view that economics could not 
adequately explain technological innovations, only demonstrate that they are 
an essential part of the system:
Economics can explain the necessary but not the sufficient conditions 
for innovation. No new technology can be introduced unless the 
economic system requires it. But a new technology cannot be 
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successful unless it fulfils some kind of need. The specific form of this 
need will be ideologically determined; in the case of the cinema the 
ideological determinant most frequently identified has been realism
(emphasis in original) (1978, p. 5).
This leads Buscombe on to a discussion of realism, particularly in the context 
of the introduction of colour. He reaches the conclusion that some of the 
objections to the introduction of colour can only be explained by accepting 
that realism in the context of what is seen on the cinema screen does not 
equate to what we see in the real world: “…in fact it has never been a 
question of what is real but of what is accepted as real” (emphasis in original) 
(1978, pp. 5 to 6).  This is particularly apparent in the context of colour, which 
as discussed below was initially seen as denoting only fantasy or stylisation 
until the advent of mass produced colour television, when the position was 
entirely reversed. It is however a characteristic of all the technologies 
examined here that when they are first introduced they are marketed as being 
essentially spectacular in nature although all of them had the potential to 
make cinema more realistic. It is suggested that this apparent paradox is 
resolved by bearing in mind the difference between the initial presentation of 
these technologies as spectacle for marketing purposes and their subsequent 
use by filmmakers, which was to assist in the creation of cinematic realism, as 
will be discussed below.     
“Real” in this context equates to a cinematic reality which does not 
necessarily accord with our experience of the veridical world. Ellis suggests 
that “Reality is taken as being the subject and object of the representation” 
but admits that what is deemed to be “real” can be altered over time (1982, 
pp. 8 to 9). He goes on to point out that cinematic reality is really a juggling 
of the potentially fantastic and the codes of realism rather than a strict 
representation of the real world. Thus, particularly in what he describes as 
“entertainment cinema” there has been a tendency to make “the real 
spectacular and the spectacular plausible”, as pithy a description of the 
practice of most Hollywood blockbusters as one could hope to find (1982, p. 
51). 
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The tendency to realism in the cinema is therefore in fact a tendency towards 
a realist aesthetic, not necessarily in the Bazinian sense, but more the creation 
of a cinematic reality which simultaneously reflects the real world and 
distorts it through cinematic devices such as lighting, sound and editing as 
well as more overt methods such as colour manipulation and extreme slow or 
fast motion. As a result, what is taken to be real in cinematic terms is 
constantly altering, as Ellis points out (1982, pp. 8 and 9). Consequently, old 
films appear less real than more recent films even if some older films are, in a 
Bazinian sense, more realistic. 
It can be argued that once technology has become invisible, however, the 
tendency towards the realist aesthetic (or realist imperative as Everett calls it) 
which underpins mainstream cinema means that the technology is used to 
make the film look cinematically real even if the narrative element deals with 
the fantastic or unreal. Put another way, bearing in mind the distinction 
between initial presentation and subsequent use outlined above, technology is 
no longer presented as a spectacle in its own right but is instead now used for 
promoting cinematic realism. Even the fantastic or clearly unreal is therefore 
presented with enough recognizable signifiers to make them seem capable of 
existing in the real world. Prince’s term for this phenomenon is “perceptual 
realism”: the link between “the represented fictionalised reality of a given 
film and the visual and social coordinates of our own three-dimensional 
world” through a correspondence-based model rather than one relying upon 
either Bazinian indexicality or a semiotic approach (2004, p. 277). 
Prince was writing in the context of a discussion of how to deal, in theoretical 
terms, with CGI, which does not appear to fit comfortably into either the 
semiotic or indexically-based schools of thought.  As a consequence, he 
proposes an approach which steps outside both:
A perceptually realistic image is one which structurally corresponds to 
the viewer’s audiovisual experience of three-dimensional 
space…Perceptual realism, therefore, designates a relationship 
between the image or film and the spectator, and it can encompass 
both unreal images and those which are referentially realistic. Because 
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of this, unreal images may be referentially fictional but perceptually 
realistic (2004, p.277).
Although written in the context of CGI, I suggest that this theory will serve 
for any image created in a film whether intentionally unreal or as realistic as 
possible on the basis that cinema does not depict the real world. It is a given 
in Prince’s article that the cinema does tend towards the realist aesthetic even 
when depicting the unreal. Cinema is, as Frampton says, a cousin of reality 
(2006, p.1).  It is a heightened representation of reality in which the narrative 
tidies up the messiness of the real world (to a greater or lesser extent) and the 
image presents amplified elements of the real world which are accepted by 
the spectator as being real through the mechanism of perceptual realism. It is 
therefore more accurate to suggest that the realist aesthetic operates to direct 
film towards perceptual realism. 
Consequently, whilst widescreen offered the possibility of making the 
cinematic experience appear more realistic through the use of more 
pronounced lateral compositions permitted by the new screen ratio, as Bazin 
believed, (Quoted in Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, 1985, p.360) it is clear 
that the screen’s monumental size and shape “tended towards stylization and 
the enhancement of spectacle” as Bordwell puts it (Bordwell, Staiger and 
Thompson, 1985, p.361). It is of course the case that widescreen cinema was 
marketed primarily as a spectacular experience. Finally, whilst CGI has the 
ability to blend invisibly into the image (and the majority of CGI is used in 
this way) it was the visible use of CGI, principally the integration of a CGI-
created image into an optical background, that was initially prominently 
marketed. 
To summarise, in the context of the propositions set out above, new 
technology is presented and marketed in such a way as to make it visible, and 
the spectacle created by the presentation of that technology is therefore at its 
formative stage. The ideological driver of the realist aesthetic pointed out by 
Buscombe and Ellis asserts itself once the novelty of the new technology has 
worn off and the technology becomes invisible, no longer presented as a 
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spectacle in its own right. At this stage the technology has become 
assimilated, has developed an aesthetic that governs its use. It is controlled 
within the diegesis and serves the ends of the film itself rather than the film 
serving the technology as spectacle. Spectacle associated with technology 
during this stage therefore disappears. Given this fundamental bias towards 
perceptual realism, if the technology is subsequently to become prominent it 
will usually do so by being presented as a spectacle that is essentially unreal 
or formalist; that is, spectacle that deliberately exaggerates or otherwise 
distorts the prevailing realist aesthetic. Consequently the difference between 
formative and formalist spectacle is that the former significantly influences 
the film’s mise-en-scene and often its narrative structure whereas the latter is 
deliberately foregrounded to a greater extent than would be expected within 
the context of perceptual realism. As always, the driver for this change from 
assimilated technology to formalist spectacle is novelty: the need to find 
something new to bring audiences into the cinema. 
In the following sections these propositions will be examined in more detail, 
drawing upon examples from mainstream cinema. 
4.2 Formative spectacle
I will argue in this section that when the economic conditions are favourable 
for the introduction of a new technology, the use of that technology in a film 
is presented as a spectacle in its own right. This is a principle that is common 
to colour, widescreen and CGI and also applies to the introduction of the 
original cinematic apparatus itself, as demonstrated in Chapter Two. At this 
stage the films are constructed to showcase the technology on show. 
Consequently, the spectacular elements of these films appear excessively 
ostentatious, stepping outside the bounds of perceptual realism. The spectacle 
is generated by the technology which the film is serving rather than existing 
within a set of aesthetic parameters that defines assimilated technology. 
It will be helpful to consider a number of examples in relation to the three 
technologies under review. The first of these is the first full length live action 
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feature film to use the three strip Technicolor process: Becky Sharp (1935). 
At this time, the use of colour in films was considered to be problematic. 
Buscombe quotes Douglas Fairbanks, whose picture The Black Pirate (1927) 
had been produced in two strip Technicolor, complaining that colour always 
met with overwhelming objections and that it would distract from the action 
and would militate against the simplicity and directness which films derived 
from the use of “unobtrusive” black and white (1978, p.25).  Hughes felt the 
same way, even suggesting that moviegoers were not physically able to cope 
with the experience of a colour film:
It is indeed doubtful whether man will ever be able physically to 
appreciate colour in motion, except in the most obvious masses…our 
colour sense may be developing, our spectrum dividing, but until the 
retino-cerebral apparatus is far more advanced than it is at present, it 
is improbable that we shall sensually enjoy coloured films, except for 
their purely Kaleidoscopic characteristics (1933, p.17).
Arnheim argued in 1933 in “The Complete Film” that as colour moved closer 
to reality so it reduced the artistic choices available (1958, pp.129 to 134). It 
should be the aim of film to move away from the urge to be realistic:
The reduction of actual colour values to a one-dimensional grey series 
(ranging from pure white to dead black) is a welcome divergence from 
nature which renders possible the making of significant and decorative 
pictures by means of light and shade (1958, p.62).
Eisenstein, whilst welcoming the advent of colour, also pointed to the huge 
colour range already available in black and white films but felt that “complete 
organic unity – the unity of picture and sound – will be achieved only when 
we have films in colour” (1970a, p.118). He did not feel, however, that 
realism should be the ultimate goal of colour in films:
…colour [and music] are both good where and when they (they and 
not the other elements) can most fully express or explain what must be 
conveyed, said, or elucidated at the given moment of the development 
of the action (1970b, p.126).
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Arnheim and Eisenstein represent an artistic response to the possibility of 
colour film whereas Fairbanks and Hughes reflect wider concerns about the 
difficulty of adapting to this new technology. It is interesting to note Hughes’ 
objections, which appear to be based on the premise that the human brain is 
not capable of dealing with visual colour stimulus notwithstanding the fact 
that it does so every day already. What lies behind these objections appears to 
be the idea that the brain cannot cope with such information on the cinema 
screen and that this information is some way differently processed from that 
acquired from the real world, a subconscious distinction perhaps between 
perceptual realism and observable reality. 
Natalie Kalmus, the chief Technicolor colour consultant, was nevertheless 
striving to attain a natural balance of colour within the image whilst at the 
same time using colour to direct the spectator’s emotional response (Dalle 
Vache and Price, 2006, p.26). Given that these were her priorities, it is 
interesting to see how colour was actually used to spectacular effect in Becky 
Sharp.
Becky Sharp was adapted from a play of the same name which was in turn 
based upon Vanity Fair. It seems likely that this particular story was chosen 
because of the opportunities for colour treatment afforded by the ladies’ ball 
gowns and dresses and the soldiers’ red, white and gold uniforms, 
opportunities which are seized upon enthusiastically by the filmmakers. The 
opening titles are set over single colour green curtains and there is a tendency 
throughout to maintain fairly restricted background colour palettes, usually 
blue/grey or red/brown. Against these backgrounds, however, are set bright 
blocks of largely primary or secondary colours. So for example in her first 
scene Becky wears a grey dress accompanied by a shocking sky blue ribbon 
and hat and subsequently appears in a bright yellow and sky blue outfit 
(matched by cushions on a sofa). Central to the film is the Duke of 
Richmond’s ball, which takes place immediately before Waterloo, and which 
affords plenty of opportunity for the deployment of dresses of many colours. 
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The effect of these bright colours set against drab backgrounds is wholly 
unrealistic and at times almost abstract, as in one scene where the camera 
looks down on a swift procession of soldiers in red cloaks passing beneath a 
red light. It was generally felt that the film showcased the Technicolor 
process impressively but the film itself was considered to be poor (Higgins, 
2006, pp.154 to 160). The spectacle of the colour used in the film 
overwhelms the rest of the film. The technology on display is highly visible 
and serves only to advertise its own presence. The film is constructed so as to 
present the technology on display as a spectacle in itself, consequently the 
technology presented as spectacle here is formative, operating largely outside 
the realist aesthetic.
Another example of formative spectacle can be found in The Robe (1953), the 
first film made in CinemaScope. There was a concerted effort to introduce 
widescreen formats into cinema in the 1920s, coinciding with the introduction 
of sound, but this failed, possibly as Enticknap suggests, because it occurred 
at the same time as the industry was absorbing the cost of converting to sound 
and, as the 1920s progressed, feeling the effects of the Wall Street crash and 
the depression that followed (Enticknap, 2005, pp.53 to 55: Belton, 1992, 
pp.53 to 68). It was not until the 1950s that the conditions were propitious for 
the successful introduction of the widescreen format.
The main widescreen formats that developed in the 1950s showed a 
technological progression marked by competition between the various 
companies promoting the competing formats and the desire to overcome the 
challenges and difficulties inherent in each format (Belton, 1992, pp.57 to 
66). The first widescreen system was Cinerama, introduced in 1952. This 
introduced a novelty which remained one of the defining features of 
widescreen presentation and a significant contributor to the participatory 
nature of widescreen cinema: the curved screen. As Belton suggests, the 
curved screen “automatically amplified the sense of audience participation by 
surrounding spectators with the image” (1992, p. 169). As will be discussed 
in more detail below, this sense of participatory entertainment is not only 
central to the change in spectator experience and requirements during the 
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1950s, it is also, as a direct and exhibitionistic experience, a key element of 
spectacle and one of the reasons why spectacle is so readily identified with 
widescreen presentations. 
During 1953 Twentieth Century Fox worked on an alternative to Cinerama 
which would be less expensive and which would involve less adjustment to 
the fabric of cinemas (other than catering for the wider screen). This 
alternative was CinemaScope. CinemaScope and its variants along with 
Todd-AO and its variants would become the most successful of the formats, 
largely because CinemaScope and Todd-AO were the most backwards 
compatible with the existing technology, always an advantage from the 
economic perspective. 
The Robe therefore represents the first significant example of formative 
spectacle in the context of widescreen cinema in a fiction film as opposed to 
the documentaries used to showcase the possibilities of Cinerama, which 
preceded CinemaScope. The film was one of many Biblical epics made in the 
1950s adapted, as others were to be, from an existing bestseller. Shot in 
Technicolor the film was, Time enthused, “Hollywood at its supercolossal 
best” (www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,818950,00.html).  The 
overwhelming impact of the size of the screen and its curvature, allied with 
the introduction of stereophonic sound, lead to a sense of immersion in the 
experience, almost against the spectator’s will, as Barthes observed (Barthes, 
1954).
It has often been proposed that the introduction of television and the rapid 
development of the suburbs in the 1950s caused the sharp decline in the huge 
cinema audiences of the 1930s as families moved out of the city and away 
from the cinemas and spent more time at home. As a consequence, cinema 
had to try to win audiences back by providing something that the small, black 
and white television image could not; namely a huge, colour image 
accompanied by stereophonic sound. Belton suggests, however, that these 
were not the only reasons why widescreen technology finally succeeded in 
the 1950s. This was to do with the nature of the cinematic experience itself:
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Thus the suburbanization of postwar America did not single-handedly 
wrest the movies from their audiences. The standard motion picture, 
whether shown in drive-ins, suburban shopping centres, 
neighbourhood theatres, or downtown movie palaces, no longer held 
spectators in thrall. Postwar consumers demanded more engagement 
from their diversions. Passive entertainment no longer satisfied those 
millions of Americans who now had more time and money to spend 
on their leisure-time activities (1992, pp.76 and 77).
It is the requirement for a more participatory form of entertainment, an 
experience that physically involved and encompassed the spectator, that 
provides the key here. Belton points out that during the 1950s there was a 
massive increase in sporting activities, the playing of musical instruments and 
attendances at amusement parks, fairs and carnivals; all participatory leisure-
time activities (Belton, 1992, pp.76 and 77). In terms of cinema, the 
requirements of the new leisured classes generated new genres of films such 
as the teen exploitation movies and car and motorcycle films. There was also, 
however, amongst older generations, the desire for the spectacular, 
manifested in musicals and historical costume dramas. This desire for 
participatory cinema clearly reflects the participatory nature of spectacle, the 
direct communication with the spectator on an emotional level. Implicit in the 
notion of participation, and the need for something else to hold the spectator’s 
attention, is the need to find an emotional reengagement with the spectator 
which Belton implies is missing by the 1950s. 
The effect of widescreen cinema, of being almost engulfed by sound and 
image, at once the centre of the experience and yet simultaneously having to 
search across a huge visual field to concentrate on the details, (Belton, 1992, 
p.197) not only provided a new way of experiencing cinema but of engaging 
directly with the cinematic experience itself:
Virtually overnight, the traditional conditions of spectatorship in the 
cinema were radically redefined. On September 30 1952, Cinerama 
launched a widescreen revolution in which passive observation gave 
way to a dramatic new engagement with the image (Belton, 1992, 
p.2).
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This dramatic reengagement, on an emotional as well as physical level, was 
achieved through the emotive and exhibitionistic power of spectacle, a 
spectacle that extended not only to the huge screen itself and the stereophonic 
sound, but also to the presentation of the film as event. The appeal of 
widescreen is thus the appeal of spectacle, and through the use of the 
spectacular in all its manifestations in this context we can see once again the 
salient characteristics of spectacle, of an exhibitionistic display aimed directly 
at the spectator outside the boundary of the film providing an enhanced 
emotional experience. Belton has argued that it was spectacle rather than 
realism that accounted for the success of widescreen (1992, p.2).
The director of photography for The Robe felt the same way. Writing in Films 
in Review in May 1953 Leon Shamroy suggested that watching a 
CinemaScope film “engenders a keener sense of participation in the action” 
(1953, p.226). The advent of CinemaScope as used in The Robe highlighted 
the disappearance of the proscenium from the cinematic experience:
The absence of a framework imprisoning the action enables you to 
feel you are actually witnessing an event, rather than watching a 
picture of it (1953, p.226).  
The overwhelming effect of widescreen came from its sheer size and this 
inevitably had an effect upon the way in which the cinematic image was 
composed. Zanuck ordered filmmakers to use the full width of the screen so 
as to maximize the physical effect of the spectator having to turn their head to 
see everything that was happening on the screen, (Belton, 1992, p.198) and 
lateral compositions became more prominent with the advent of widescreen 
ratios (Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, 1985, p.362). This is evident in the 
full-screen staging not only of large crowds and huge sets but also in the way 
that characters are separated by significant spaces across the screen to 
emphasize their differences of opinion, as occurs for example in the 
courtroom scene in The Robe or the discussion between Messala and Ben-
Hur’s family over a meal in Ben-Hur (1959). 
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Whilst the opportunity for more extensive lateral compositions clearly offered 
scope for literally extending and redefining the way the image was populated, 
again we can see evidence of The Robe being constructed to suit the 
opportunities offered by the new format, another example of formative 
spectacle, the aesthetic choices made by the film being dictated by the 
presentation of the technology. The film’s opening titles are shown over red 
theatre curtains, which not only emphasise the link between the cinema and 
prestige theatrical productions but also, when they subsequently open as the 
action begins, emphasise the width of the screen. A similar moment occurs 
shortly after the film has commenced, when a shot of the teeming slave 
market is placed between two pillars and, as the camera moves forward, the 
pillars appear to move apart, once again emphasising the width of the screen 
and the difference between the old Academy ratio and the new CinemaScope 
ratio. Throughout the film opportunities are taken to populate the sets with 
large numbers of people and often to emphasise the screen shape with strong 
verticals (usually pillars) placed well apart. 
Zanuck’s instructions regarding placement of characters across the full width 
of the screen to maximise the effect of the new screen ratio, requiring the 
spectator to physically turn their head to follow conversations between 
characters, is another example of the way that widescreen emphasised the 
participatory nature of the new cinematic experience. The Robe demonstrates 
this tendency to string people out across the full width of the screen in a line 
rather than rely on any real sense of depth in the frame, leading to a rather 
artificial feel to many of the more static scenes, though Bordwell points out 
that some critics at the time felt that this arrangement clarified the confusion 
that had been caused by deep focus photography (1997, p.241). 
In the case of The Robe it is no doubt also pertinent that the fixed focal length 
of the anamorphic lenses used to shoot the film and the relative immobility of 
the cameras contributed to this sense of flatness. The director Henry Koster 
remarked that the restrictions on the cameras lead to the film being blocked 
out as if it was a theatrical production. At the time although some reviews 
considered that it was a superior example of the Biblical epic genre and were 
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overwhelmed by the size of the screen (the Time reviewer noting, rather 
alarmingly, that during close ups “an average adult could stand erect in Victor 
Mature’s ear”) there were others who felt that, as was the case with Becky 
Sharp, the demonstration of the technology was impressive, but the film itself 
less so. Writing in Film in Review Henry Hart felt that The Robe represented a 
milestone in the evolution of the movies but was not of itself a good motion 
picture:
Although The Robe is an inferior motion picture, its Cinema Scopic 
presentation is a superior mode of motion picture exhibition, which 
yields new and deeper esthetic and emotional experiences. What is 
shown in the large Cinema Scopic screen is more life-like, and richer 
in detail and incident, than what has been shown on the conventional 
screen of the past…(1953, p.428).   
Again this demonstrates the apparent paradox between the increased 
perceptual realism of the new technology and its initial, spectacular impact. 
Bazin was of the view that widescreen was another step towards his realist 
aesthetic although it was Barr who most coherently extended the application 
of Bazinian realism to widescreen cinema (1974, pp.120 to 146). Writing in 
1963, well into the period of what for our purposes is assimilated spectacle, 
Barr noted that the early CinemaScope films were indeed “crude” but that it 
had not been the trivial sensation limited only to spectacle that many had 
anticipated. He identifies that the resistance to classifying this reformulated 
cinematic image was based upon adherence to an established aesthetic which 
was challenged by the widescreen format but which was, of itself, not 
particularly superior to that which widescreen could now offer. This 
traditional aesthetic emphasised framing, the close-up, camera angles and 
montage. It did not of itself, however, produce films that were any more real 
that those subsequently produced by widescreen techniques. Rightly, Barr is 
careful to qualify what real means in these circumstances, identifying that 
cinematic reality is clearly distinct from what is observable in the real world 
and that even those films that strive towards as close a surface representation 
of reality as possible are still nonetheless artistic creations. CinemaScope 
encourages a simultaneous presence of subject and object, character and 
landscape that previously had to be achieved through camera movement and 
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staging and hence offers increased possibilities for subtlety and freedom of 
participation. He suggests ultimately that CinemaScope allows for more 
“gradation of emphasis”, requiring on the spectator’s part an “active 
interpretation on every level” but that this will require critics to overcome 
their pre-conditioned approach to viewing films only recognising a style 
“based on montage and the close up and on ‘signposting’ of effects, as 
valid…”.  There is an echo here of Hughes’ rather more extreme comments 
on the apparent inability of the human eye to perceive colour film correctly, 
disguising perhaps the need to adjust pre-existing aesthetic conceptions. 
To summarise, like Becky Sharp, The Robe was constructed to present new 
technology, in this case CinemaScope, through its full use of the width of the 
screen, emphasised on many occasions throughout the film. In fact, the 
restrictions imposed by this new technology in terms of the short focal length 
of the lenses and the relatively static camera, which dictated the way in which 
the film was made, contribute to the formative spectacle on display by 
making the presence of the technology more obtrusive, the sense that the need 
to present the new technology dictates the way that the film is made. Everett 
makes a similar point in relation to the early Technicolor films, noting that 
the “striking artificiality of the densely saturated colours” inevitably attracted 
attention to colour “in its own right” (2007b, p.109).  Such artificiality would 
operate outside the film’s diegesis, providing another example of formative 
spectacle arising out of the technical restrictions of the new technology.  The 
centrality of formative, visible technology presented as a spectacle in its own 
right contributes towards these films appearing to be less realistic even in 
cinematic terms than otherwise. The practical constraints of utilising this 
technology therefore adds to this effect.  
It is worth at this stage drawing a modern parallel with 1950s widescreen 
films not only in relation to the impact of the screen size in presentational 
terms but also the effect on the cinematic image. This is through a 
consideration of the recent use of the Imax format in The Dark Knight (2008).
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Imax is a variant of VistaVision, utilizing a 70mm film stock with the same 
perforation size and pitch as Todd-AO but moving horizontally through the 
projector with 15 perforations per frame. Consequently the image is three 
times the size of a 70 mm image, allowing it to fill a screen 24m high 
(Enticknap, 2005, pp.71 and 72).  It has survived since its inception in 1970 
owing to its application to a niche market and hence its relatively limited 
distribution. Until recently it has been limited to documentaries, travelogues 
and music videos, but since 2002 it has been possible to transfer digitally 
70mm films to Imax format, and this has been done with a number of films, 
all of them perhaps not surprisingly action/adventure/fantasy films. 
Consequently, although, as Belton suggests, Imax remains largely an 
advertisement for its own technology, (1992, p.88) it is interesting to see that 
six action sequences in The Dark Knight were filmed on Imax cameras. 
Many of the comments made by the film’s director in relation to the use of 
Imax equipment echo those relating to the introduction of widescreen (Details 
available on DVD release). So, for example, the opening bank robbery was 
shot in Imax format in order to make an immediate impression on the 
spectator and to “throw them into the action”. The advantage of the Imax 
format is that it is “an immersive medium”. Given that the bulk of the film 
was shot in 70mm format, this is a revealing comment. When it was 
introduced, as indicated by the comments detailed above the advantage of the 
new widescreen format was precisely that it was a medium which immersed 
the spectator in the action. Barr noted in his article in 1963 that 
“CinemaScope scarcely makes any impact any longer for its own sake: most 
of the really big pictures today are made on 70mm film or in Cinerama” 
(1963, p.120). It seems that now 70mm hardly makes any impact of itself, 
perhaps not surprising since virtually every big blockbuster movie since Star 
Wars (1977) has been shot in this format (Belton, 1992, p.158).  This 
development would echo the way in which both colour and widescreen 
technologies were available for many years before becoming economically 
viable in the context of mainstream commercial cinema. It is of course a good 
example of the way in which the need to provide novel, new experiences to 
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entice spectators into the cinema drives technological change in the service of 
the provision of spectacle. 
At present the practical difficulties recorded in using Imax cameras on The 
Dark Knight recall many of the practical issues faced by those shooting The 
Robe: the cameras are relatively immobile (in fact an entirely new hand-held 
rig was invented to use the cameras for the film) and have a shallow depth of 
field, limiting the area in focus to four or five inches instead of the twelve feet 
usually available with a 70 mm format. As a result the number of edits is 
reduced and takes are held for longer, exactly the same effect as that which 
CinemaScope had on existing practises in the 1950s.  In both cases the 
method of composition of the cinematic image is altered to suit the 
technology available. 
A final example of formative spectacle in the context of the introduction of 
new technology (in this case, CGI) is that which appears in the film Tron 
(1982). In common with the trajectory of the development of the other 
technologies reviewed in this chapter, CGI became used widely once the cost 
of the technology and the ease of its use enabled it to become widely 
available, a trend that has continued to the extent that it is now virtually 
ubiquitous in mainstream cinema and entry-level computers can enable 
anyone to replicate the computer generated effects achieved by films 
considered to be cutting edge in the 1980s (Cubitt, 2002, p.25).  Enticknap 
points out that again the economic imperative drove the development of the 
digital recording of sounds and images, the precursors to CGI, in that digital 
recordings can be reproduced with one hundred percent accuracy, a 
considerable quality and cost advantage in an industry which is required to 
reproduce its products accurately over and over again (2005, pp.203 to 204).
There were a number of developments in the limited use of CGI in the 1970s, 
but it was Tron that began a significant advance in the use of CGI, employing 
four major production companies to produce over 20 minutes of full three 
dimensional graphics. (Leonard, undated) It also used more than 50 minutes 
of backlit animation. The story was written with the intention of using CGI, 
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hence from the start the film was fashioned around the technology it was 
showcasing (Details available on DVD). The live action was matted onto 
CGI-created backdrops and there are some entirely CGI-created sequences 
not involving any live actors. As a result, there is no attempt to link the real 
world with the CGI-created world inside the computer, which is rendered in 
bright, unrealistic colours. This may be justified by the plot, which requires 
the central character to enter into the video game world created by the 
computer. In the context of the technology available at the time, it seems 
likely that this was the only option open to the filmmakers. The integration of 
a CGI image into an optical background did not really begin until The Abyss 
in 1989 and Terminator 2: Judgement Day in 1991. The film’s real weakness 
is its story, which does not emphasise the narrative, but even then the effects 
overwhelm the story so that there is little or no identification with any of the 
characters, as some critics pointed out at the time                            
(http://www.variety.com/reviews/).
Consequently, the level of CGI technology available at the time that Tron was 
made defined the context in which the story had to be set, entailing a 
separation between the CGI world and the real world in which the characters 
usually existed.  Again the spectacle created by the technology itself is 
formative and clearly drives the rest of the film. Up until this point, CGI 
effects had appeared in films in relatively limited circumstances such that the 
impact of the spectacular effects created by the technology was limited 
(similar to the restricted use of Imax cameras in The Dark Knight).  
The common thread that links Becky Sharp, The Robe and Tron is that the 
technology employed in their making is visible and the films themselves are 
structured so as to present that technology as a spectacle in its own right. The 
limitations of the technology available at that time further add to the sense of 
formative spectacle controlling the aesthetic choices made by the film.  
Formative spectacle cannot, of course, last indefinitely. It will alter as its 
novelty ceases to be a selling point, as the technology from which it derives 
becomes less novel. The second stage is then reached when the technology 
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develops to a stage where it becomes invisible. Often this stage is reached not 
only because the spectator is now used to that technology and is looking for 
something new to arouse interest and excitement, but because the problems 
that characterised the early use of that technology have been solved. So, for 
example, the problems of colour saturation, frame distortion and shallow 
focal length that beset early widescreen films were subsequently resolved, 
making the technology involved less obtrusive and hence less visible through
being less restrictive in terms of the aesthetic choices open to the filmmakers. 
A similar developmental path was followed by CGI as it became possible to 
integrate a CGI-created object into an optical background. Consequently, the 
restrictions placed on the makers of Tron, who were obliged to situate 
optically filmed characters into an environment that was obviously computer 
generated, disappeared enabling the makers of The Matrix (1999), which has 
the same plot device of “reality” as experienced inside a computer, to present 
that world as if it was an exact simulacrum of the real world and to 
seamlessly blend CGI and optically-created elements into the same frame. 
(As discussed later in this chapter, The Matrix in fact contained formalist 
spectacle in its bullet time sequences, but these were set against a background 
of otherwise realistic CGI effects.)
Thus, the presentation of new technology moves away from being spectacular 
in itself and, driven by the realist aesthetic, the technology begins to 
contribute towards an enhanced sense of perceptual realism or, to be more 
precise, begins to be accepted as part of the realist aesthetic that is current at 
that time. In these circumstances, spectacle associated with technology ceases 
as the technology is assimilated and comes under the controlling influence of 
the realist aesthetic and consequently subject to the dictates of the film’s 
diegesis rather than being the driving force behind the film itself. 
4.3 Assimilated technology and formalist spectacle
It can be argued that once technology has become assimilated, spectacle 
associated with that technology by definition ceases to exist since the 
technology is no longer presented as a spectacle in its own right. Instead, it 
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contributes towards the creation of spectacle rather than creating it in and of 
itself. As a consequence, technology comes to serve the film rather than 
dominate it. The assimilation of technology is a matter of the control of 
technology. This method of control and consequent assimilation can be seen 
in the context of the three technologies under consideration in this Chapter.
Colour had always been seen as a source of spectacle from the early days of 
cinema, as Bordwell has pointed out (Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, 1985, 
p.353).   Neale also observes that the need to control the colour process in the 
1940s and 50s outside the “artistic canvas” (that is, in more mainstream 
productions) was in reality a balancing act between what he sees as spectacle 
and narrative “since what colour tended to provide, above all else, was 
spectacle” (1985, p.148).     
As mentioned above, colour as a technology has existed for almost as long as 
cinema itself but was initially identified with genres associated with spectacle 
and fantasy and with animated features. To this extent Becky Sharp was not a 
significant departure: it was an historical costume drama, not a film 
attempting to wrestle with gritty realism or pressing everyday issues. Neale 
suggests that colour was confined to these categories because colour was 
considered to be something of a distraction from the narrative element of the 
film and hence had to be confined to those sections of the film in which 
reality counted for less or (as Neale puts it) those points at which the narrative 
“comes to a halt and spectacle takes over” (1985, pp.146 to 148).  Whilst 
clearly the notion that narrative actually halts while spectacle takes over does 
not accord with the transmission model, the position of colour in relation to 
the realist/spectacle issue foreshadows similar issues with widescreen and 
CGI. The confining of colour to non-realistic elements of film is thus a 
method of control, albeit one predicated upon a series of false distinctions 
which are undermined by the transmission model. Colour was to be 
subordinated to the dictates of the (narrative-driven) film so as not to disrupt 
the perceptual realism of the cinematic experience (Neale 1985, p.148).
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This division between realism and fantasy is clearly visible in, for example, 
The Wizard of Oz (1939), where the realistic scenes in Kansas are shot in 
black and white and the fantastic scenes in Oz in colour.  It was not until the 
advent of mass produced colour television in the 1960s and full time colour 
television broadcasting at the end of that decade that it became the case that 
colour was identified as the most realistic medium and the choice of black 
and white became an artistic statement, neatly reversing the position up to 
that point (Neale, 2006, p.15).  Neale points out that in fact after its 
introduction in the 1930s colour did gradually become more extensively used 
and the range of genres in which it appeared began to expand (Neale, 1985, 
pp.146 to 147) so that, to take just one example of many, This Happy Breed 
(1944), an attempt at the realistic depiction of family life between the wars, 
was filmed in Technicolor.   
This process is a demonstration of the gradual absorption of colour 
technology into the accepted realist aesthetic over a period of time. 
Subsequent uses of the Technicolor process after Becky Sharp such as The 
Adventures of Robin Hood (1938) use colour in a more considered way or it is 
motivated as an artistic statement, as in Henry V (1944) where the colour 
scheme is intended to echo that of mediaeval paintings (Neale, 1985, p.148). 
As this technology develops, however, and is disseminated widely after the 
advent of mass produced colour television, the technology is no longer 
presented as a source of spectacle in its own right. It is also the case, of 
course, that developments in colour technology make the colours used in the 
film capable of looking less saturated, a process aided by the eventual 
replacement of Technicolor by Eastman as the primary colour process in the 
industry.  Spectacle directly associated with colour technology thus ceases as 
the technology becomes assimilated within the films’ diegesis in that it no 
longer controls the film itself but has to function within the parameters 
established by the diegesis.  
In the context of widescreen, whilst the heyday of its presentational aspect 
was the 1950s, its cinematic image aspect, being the use of the 70 mm format, 
has persevered and indeed, as mentioned above, this format is now regularly 
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used in virtually every major blockbuster released by the studios.  For some 
time prior to the advent of large screen home televisions capable of catering 
for the 70 mm format, there was a tendency for filmmakers to group the 
action in the centre of the screen to avoid losing anything vital in the cropping 
process that takes place in the transfer from cinema to television, perhaps 
unconsciously echoing the measures taken by earlier filmmakers such as 
Herbert Lightman, who shot Oklahoma! (1955) in Todd-AO and tried to 
concentrate spectators’ attention on the action in the centre of the screen by 
using static objects in the foreground or filling in the side areas with shadows 
(Macgowan, 1956/7, pp.236 to 237). As is evidenced by the decision of the 
makers of The Dark Knight to use Imax cameras to create an impact, the use 
of the widescreen format no longer of itself creates a spectacular effect 
although again it will contribute invisibly to the impact that spectacle will 
have on the spectator often by utilising the full width of the screen to 
emphasise the scale of the event, such as the Civil War battlefield in The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly (1966), the space battles in Star Wars and the 
battlefield sequences in the Lord of the Rings trilogy or Lawrence of Arabia 
(1962).
In terms of the assimilation of spectacle and the change from visible to 
invisible technology, CGI has progressed slightly differently to colour and 
widescreen since it has followed parallel tracks in its development: one track 
has been the extensive use of  CGI intended to blend seamlessly into a scene 
so that the spectator does not know it is there (such as the augmentation of 
features of the landscape or the removal of roads and powerlines in the Lord 
of the Rings trilogy) whilst the other is the photorealistic incorporation of 
what is evidently an unreal or impossible image into an existing optical 
image, such as the robots in Transformers (2007) or the Hulk in The 
Incredible Hulk (2008), to take just two recent examples. Pierson uses the 
terms “simulationist” for CGI which presents things which could actually 
exist, and “technofuturist” to categorize the photorealistic presentation of the 
fantastic or the impossible, equating broadly to invisible and visible or 
prominent technology respectively (2002, p.101). 
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The aim of simulationist CGI (which accounts for the bulk of CGI work in 
the cinema) is willed invisibility (Buckland, 1999, p.184). It does not 
contribute overtly towards a spectacular event because it does not draw 
attention to itself. In contrast, technofuturist CGI aims to draw attention to 
itself, to maintain its visibility whilst at the same time ensuring that the 
obviously artificial CGI creations interact as seamlessly as possible with the 
optically filmed real world. This includes ensuring that surface reflections, 
shadows and perspective are accurate and exact and that the CGI creation 
moves as close to what would be expected of something of that nature should 
it actually exist, in short that the CGI-created images are perceptually 
realistic. This can be achieved by motion capture techniques but even where 
this was not possible, an approximation to real creatures is often sought: so 
for example the creators of the Wargs, large wolf-like creatures that appear in 
The Two Towers (2002), studied the movements of real dogs in order to 
understand how these creatures would run (Details available on DVD). In 
fact, Pierson’s definition of this visible CGI and her subsequent restriction of 
it to science fiction films perhaps highlights that at the time she was writing 
most visible CGI was indeed used in the science fiction film genre whereas 
the examples cited above from the Lord of the Rings trilogy together with its 
use in otherwise realistic films such as Buffalo Soldiers (2001) (a CGI-
assisted invisible edit pushing the camera through a solid window) or Panic 
Room (2002) (numerous examples of impossible camera movements through 
the handles of pots, into keyholes and so on) indicate that visible CGI is 
relatively unconfined by genre today.
The feature that characterises both visible and invisible CGI is the 
achievement of a compositional interaction with the optical image which, as 
Buckland points out achieves all three types of realism identified by Bazin: 
ontological realism, in that the elements appear to have equal weight and 
density to the indexically-based elements; dramatic realism, in that they are 
seamlessly blended into and interact with the indexically-based elements; and 
psychological realism, in that they are all seen to occupy the same diegetic 
space as the indexically-based elements (Buckland, 1999, p.189). 
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Consequently, in the case of CGI whilst we can say that the technology 
remains both visible and invisible depending upon its context, it is still correct 
to characterise the spectacle generated from the use of this technology as 
assimilated rather than formative. Even visible CGI serves the realist aesthetic 
established by the film’s diegesis so that whether we are viewing a giant 
robot, a man wearing an iron suit or the Hulk they still confirm to the physical 
laws and parameters established by the film. The spectacle therefore 
establishes its relationship with the spectator simultaneously in the context of 
the diegesis and outside that diegesis by presenting an object which is 
perceptually realistic but obviously not observable in the veridical world. 
The establishment of an invisible and assimilated technology may mark the 
end of that particular development. A film may of course contain many 
spectacular sequences, but they will not include spectacle that arises from the 
presentation of the technology itself. This is not, however, always the case. 
Occasionally, a film will draw attention to the technology employed in its 
creation, making the technology prominent. As stated above, this 
development may follow on chronologically from assimilated technology or it 
may occur simultaneously. As discussed above, technology tends to reinforce 
the perceptual realism of a film once it becomes invisible. This is the result of 
the effect of the realist aesthetic. Given, however, the constant need to 
provide novelty in the service of spectacle, when technology becomes 
prominent it tends to be presented in an abstract or formalist manner, as 
described in Brown’s article mentioned at the start of this chapter, so as to 
draw attention to itself. This results in what I have called formalist spectacle.
Formalist spectacle, a deliberate distortion or exaggeration of a particular 
film’s realist aesthetic, thus draws attention to the technology once again. 
Formalist spectacle is thus different from formative spectacle because the 
former is not uncontrolled and does not dictate the aesthetic choices made by 
the film. Formalist spectacle deliberately foregrounds itself, drawing attention 
to the technology in question, but the film does not exist solely to present the 
technology as spectacle.  
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So, for example, in Hero (2002), each segment of the film is colour coded, 
employing a very distinctive overall colour scheme which orchestrates many 
scenes in one dominant colour, largely through costume and production 
design, although saturated colour effects are also employed together with 
slow motion camerawork to heighten the stylised nature of many of the 
sequences. In a more subtle fashion, Three Colours Blue (1993) draws 
attention to the central character’s relationship with music and death through 
the repeated use of the colour blue, which appears and reappears throughout 
the film as a lighting effect, a blue room, the blue of the water in a swimming 
pool, blue glass beads, music contained in a blue folder. Whilst the majority 
of these effects remain within the diegesis, their repetition alerts us to their 
significance.  Taking this process a stage further, in All That Heaven Allows 
(1955) colour is used not only realistically but also in an excessive, unrealistic 
fashion to emphasise and heighten the effects of the melodramatic storyline, 
from the rich, startling reds of the autumn leaves and the sky blue car in the 
opening sequence through Cary’s red dress and the spectacular colours of 
nature, seen through the large window (screen-like in its appearance) which 
Ron builds into the wall of the old mill. As Haralovich observes, All That 
Heaven Allows “…uses the ability of colour to function as an emphasis in 
itself: as spectacle, as excess, and as potentially distractive of the primacy of 
narrative” (2006, p.152).   The use of spectacle in the context of Sirk’s films 
will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
Finally, colour may also draw attention to itself by being used in an entirely 
abstract fashion, such as the broad bands of colour which punctuate Punch 
Drunk Love (2002), the “star gate” episode in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) 
or the internal, drug-fuelled odyssey undertaken by Jessup in Altered States 
(1980).  
Formalist spectacle in the context of widescreen technology in relation to its 
cinematic image may occur when, for example, characters are placed, 
sometimes singly, at extreme edges of the frame, as in The Last Emperor 
(1987), or where the film presents a sequence in which the spectator will have 
to traverse the entire width of the screen to understand the information being 
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transmitted in full, as occurs in the parley scene in The Last of the Mohicans 
(1992) or the restaurant scene in Play Time (1967). The most significant 
recent use of formalist spectacle arising out of prominent technology is the 
Imax sequences in The Dark Knight in which the screen actually changes 
shape for the relevant sections of the film, consciously directing the 
spectator’s attention to the technology involved whilst operating within the 
realist aesthetic of the film in the same way, for example, that the colour 
coding in Hero draws our attention to the use of colour whilst still operating 
within the parameters of that film’s realist aesthetic. 
Perhaps because of its relatively greater degree of flexibility within the 
confines of the cinematic image, CGI has developed more significantly along 
the formalist path than either colour or widescreen. In particular, in the case 
of CGI, this appears to have been influenced by its tendency towards 
hyperrealism as the yardstick of the realist aesthetic prevalent in films which 
rely on such effects.
For example, the use of the Massive flocking programme to create the ten 
thousand-strong army that attacks the fortress of Helm’s Deep in The Two 
Towers, allied with carefully crafted compositional shots utilising miniatures 
and partial full scale sets, creates a very detailed shot, in fact more detailed 
than would actually be possible using solely indexically-based elements. This 
extends not only to the huge amount of activity that is evident in crisp and 
clear detail, even across huge, long range shots, but also the use and 
distribution of light evenly across a scene that appears to take place at night in 
the rain. 
This excessively detailed hyperrealistic approach is common in the use of 
CGI, whether visible or invisible. As an artistic process, however, it is not 
new. The same tendency can be identified in super- or hyper-realist painting, 
which emerged in the 1960s in the United States, a process involving the 
meticulous copying of a photographic image (which the painter may or may 
not have taken). As Darley has pointed out, this results in an excessive 
imagery, an intensification and exaggeration and therefore a kind of 
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foregrounding of the realistic/analogical character of its model: the 
photographic medium (Darley, 1997, p.20; Darley, 2000, p.86; Sobchack, 
1987, p.256). Super-realist painting therefore involves a conscious form of 
artifice, given that the paintings themselves are usually much bigger than the 
photographs from which they are copied. Purely at the level of image, super-
realist paintings and hyperrealist CGI seek to achieve the same ends and both 
involve the transposition of aesthetic codes from one medium (the 
photographic, whether that is a still or moving image) to another (painting or 
CGI) notwithstanding the fact that some CGI, particularly technofuturist CGI, 
may not involve direct copying at all. Perhaps the major philosophical 
difference between the two is that CGI strives towards representations which 
are indistinguishable from their model whereas super-realist painting does 
not.
Cinematic hyperrealism achieved through purely optical and mechanical 
effects perhaps achieved its apotheosis in Blade Runner (1982), involving a 
seamless blend of miniatures of varying scales, computer-controlled 
camerawork and multiple layers of travelling mattes (Bukatman, 1993, 
p.132).  The result is, as Bukatman suggests, “an impossible clarity through 
the perception of detailed space in which everything is nevertheless visible”.  
Sobchack criticizes what she describes as this “excess scenography” for 
inflating the value of the space that contains the objects in the shot, 
eroticising and fetishizing material culture (1987, p.261).   Cubitt also 
suggests that the detailed representation of the spatial, the imaginary worlds 
created by CGI and other mechanical and optical effects, is now of more 
importance than the narrative drive, as witnessed by the paucity of narrative 
coherence in many modern blockbusters (2002, p.26).  Thus the 
hyperrealistic, CGI created world contains more incidental material than the 
formulaic, under-developed narrative. From the transmission model 
perspective, we may see this is a shifting of the overall balance between 
narrational and non-narrational transmission.  Cubitt’s observations, however, 
may also raise an issue about how narrative should be defined in this context 
and whether the incidental material created by a hyperrealistic CGI image 
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may also be part of the overall narrative at a thematic level rather than as part 
of the narrative arc of the classical Hollywood film.
This tendency towards the acceptance of hyperrealism is increasingly evident 
in films which are, as mentioned above, well outside the genres such as 
science fiction or fantasy that might be expected to contain such imagery. In 
the same way that colour was initially confined to fantasy or action/adventure 
films but then became common in films of any genre, so CGI has moved 
beyond similar limitations in the early 1990s to its present extensive use in a 
wide variety of films that might not be expected to utilise it at all. So, for 
example, a shot of a large number of monks in Kundun (1997), a film which 
is concerned to establish a realistic world within which to tell the story of the 
Dalai Lama, was enhanced by CGI, which was also used to add features to 
the landscape such as distant mountain ranges. 
Arguably, hyperrealism began as an attempt to provide an impression of 
verisimilitude through the use of extraneous detail, a tendency apparent not 
only in the visual arts but also in the novel as it developed in the nineteenth 
century. Andrew points out that realism in the cinema depends amongst other 
things on the use of a number of codes intended to promote the experience of 
realism. One of these is the code of extraneous detail, common to literature as 
well as the cinema (1984, pp.64 and 65). This code is a “profligate rendering 
of too many items and actions” intended originally to draw the spectator’s 
attention to everyday objects which would enable the spectator to ground the 
drama in the banality of everyday life. This eventually leads to an assumption 
on the spectator’s part that the excessively detailed reality depicted on the 
screen is the starting point from which, in the search for further novelty, an 
ever more excessive cinematic image develops. Again this points towards the 
differences between perceptual realism and the empirical world and the 
spectator’s acceptance of that reality also dramatically illustrated by the use 
of black and white photography as the medium of realism until the late 1960s, 
discussed above.
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The establishment of this hyperrealist tendency in films sets the basic realist 
aesthetic against which CGI operates and against which any formalist 
spectacle will work. In the context of CGI, Cubitt suggests that in order for 
the technology to become prominent, to become a special effect, there will 
have to be a significant technological development: it will have to become 
cutting edge again (2002, p.25). This observation is borne out by, for 
example, the introduction of bullet time sequences in The Matrix, sequences 
which exist in the film alongside other spectacular sequences employing CGI 
and stunt work but which are showcased from a relatively early point in the 
film (the fight towards the beginning of the film where Trinity leaps into the 
air and freezes while the camera pivots around her). This is a sequence that 
operates outside even the flexible realist aesthetic operating in the film and 
whilst the spectator eventually understands the particular realist aesthetic of 
the computer-generated world depicted in the film, the presence of these 
sequences is never explained as a consequence of that world: in other words 
they remain an extra-diegetic effect communicated directly to the spectator by 
the film and which is available to the spectator but not the characters.  
Films such as Wanted (2008), utilizing kinetic editing and extreme distortions 
of time and space via bullet time sequences, “impossible” camera shots and 
hyperrealistic, excessive use of CGI thus foreground the technology through 
the use of formalist spectacle. Other examples include the bullet time 
explosion in Swordfish (2001), the stylized blood letting in Zatoichi (2004), 
the horse drawn carriage leaping over the gorge in Van Helsing (2004) and 
the presentation of the Hulk in Hulk (2003) (the last example also being noted 
by Brown, 2004). In each case the film establishes a set of parameters that 
defines its realist aesthetic and then distorts or exaggerates that aesthetic. 
Although the use of CGI continues to develop it is interesting to see that the 
constant demand for novelty in the presentation of spectacle may be taking its 
toll on purely CGI-driven spectacle, whether assimilated or formalist. There 
are indications that the use of CGI in itself is now not a selling point for a 
film, given its widespread usage and that, on the contrary, the absence of CGI 
in achieving a certain effect is seen as a selling point. So, for example, the 
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makers of Troy (2004) were at pains to point out that their horse was real, not 
a CGI creation; the director of Confessions of a Dangerous Mind (2002) 
dwells in the documentary accompanying the film release on DVD on the fact 
that the effects in the film were achieved in the camera through the use of 
rapidly demountable sets and other essentially mechanical devices, and the 
makers of Die Hard 4 (2007) emphasised that many of the stunts in the film 
were real and were not CGI-assisted. The success of the Bourne films, with 
their emphasis on actual stunts rather than CGI-assisted action, have had a 
significant effect on action films recently, evident in the revised approach 
taken by the Bond franchise and in films such as Salt (2010), which 
consciously set out to add “a bit of Bourne” to the action sequences (Details 
available on DVD).  A significant amount of the publicity surrounding the 
release of the James Bond film Quantum of Solace (2008) focussed on the 
fact that Daniel Craig, playing Bond, performed his own stunts and 
highlighted other films in which this had also happened. This is perhaps an 
extension of the notion that the risk inherent in the physical stunt, extending 
to the actual participation by the actors themselves, is sufficiently novel to 
enhance the spectacular elements of these films. 
Again, the comments of the creators of The Dark Knight are revealing in 
relation to the relatively sparing use of CGI on that film. Many of the 
spectacular crashes seen in the film were real and CGI was used only to 
remove cameras or other equipment which would otherwise intrude into the 
shot or, in one case, to add windows that were missing from a building that 
was then actually demolished. In addition, apart from the restrictions imposed 
on the number of edits by the use of Imax cameras, referred to above, there 
was a deliberate move away from the extending of an action sequence 
through the use of multiple-angle edits in favour of an approach which tended 
to show the action in real time. These approaches were adopted because the 
filmmakers knew that sequences filmed using extensive CGI and multiple 
edits now look “unreal”. In other words, the parameters of the realist aesthetic 
governing such films has moved away from that established by films such as 
The Matrix towards an aesthetic which connects more obviously and directly 
with what is perceived to be the real world. It is interesting to consider what 
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will happen next. Will the use of Imax cameras in The Dark Knight, 
essentially an optical effect, mark a return to the sort of special effects used in 
films such as Blade Runner and the resurgence of the huge screen as a 
presentational spectacle or will it remain an interesting curiosity, overtaken 
by the relentless development of CGI? 
These developments demonstrate that formalist spectacle, like formative 
spectacle, in fact has a relatively short shelf-life before the need for novelty 
drives the process forward. Technology-as-spectacle is therefore of quite 
limited duration. It exists alongside other categories of spectacle as a novelty 
in its own right but the twin pressures of familiarisation and the tendency 
towards a realist aesthetic mean that it will not exist as a spectacle in its own 
right for any substantial length of time.  
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that it is possible to construct a model of the 
historical development of spectacle and its relationship with technology and 
to use this to trace the development of spectacle in its historical context. 
Whilst there are obvious differences between the three types of technologies 
examined, there are also clear continuities in the way in which the formative 
and formalist spectacle associated with these technologies has developed. An 
examination of the development of the three technologies outlined above 
allows us to see that they share a common trajectory, one which is also 
apparent in the development of the original cinematic apparatus. Initially 
technology is presented as a spectacle in its own right, a source of amazement 
and astonishment, and is used by filmmakers to lure spectators to the cinema. 
Films are constructed to showcase this technology as spectacle. In time, the 
technology becomes incorporated into the cinematic experience and ceases to 
be a spectacle in itself. In the formulation I have proposed above, it begins by 
being visible and becomes invisible. It may continue to contribute to a 
spectacular sequence but will not of itself be seen as source of spectacle. The 
presentation of visible technology as spectacle is communicated directly and 
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exhibitionistically by the filmmakers to the spectator to create a sense of 
excitement and astonishment.
Invisible technology may become prominent by drawing attention to itself. So 
for example, a colour scheme may be patently artificial or may border on the 
abstract. Although the widescreen format is now often used, occasionally a 
filmmaker will draw attention to the width of the screen by utilising it fully 
rather than placing the characters in the middle of the screen to take account 
of the cropping that occurs for television release. The use of Imax sequences 
in The Dark Knight represents a particularly interesting recent development in 
the re-emergence of widescreen technology in a new format. Increasingly, 
films are being shown on limited Imax release and it may be that this marks 
the beginning of a resurgence of interest in this technology. The use of bullet 
time sequences in films such as The Matrix provides an example of CGI 
becoming more visible through the introduction of a technological advance. 
Films such as Wanted make CGI visible by virtue of it becoming more 
abstract, drawing attention to itself through excessive or hyperrealistic 
sequences which advertise its existence.
The relationship between spectacle and technology, and an element of the 
way that the aesthetics of spectacle manifests itself in this context, therefore 
lies in the manner in which film presents visible or prominent technology to 
the spectator as a spectacle in its own right. This is done in a direct, 
exhibitionistic way to achieve the ends identified in previous chapters: 
principally the emotional engagement of the spectator in the cinematic 
experience.
The spectacle linked to the development of technology through the phases 
identified above has been characterised as formative and formalist. In the 
formative phase the spectacle is generated from and reflects the technology 
around which the film is based. As such, the technology as spectacle tends to 
dominate if not overwhelm the film in which it appears; it sits outside the 
realist aesthetic to which mainstream films tend to gravitate, although the 
parameters of this realism exist primarily in the context of the film in 
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question, which I have characterised as perceptual realism, developing upon a 
concept originally proposed by Prince in the context of CGI. The confines of 
the genre in which a film operates will tend to dictate a number of common 
parameters governing the film’s measure of what is and is not perceptually 
realistic.
After the technology has been assimilated into the film’s realist aesthetic and 
therefore has become invisible, spectacle associated with that technology 
ceases and the technology instead works within the parameters established by 
the film. Given this tendency towards realism, technology subsequently 
presented as spectacle must then deliberately distort or exaggerate the realist 
aesthetic established by the film, making this technology visible (or 
prominent) once again. This abstract or formalist spectacle may be driven by 
aesthetic choice on the part of the filmmakers rather than necessarily a new 
technological development which the film seeks to advertise.  
Technology is always marketed initially as spectacle rather than as a device to 
enhance the realism of the cinematic image because of its intrinsic novelty. 
Novelty is a way of attracting audiences, feeding the economic imperative of 
revenue for the cinema. Once the novelty wears off, it is necessary to find 
something else to attract the crowds. The brake on the introduction of new 
technology in this way is the equally important cost imperative: that the new 
technology is capable of being introduced as cost effectively as reasonably 
possible into cinemas.  
If film is an emotion machine, spectacle helps to generate that emotion and 
when working with the narrative as described in Chapter Two, enhances that 
emotion through its effective amplification of emotional response. 
Technology is used to enhance the effect of spectacle through first its novelty 
and then through the effective use of technology to amplify the impact of the 
spectacle. Narrative is also used to enhance emotional response, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, but this is linked symbiotically to spectacle in terms of 
emotional effect and, as predicated by the transmission model, narrative and 
spectacle in any event coexist simultaneously as points along the same 
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information transmission spectrum. Visible or prominent technology is 
readily presented as spectacle because it is exhibitionistic in effect, 
communicating directly with the spectator outside the film’s diegesis rather 
than directing its energy inwards towards the film, as narrative does.   
This need constantly to find the next attraction, and the fact that technology 
will almost inevitably become invisible, draws attention to another facet of 
spectacle which has become apparent during this review: the need to provide 
novelty. Whilst it is not inevitably the case that the novel must be spectacular, 
the familiar is rarely of itself spectacular. The intrinsic interest in the potential 
of the new and therefore unknown is married to and balanced by the 
presentation of the familiar through existing genre conventions so that the 
tendency is towards the provision of spectacle through presenting what has 
been done before only faster, higher, louder and so on. Thus novelty exists 






This chapter will examine spectacle as a manipulation of narrational and non-
narrational transmission via the mise-en-scene to achieve the ends identified 
in the first three chapters of this thesis. This will allow new perspectives on 
both spectacle and mise-en-scene and their interaction as elements of the 
cinematic image. It will also permit us to differentiate spectacle from the 
broader and perhaps more amorphous concept of mise-en-scene. This is 
important since an understanding of the differences between spectacle and 
mise-en-scene will permit a more precise and nuanced analysis of spectacle in 
itself and will avoid the implication that spectacle is everything in the film 
other than narrative. An understanding of the operation of spectacle in its 
various forms in the context of the mise-en-scene also reveals more about the 
characteristics of the mise-en-scene itself and the way it is used by the film to 
communicate with the spectator. As was demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, what is revealed is a relationship with the spectator which operates 
holistically to provide an emotional experience to the spectator through the 
intertwining of narrational and non-narrational transmission in a flexible and 
shifting relationship as the film progresses.     
Whilst, as discussed below, the precise ambit of mise-en-scene is a matter of 
debate, generally it can be described as the director’s control over what is 
seen in the film frame (Bordwell and Thompson, 2010, p.118).   As such it is 
a concept which not only goes to the heart of the spectator’s experience when 
watching a film but is also a mechanism for assessing the operation of the 
cinematic image in its entirety, encompassing everything which the spectator 
sees on the screen and arguably everything they hear as well. This chapter 
will examine the manner in which spectacle, as a manipulation of narrational 
and non-narrational transmission through the mise-en-scene, achieves its 
aims. It will be demonstrated that in fact this manipulation takes two primary 
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forms, which I have called “event spectacle” and “object spectacle”. These 
will be defined in further detail below. A consideration of these two primary 
forms of spectacle provides not only a more precise and nuanced 
understanding of how spectacle operates in this context but also reveals how 
the spectator is emotionally aligned by a spectacular sequence or moment to 
create empathy between the spectator and the characters on the screen or at 
least an understanding of the characters’ emotional predicaments.    
5.2 Spectacle and mise-en-scene
The purpose of this section is to examine the concept of mise-en-scene, its 
links with spectacle and what this reveals about the inadequate treatment of 
spectacle in the context of narrative-driven models of the mise-en-scene. 
Consequently, I will begin with a more detailed examination of the definition 
of mise-en-scene before examining how this is treated by Neoformalism. I 
will show that the Neoformalist model seeks to narrativise mise-en-scene but 
that this inevitably leads to problems with material that does not fall within 
the unifying force of the narrative. Given that films contain material that 
cannot be categorised as narrative, the problem arises as to what to do with 
this material. This leads to the concept of excess, although it is equally 
pertinent to the issue of spectacle, as discussed in Chapter One. 
This section will demonstrate that the correct approach to an understanding of 
this area is not to adopt the Neoformalist model but instead to use the more 
inclusive transmission model. From this perspective I suggest that the mise-
en-scene can be seen as the vehicle for organising the narrational and non-
narrational transmission which is then communicated to the spectator. 
Spectacle is the result of a manipulation of narrational and non-narrational 
transmission (organised by the mise-en-scene) to achieve the characteristics 
described in Chapters One to Three of this thesis and which manifest 
themselves in the two forms of spectacle which I have called event and object 
spectacle. The following section will go on to examine these manifestations 
in more detail. 
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Somewhat like “spectacle”, “mise-en-scene” is a term often used but rarely 
precisely defined. The standard definition is that advanced by Bordwell and 
Thompson in Film Art, referred to above, as being the director’s control over 
what appears in the film frame. This is perfectly adequate as a broad 
definition but it obviously begs a number of questions, principally about the 
nature of that control, precisely what appears in the film frame and, more
importantly, the way in which that is used by the filmmakers to achieve their 
desired ends. Consequently, mise-en-scene is most often defined by reference 
to what it contains, and here there are disagreements amongst commentators. 
Bordwell and Thompson review the elements that constitute mise-en-scene in 
Film Art. They list setting, costume and make-up, lighting and staging (which 
includes movement and performance), emphasising that these elements 
overlap with the art of the theatre. As such, in controlling the mise-en-scene 
the director stages the event for the camera. This is a useful formulation, 
emphasising that each element of the mise-en-scene is carefully chosen and 
controlled and that the mise-en-scene is required to conform to the idea of 
realism as defined by that particular film rather than attempting to reproduce 
the veridical world. Gibbs criticises this definition for being too restrictive 
and for leaving out important elements such as framing or camera movement 
although in fact Bordwell and Thompson deal with these elements in separate 
chapters of Film Art since for them mise-en-scene is part of a larger formal 
system which they designate as “style” (Gibbs, 2002, pp.53 and 54).  This 
will be discussed in further detail below.
Gibbs suggests that mise-en-scene “refers to many of the major elements of 
communication in the cinema, and the combinations through which they 
operate expressively” (2002, p.5). Gibbs lists these elements as encompassing 
lighting, costume, colour, props, décor, action and performance, space, the 
position of the camera, framing and the interaction of elements. As suggested 
by his definition, it is this last characteristic that it most important: “…it is 
terribly difficult to make claims for an individual element or moment without 
considering it within the context provided by the rest of the film” (2002, 
p.39). 
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The one element missing from this list is sound. Whilst Gibbs suggests that 
this may not form part of the mise-en-scene, he does admit that to think about 
mise-en-scene without sound is “rather limiting”. Bordwell and Thompson 
include a chapter on sound in their section on style in Film Art before 
drawing together all of the aspects of style that they have considered in a 
concluding chapter examining style as a formal system.  Situating sound 
within the larger formal system of style therefore allows Bordwell and 
Thompson to deal with the issue of sound without the difficulties that Gibbs 
encounters. Seen from this perspective, there may be less difference between 
Bordwell and Thompson and Gibbs than at first appears since both posit a 
concept that deals with much the same set of characteristics and which 
emphasises that those characteristics interact with each other, whether this be 
Gibbs’ expanded definition of mise-en-scene or Bordwell and Thompson’s 
style. 
In summary, mise-en-scene is therefore the manipulation of visual and aural 
elements of the film in the service of the drama. It may act almost 
subliminally, reinforcing a mood or atmosphere or providing thematic 
information about plot or characters. It may also, for example, be used to 
articulate characters’ predicaments non-verbally, contrasting their socially-
constrained verbal articulations with their unspoken emotional responses, an 
observation also made by Elsaesser (1987, p.52).
If the use of mise-en-scene can provide a method of non-verbal 
communication, what is being communicated? This would seem to go beyond 
narrative in the Neoformalist sense of classical narrative-based Hollywood 
cinema. There is a distinction to be drawn here between form and content or, 
to use the terms adopted by Bordwell and Thompson, style and meaning. 
Gibbs is of the view that ultimately style determines meaning and refers to 
Place and Burton, who wrote in Movie in 1976:
…critics who confine themselves to chronicling changes in narrative 
content throughout the history of the cinema, ignoring the fact that the 
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mediation of form is the final arbiter of a particular film’s effect on 
the viewer, can never achieve more than an incomplete understanding 
of specific films and of the medium itself (p.59).
This echoes Elsaesser’s comments that mise-en-scene in the family 
melodrama became “functional and integral elements in the construction of 
meaning”, communicating the emotional conflicts of the story other than 
through dialogue (1987, p.52). 
Whilst this might seem a reasonable view, the issue to be addressed in the 
context of the Neoformalist position that was subsequently articulated in 1985 
is what the term narrative actually means and the extent to which that 
definition would accommodate the communication of narrational 
transmission suggested by Elsaesser. If we consider the approach to mise-en-
scene taken in Film Art together with Bordwell’s formulation of 
Neoformalism in Narration in the Fiction Film it becomes apparent that the 
Neoformalist approach seeks to “narrativize” mise-en-scene, subordinating it 
to the Neoformalist definition of narration. 
Mise-en-scene is analysed in Film Art in narrative terms but style is seen 
overall as shaping meaning (Bordwell and Thompson, 2010, p.316). Style is 
defined as “the patterned use of techniques across the film” (p.314). The 
precise techniques used and the patterns in which they are employed by the 
filmmakers will vary widely depending upon the technology available, the 
artistic choices made by the filmmakers and any constraints, self-imposed or 
otherwise, under which they will be operating. In analysing film style it is 
necessary to determine the film’s organisational structure, identify the salient 
techniques used by the filmmakers in terms of colour, sound, lighting, editing 
and so on, trace the patterns that these techniques make and finally propose 
functions for those techniques and patterns. In mainstream cinema the 
organisational structure of the film will be determined by its narrative 
content.
Consequently, for Bordwell and Thompson, mise-en-scene is part of a film’s 
style which itself is connected to the narration through the structuring of the 
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film. Style is therefore not independent of this structuring process, but is used 
to elaborate upon the underlying narrative structure. In Narration in the 
Fiction Film Bordwell suggests that plot (being in this context the governing 
narrative structure of the film) and style coexist in a narrative film each 
“treating different aspects of the phenomenal process. The syuzhet [plot] 
embodies the film as a ‘dramaturgical’ process; style embodies it as a 
technical one” (1985, p.50). In fact, style serves a narrative purpose:
In the fiction film, narration is the process whereby the film’s syuzhet 
and the style interact in the course of cueing and channelling the 
spectator’s construction of the fabula [story]. Thus it is not only when 
the syuzhet arranges fabula information that the film narrates. 
Narration also includes stylistic processes (Bordwell, 1985, p.53). 
Although the organising principle behind a mainstream film will be its 
narrative structure, style and hence mise-en-scene is not just an elaboration 
upon that structure, a way of drawing the spectator’s attention to aspects of 
the narration that the filmmakers wish to emphasise; it can also serve a 
narrative function in itself. The issue then becomes precisely what that 
narration is thought to include, which returns us to the enquiries made in 
earlier chapters about the inadequacy of Neoformalism to deal with the 
concept of spectacle and the consequent relegation of spectacle to the margins 
as a dangerous concept which appears to undermine the Neoformalist model. 
Whilst it is therefore correct to say that mise-en-scene as an aspect of a film’s 
style may assist in communicating the narration, there are other elements of 
the cinematic experience which escape the constraints of the Neoformalist 
model and which may also be communicated through the mise-en-scene. One 
of these elements is spectacle. Another one, as discussed in Chapter One, is 
excess material. 
Arguably, seen from the perspective of the transmission model, if mise-en-
scene as described above is the organisation of visual and aural elements of 
the film in the service of the drama, we can more properly see mise-en-scene 
as the vehicle for organising the narrational and non-narrational transmission 
that is communicated to the spectator.  This process of organising may give 
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rise to particular balances of narrational and non-narrational transmission that 
can be characterised as spectacle if they are intended to achieve the direct, 
exhibitionistic communication described in previous chapters. An 
examination of the way in which narrational and non-narrational transmission 
is organised through the mise-en-scene in these circumstances reveals the two 
forms of spectacle that I have called event and object spectacle. The 
formulation of these two types of spectacle clarifies the way in which 
spectacle operates in the context of mainstream cinema with more precision 
than has been the case so far. Event spectacle is tied more closely to narrative 
structure, or narrational transmission, whilst object spectacle reflects a 
particular type of manipulation of the mise-en-scene, therefore primarily non-
narrational transmission.  
Thus, using the transmission model, we understand more clearly the 
relationship between mise-en-scene and spectacle, seeing spectacle as a 
particular manipulation of narrational and non-narrational transmission which 
has been organised via the mise-en-scene. This manipulation takes two 
particular forms, which will be examined in more detail in the following 
section to allow a more precise understanding of the characteristics of 
spectacle in this context and what these reveal about the aesthetics of 
spectacle in mainstream cinema.  
5.3 Event and object spectacle
5.3.1 General characteristics and emotional alignment
In this section I shall examine the characteristics of what I have called event 
and object spectacle.  I shall consider the general characteristics of these types 
of spectacle and will then consider the use of spectacle as a way of 
emotionally aligning the spectator with the characters on the screen. I will 
then move on to consider first event and then object spectacle in more detail. 
Finally, I will conclude with a detailed consideration of the parachute stunt 
sequence from The Tarnished Angels (1957) to demonstrate the simultaneous 
use of event and object spectacle and their essential characteristics. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the formulation of event and object 
spectacle arises out of a consideration of mise-en-scene in the context of the 
transmission model and the clarification of the function of mise-en-scene that 
the use of this model provides. If we examine films looking for examples of 
particular formulations of narrational and non-narrational transmission shaped 
or manipulated through the vehicle of the mise-en-scene that achieve a direct 
and exhibitionistic communication with the spectator intended to amplify the 
emotional impact of the film, it becomes apparent that two particular forms 
emerge. Assessing films in this way is important because not only does it 
allow for a more precise understanding of what has traditionally been thought 
of as a spectacular sequence, here identified as event spectacle, it also 
clarifies that in fact there are other examples of spectacle, known as object 
spectacle, that may up until now have gone largely unremarked or may not 
have been considered to have been spectacle at all. The identification of 
object spectacle shows that spectacle is more pervasive and fundamental to 
the cinematic experience than simply the isolated event spectacle.  
Event spectacle is that type of sequence most commonly thought of as 
spectacle in the accepted sense of the word.  In it, things happen to the 
characters, often putting them at risk of death or serious injury, and it is thus 
intended to work with the narrative, as discussed in Chapter Two, and to 
increase the emotional impact of the film. Event spectacle is cued strongly 
within the film’s narrative architecture. The impact of an event spectacle may 
be heightened by the sense of anticipation which the film instils into the 
spectator through the narrative development. So, for example, the chariot race 
in Ben-Hur (1959) is within the film itself the central focus of much of the 
second part of the film (quite apart from being the main image for its 
advertising campaign). Thus the film builds up to the race and then indulges 
in a lengthy pre-race sequence to increase the tension further. The final attack 
on the Death Star in Star Wars (1977) is prefigured by several scenes dealing 
with the preparations for the attack, as is the climatic attack on SkyNet 
headquarters in Terminator Salvation (2009). In The Wild Bunch (1969) the 
final shoot out in the Mexican town is preceded by the characters walking 
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slowly through the town to the main square accompanied by a musical 
soundtrack increasing in intensity as they approach their destination. Much of 
the last third of The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957) consists of the build up 
to the destruction of the bridge at the end of the film. In innumerable 
blockbuster films the central character or characters “tool up”, arming 
themselves to the teeth before setting out to face the enemy in a sequence 
designed to increase the tension before the cathartic showdown.  
The above examples also show that whilst event spectacle is incorporated in 
the narrative architecture of the film, it is also cued within the film itself so 
that the spectator is aware that something is about to happen. Rarely does 
event spectacle erupt out of nowhere since the cueing within the film 
heightens its impact. In Gladiator (2000), a film partly concerned with the 
use and effect of spectacle as mass entertainment, each gladiatorial contest is 
preceded by some form of build-up, none more so than the first in the arena in 
Africa when the experience will be new to both the spectator and the central 
character. 
Object spectacle arises in that moment when the film asks the spectator to 
look at a particular object as a spectacle in itself. This will be related to the 
narrative in broad, often thematic terms, such as establishing the status of the 
hero or the spectacular backdrop to the action, so that the spectator’s 
emotional alignment with certain narrative concerns which the film is 
advancing is reinforced. So, for example, the first few shots of the desert in 
Lawrence of Arabia (1962) help to emphasize the size and beauty of the 
landscape which will form the backdrop to much of the remaining action in 
the film and partly helps the spectator to understand Lawrence’s attraction to 
the desert. Or in the opening moments of Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981) the 
camera holds back from showing us the full view of Harrison Ford as Indiana 
Jones for which we have been waiting until after he has disarmed an attacker 
with his bullwhip. He then steps forward into the light, finally revealing his 
face. This revelation of the central character is a common moment of object 
spectacle. Other examples of this process would include the gradual revealing 
of Blondy in The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (1966) and the first appearance 
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of Scarlett O’Hara in Gone with the Wind (1939) from behind one of the 
Tarleton brothers, who moves aside to reveal her as the camera zooms in on 
her face (an example cited by Brown (2008, p. 170)). It is also the case that 
the object spectacle here is as much about Harrison Ford, Clint Eastwood and 
Vivien Leigh as it is about Indiana Jones, Blondy and Scarlett O’Hara: in 
such moments the object on display is a complex layering of star and 
character. These examples emphasise that the focus of object spectacle is 
often the body, as will be discussed further below. 
As is apparent from these examples, object spectacle results from the film 
treating a particular object in a particular way so as to draw that object to the 
spectator’s attention as a site of spectacle in its own right. Again, the effect is 
of a direct, exhibitionistic communication with the spectator outside the 
film’s diegesis. The purpose is to amplify the spectator’s emotional response 
to the object on display and, as suggested above, in the larger context of the 
thematic concerns of the film, to reinforce the spectator’s involvement or 
empathy with the narrative. Whereas event spectacle tends towards producing 
feelings of awe, excitement, astonishment, fear and so on, object spectacle 
may also seek to elicit an erotic response if the object in question is 
physically attractive. The use of cueing within the film’s diegesis helps to 
reinforce the link between the spectator and the spectacle, essentially bridging 
the transition from voyeuristic narrative to exhibitionistic spectacle.
Object spectacle can also be cued within the film and often is if the object is a 
body. Neale discusses this phenomenon, which he refers to as “looking” in 
the context of his examination of the use of spectacle and looking in The 
Triumph of the Will (1935). He identifies that the act of looking at an object 
by those in the film when that object is as yet unseen by the spectator 
establishes the object as a spectacle in itself through the anticipation 
generated by the withheld object: “It is at this point that the activity of 
looking is inscribed into the diegesis itself, and that its privileged object 
begins to be established” (Neale, 1979, p.69). The cue or look (to use Neale’s 
term) therefore functions as a device to align the spectator with the characters 
on the screen, anticipating a similar emotional response. Neale suggests, in 
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the context of The Triumph of the Will, which is structured as a series of 
staged event spectacles through which the object spectacle of Hitler moves, 
that looking “…is not only the foundation of spectacle in its relations with the 
spectating subject, it is also the means by which the film coheres as a film –
linking the images together and to a large extent specifying their meaning” 
(1979, p.76). This observation may apply particularly to The Triumph of the 
Will by virtue of its structure, but it is certainly true to say that cueing has a 
central role as a way of advertising the occurrence of an event or object 
spectacle and beginning the process of alignment of the spectator’s emotional 
response with those of the characters on the screen. 
This process of emotional alignment has been examined by Carroll in the 
context of the horror film (Carroll, 1990). He is dealing principally with 
object spectacle, being the spectator’s emotional identification with the 
characters’ feelings of fear and disgust at the monster (whatever form that 
may take) which confronts them:
In horror fictions, the emotions of the audience are supposed to mirror 
those of the positive human characters in certain, but not all, 
respects…Our responses are meant, ideally, to parallel those of 
characters (Carroll, 1990, p.18).
The evaluative response of the character to the monster is meant to be shared 
by the spectator even though the spectator knows (but the character usually 
does not) that the monster does not exist. Carroll is of the view that whilst this 
emotional alignment is a central feature in the horror film, it is not the case 
for every genre. This may be true, but the position may be different in the 
context of spectacle. It is certainly the case that the spectator is unlikely to 
mirror all of the emotions experienced by characters involved in an event 
spectacle since these may often include fear, terror and horror whereas the 
spectator may feel excitement, astonishment and so on. Object spectacle, 
however, may rely more on alignment of emotion so that the characters’ 
reactions to the object viewed are understood and shared by the spectator. It 
may be that object spectacle therefore rests to a greater extent than event 
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spectacle upon the generation of an empathic response through alignment as 
part of its emotional amplification. 
5.3.2 Event spectacle and narrative
Event spectacle tends to generate excitement, astonishment, awe, possibly 
fear, arising out of the spectator’s identification not only with the characters’ 
predicament but also the event in itself. It operates within the generic confines 
of the film so that, for example, we would not expect to see the characters 
break into a spectacular musical number in the middle of a war film. 
Traditional criticism of spectacle tends to focus on the extent to which event 
spectacle interferes with the narrative flow. This criticism is of course belied 
by the transmission model, and as King has pointed out:
Narrative is far from being eclipsed, even in the most spectacular and 
effect-oriented of today’s blockbuster attractions.  These films still tell 
reasonably coherent stories, even if they may sometimes be looser and 
less well-integrated than some classical models  (King, 2000, p.2).
King suggests that the notion of the complete homogeneity of the classical 
film was probably first proposed by Heath and continued thereafter by the 
Neoformalist approach and the concept of excess material. It is the case that 
not all products of the classical Hollywood cinema actually conformed to the 
tidy Neoformalist model, neither is it necessary to argue that films can or 
should be as homogenous as Heath proposes. As King observes, profitability 
was (and is) more important than unity or homogeneity and in fact the desire 
to appeal to a mass market may result in an inbuilt incoherence arising out of 
conflicting demands: “Spectacle is often just as much a core aspect of 
Hollywood cinema as coherent narrative and should not necessarily be seen 
as a disruptive intrusion from some place outside” (2000, p.4). In fact, King 
recognises that, in accordance with the transmission model, spectacular 
sequences do actually contain narrative elements: “In some cases spectacle 
reinforces, rather than interferes with, the narrative. Moments of spectacle 
sometimes help to move the plot significantly forward” (2000, p.4 and 5).
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The classical Hollywood narrative structures usually involve a tight narrative 
closure (as much the case for the B movie-type narrative structures employed 
by modern blockbusters as it was during the classical Hollywood era). It may 
well be the case that this narrative closure is effected through a spectacular 
sequence. A well-known example of this would be the gunfight at the end of 
the western, or the final assault on the enemy stronghold in the war film or 
the historical epic. 
It is notable that one of the most influential recent books in terms of 
scriptwriting is Vogler’s The Writer’s Journey, which explores the use of 
mythic structures, particularly the quest myth, in Hollywood films. This 
allows for an episodic structure capable of incorporating spectacle into its 
architecture without disrupting the forward progress of the narrative. King 
suggests that “Formal closures at the level of mise-en-scene and editing tend 
to tie the viewer tightly into driving narratives that offer big emotional pay 
offs as a reward” (2000, p.29). The narrative may therefore, it is suggested, 
operate at a more thematic level, concerned less with the psychological 
development of characters than with establishing a set of conditions that 
allows for an enhanced emotional impact. It is also the case that narrative 
itself is not the sum total of the cinematic experience, as Tasker observes:
…spectacle is not necessarily best understood as devoid of narrative 
content. As in melodrama, narrative themes and concerns can be 
developed as much through visual and aural spectacle (and indeed 
other aspects of the screen image) as through characterisation or 
dialogue. We might even argue that such visual elements are more, 
rather than less, cinematic. In the process this may remind us of 
something important about popular cinema: its meaning and its 
pleasures are unlikely to be accessed simply through narrative 
exegesis (Tasker, 2004, p.3).
 Tasker’s comments highlight a significant similarity between films as diverse 
as the family melodrama and the blockbuster: in both cases themes and 
concerns relating to the narrative can be developed through visual or aural 
spectacle rather than the narrative as understood in the more traditional sense. 
An issue which this passage raises is whether in the case of the blockbuster 
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and the family melodrama the spectacle in question is the same. The answer 
is that generally it is not. As will be discussed in more detail below, family 
melodrama tends to employ object spectacle more than event spectacle 
whereas blockbusters tend to be the other way round.  This is by no means 
always the case: the opening speed boat sequence in Magnificent Obsession
(1954) and the races round the pylons in The Tarnished Angels are examples 
of event spectacle. Blockbusters often use object spectacle, utilising the 
human physique as much as the gun or car or space ship for spectacular 
effect, often as a precursor to an event spectacle. 
In the context of its place within the narrative architecture, event spectacle 
operates as a self-contained sequence in terms of its exhibitionistic 
communication with the spectator whilst at the same time being linked into 
the narrative through its incorporation within the structure of the film itself 
and its emotional linkage to the narrative through the involvement of the 
characters in the spectacle. The extent to which we may regard event 
spectacle as being “good” or “bad” may therefore arise from the extent to 
which we are emotionally involved in the sequence and this may in turn arise 
from the effectiveness with which the sequence is incorporated into the 
narrative as a whole. King highlights The Long Kiss Goodnight (1996) as 
having a “finely-tuned narrative structure” in which the action sequences “do 
not occur randomly but within a structured pattern” (2000, p.113). It is 
interesting to note that the scriptwriter of that film, Shane Black, when asked 
to list the ingredients of a good action film listed as number one “an action-
driven plot”:
The action should always go hand in hand with the story so it’s all 
invisibly interconnected. Take the original Star Wars movies: every 
action sequence is perfectly timed and is designed not just to excite 
the audience on a visceral level but also to reveal crucial elements of 
the plot and characters  (Black, 2009).
Event spectacle functions as a display within the larger display of the film 
itself. One of the identifying characteristics of spectacle often remarked upon 
by commentators is that it is something that is both display and on display 
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and this may be seen as an acknowledgement of the exhibitionistic nature of 
spectacle, a concept that applies equally to event spectacle and object 
spectacle, though commentators rarely make the distinction between the two.
As stated above, spectacle is a shaping or manipulation of narrational and 
non-narrational transmission through the mise-en-scene. Whilst prompted by 
the narrative, event spectacle also reflects this manipulation through devices 
such as slow motion and, more recently, through extreme distortions of time 
to accentuate physical action in films such as Lock, Stock and Two Smoking 
Barrels (1998), Watchmen (2009) and Sherlock Homes (2009), through the 
speed of the editing from shot to shot and through sound distortion and 
amplification (a practise parodied in Hot Fuzz (2007)) (Rossaak and Sobchak, 
2006). These manipulations can perhaps best be described as exaggerations of 
elements of the mise-en-scene intended to heighten the impact of the event 
spectacle. 
5.3.3 Object spectacle – the body
Object spectacle relies on this manipulation process to a greater extent than 
event spectacle but relies less on narrative cueing.  It is a more purely stylistic 
adjustment to achieve an emotional effect.  This leads us to consider the 
nature of the object which is the focus of object spectacle.  The primary and 
most obvious object is the body. Neale has pointed out that a great deal of 
discussion during the Technicolor era from the 1930s through to the 1950s 
focussed on the generally beneficial effect that colour film would have on the 
female form. The presence of the female form, however, had a particular 
purpose:
The role of the female body within the regime of representation 
inaugurated by the introduction of Technicolor was one both of 
focusing and motivating a set of colour effects within a system 
dependent upon plot and narration, thus providing a form of spectacle 
compatible with that system, and of marking and containing the erotic 
component involved in the desire to look at the coloured image
(Neale, 1985, p.147).
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Here we see, formulated in different terms, object spectacle, described as 
being a form of (undefined) spectacle capable of coexisting with a narrative-
driven cinema. Klinger makes a similar point in relation to the use of 
Technicolor in Sirk’s films:
The industry perceived the visual pleasure inherent in Technicolor as 
being inextricably tied to the female image and its ability to sell films
(Klinger, 1994, p.62).
Klinger’s use of the term “visual pleasure”, which may have been borrowed 
from Mulvey, is in fact a reference to spectacle, as it is in Mulvey’s essay 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”.  Here we see also the underlying 
purpose for the deployment of any form of spectacle in the cinema: ultimately 
it is to draw spectators to the cinema, the economic driver behind the creation 
of the vast majority of mainstream films. Klinger goes on to point out that the 
use of spectacle in films such as Written on the Wind (1956) also served other 
purposes linked to economic imperatives, giving rise to a mode of viewing 
not necessarily linked to “analysis of narrative and style as intrinsic systems” 
but instead a consumer-based approach, seeing the display of upwardly 
mobile lifestyles and trappings as part of “the consumer glance” (a phrase 
borrowed from Mary Anne Doane) which is less concerned with the narrative 
and temporal dimensions of the film and more with the spaces occupied by 
rooms and bodies (Klinger, 1994, p.67). In such circumstances it is the luxury 
of the mise-en-scene (aided by the lush Technicolor treatment) that satisfies 
the consumerist aspirations of the spectator. 
Perhaps the best known formulation of the female body as object spectacle, 
described this time from an ideological and psychoanalytical perspective, is 
Laura Mulvey’s article “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Mulvey’s 
approach was to look at the apparently gendered nature of the spectator’s 
gaze in the context of classic Hollywood cinema. In her view the films of the 
classical period were organised around an active and central male presence 
given a position of mastery by the film. The woman interrupted the smooth 
coherence of the film’s structure by serving as the spectacular object of the 
male gaze, a gaze that the spectator was invited to identify with and 
197
participate in so that the implicit ideological viewpoint of such films was that 
of the male voyeur gazing at the female object of desire. The presence of the 
woman as object spectacle in this narrative context had a significant effect:
The presence of woman is an indispensable element of spectacle in 
normal narrative film, yet her visual presence tends to work against 
the development of a story line, to freeze the flow of action in 
moments of erotic contemplation (Mulvey, 2004, p.841).
Here again is the notion that in some way narrative is separate from spectacle 
and that narrative comes to a halt while a spectacular event occurs. This is not 
the case, either from a transmission model perspective or from the more 
expansive view of the development of narrative thematics suggested by King. 
Object spectacle of the sort that Mulvey considers operates simultaneously as 
a moment of enhanced emotional impact and to reinforce the alignment of 
empathic reactions between spectator and the characters on the screen.  If we 
are, for example, invited to see Gilda as an object of erotic desire, we are 
being emotionally aligned with the male characters in the film that feel the 
same way. We may well describe this as advancing the plot in terms of the 
establishment of the emotional geography of the story, quite apart from any 
more overt narrative function that it may possess. 
One of the criticisms of Mulvey’s essay was that it suggested that the only 
gaze in the classical Hollywood cinema was that of the male at a female 
object whereas this was not the case. An early response on this issue was 
Neale’s “Masculinity as Spectacle”, which appeared in 1983. Here Neale 
sought to argue that in fact attention should also be paid to the representations 
of heterosexual masculinity in mainstream cinema. These often focussed 
around images of the male as powerful and omnipotent to an extraordinary 
degree and also sometimes as an object of erotic contemplation, leading to an 
unstable and sometimes fragmented representation of the male image. Often 
the inherent erotic element of contemplation of the male form was mitigated 
by the violence inflicted on the male body during the course of the film 
(Neale cites the Western and the epic as examples of this tendency). Neale 
and Mulvey then draw a distinction between voyeuristic and fetishistic 
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looking, the former identified more with the usual stance taken by the 
spectator of narrative cinema and the latter being the look directed at displays 
of spectacle. 
It may be possible to draw broad parallels between the voyeuristic approach 
of narrative-based cinema and the exhibitionistic elements of spectacle and 
the voyeurism and fetishism of Neale and Mulvey’s theories, but this would 
be to miss the central feature of the transmission model that in fact both of 
these approaches to viewing occur simultaneously since the transmission 
model does not draw the distinction between narrative and spectacle that 
Neale and Mulvey observe. Consequently, Neale cites Ellis’ definition of 
fetishistic looking which, while it equates this type of looking with “display 
and the spectacular” also suggests that it “represents the opposite tendency to 
that of voyeurism” (Neale, 1983, p.13). As suggested in Chapter Two, the 
voyeuristic and exhibitionistic elements of the transmission model coexist. 
This approach avoids the necessity to choose between the two or to assume, 
as Neale does, that one element will operate in exclusion to the other: “…the 
look begins to oscillate between voyeurism and fetishism as the narrative 
starts to freeze and spectacle takes over” (1983, p.12). Neale does later 
acknowledge however, that things may not be that straightforward:
The shoot-outs are moments of spectacle, points at which the narrative 
hesitates, comes to a momentary halt, but they are also points at which 
the drama is finally resolved, a suspense in the culmination of the 
narrative drive. They thus involve an imbrication of both forms of 
looking, their intertwining designed to minimise and displace the 
eroticism they each tend to involve, to disavow any explicitly erotic 
look at the male body  (1983, p.14).
Neale deals briefly with the presentation of Rock Hudson in Sirk’s movies, 
noting that whilst he is the subject of an erotic gaze which is female, his body 
is feminised. Neale does not really explain what he means in this context, 
noting only that such feminisation takes place in the musical. It would seem 
that the process of feminising in this context is simply treating the male body 
in cinematic terms in the same way as a female body. As Tasker has pointed 
out, on Neale’s formulation we find a female gaze being directed at a 
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feminised male, which would appear to make little sense (Tasker, 1993, 
p.115).
The location of the male body as object spectacle goes back at least as far as 
Valentino. Hansen, writing on Valentino’s appeal, noted: “The star’s 
performance weakens the diegetic spell in favor of a string of spectacular 
moments that display the essence of the star”, another example, albeit 
formulated in different terms, of object spectacle (Hansen, 1991, p.246).  
Klinger notes, in the context of a discussion of Rock Hudson’s star persona 
both on and off the screen, that: “…the extra-filmic presentations of the star’s 
body, background, personality, etc. inspire a rapture with the image that takes 
the viewer beyond the horizons of the narrative, encouraging a spectacle-
driven sensibility that derives pleasure in a sporadic, alinear, anarrative 
manner” (1994, p.118). We are a long way from Mulvey’s narrative-driven, 
male-oriented view of classical cinema and instead see a more complex 
approach which recognises that narrative may not be the central prerequisite 
of the cinematic experience and that object spectacle may reside as much in 
the male as the female form.  The publicity “torso shots” of Hudson 
reproduced in Klinger find their echo in the treatment of more modern actors 
such as Brad Pitt and Hugh Jackman in films such as Fight Club (1999) and 
Troy (2004) in Pitt’s case and Swordfish (2001), Australia (2008) and 
Wolverine (2009) in Jackman’s case, where the camera lingers over shots of 
their bodies with as much exhibitionistic fervour as any female object 
spectacle.
Sirk’s films contain many examples of bodies as object spectacle, not all of 
them female. In All that Heaven Allows (1955) Ron Kirby is seen as the 
object of Cary’s desires and indeed the film as a whole is seen “strictly from a 
woman’s point of view” as Mulvey has pointed out (1987, p.78).  In Written 
on the Wind Mitch is the object of Marylee’s sexually aggressive attentions 
for most of the film. Imitation of Life (1959) is partly about the creation of 
Lora Meredith as public property, or the property of others, and as such as an 
object in her own right. As a result, there are many moments in which 
Meredith is seen as object spectacle. On several occasions Sirk frames her in 
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a long shot to allow a full view of the clothes she is wearing, and on other 
occasions she is shot in close up so her face is framed by her blonde hair and 
the large quantities of jewellery that she wears for most of the film. So for 
example, when she first appears at the agent’s office in her black evening 
dress she is seen in long shot so that we can appreciate her outfit. Later, 
ironically after a speech she has made deploring the way in which she has 
become other people’s property as a result of her success, she is shot full 
length as she puts on an extravagant and expensive outfit and the usual 
jewellery, balanced by Annie on one side and her husband on the other, her 
slightly off-centre position offset by a striking vase of red flowers to the left 
of the screen. The formal framing of the elements heightens the effect of Lora 
as an object around which the other characters revolve. 
We may distinguish this moment of object spectacle from the mise-en-scene 
generally by seeing it as the moment when the film asks the spectator to look 
at a particular object, and then structures the image around that object. As 
discussed above, mise-en-scene may contribute either directly or indirectly to 
the narrative drive of the film, may contribute information of a more thematic 
nature or possibly to accentuate a mood or atmosphere in a particular scene 
through, for example, the use of a particular colour palette. These are all 
essentially moments during which the mise-en-scene operates within the 
film’s diegesis, and examinations of the nature and function of the mise-en-
scene have tended to see it as inward-looking, concerned with the diegetic 
aspects of the film.  During moments of spectacle, however, the film 
manipulates the mise-en-scene so that it focuses out towards the spectator as 
part of the direct exhibitionistic communication between the film and the 
spectator that is one of the defining characteristics of spectacle. 
Neoformalism may see such moments as the stylistic flourishes of excess 
material or the non-narrative aspects of parametric narration, but in fact they 
should really be seen as part of the communication between film and 
spectator that occurs during spectacular sequences.  
In the context of blockbuster films, both male and female bodies have been 
treated as object spectacles. Whilst the passive female body may remain in 
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certain circumstances the object of the male gaze, as Mulvey suggests, it is 
interesting to note the rise of the male object spectacle, the continuation of the 
elements identified by Neale in his article on masculinity as spectacle. In 
retrospect, Neale was writing just at the time that a new trend in blockbuster 
movies was emerging: the rise of the heavily-muscled action hero, 
exemplified by Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger. Films starring 
Stallone and Schwarzenegger invite the spectator to see their bodies as object 
spectacle and will construct opportunities for a display of their physique: 
As with the figure of the showgirl that Laura Mulvey refers to in 
classic Hollywood films, contemporary American action movies work 
hard, and often at the expense of narrative development, to contrive 
situations for the display of the hero’s body (Tasker, 1993, p.79).
The purpose of the object spectacle in this case is not necessarily to promote 
erotic contemplation but instead as a display of power or prowess: very often 
the body is displayed in combat situations, perhaps as Neale has suggested to 
deflect any suggestion of homoerotic contemplation but also to link the 
prowess of the individual body with the excitement generated by the event 
spectacle in which that body is involved. So, for example, in the opening 
scenes in both Commando (1985) and Red Heat (1988) we are afforded a few 
moments to contemplate Schwarzenegger’s muscles before he starts killing 
people in the event spectacles that follow.  
The body as object spectacle can therefore be treated as a site of erotic 
contemplation or to generate excitement or awe through the display of 
physical prowess or power. The muscular movies of the 1980s gave way to 
the display of power by the male hero that might not be based on just his 
physical strength alone but also on his wits (such as Bruce Willis’ character 
John McClane in the Die Hard films) or through the exercise by him of some 
form of superhuman power, such as Neo in the Matrix trilogy.  In the context 
of the blockbuster there are a notable number of female stars who exercise 
this level of power. These would include Sarah Connor in the Terminator 
films, Ripley in the Alien series, Mace in Strange Days (1995) and Lara Croft 
in the Tomb Raider films. These are what O’Day refers to as “action babes”, 
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arguably a sub-group of their own, in his view, and an example of where 
Mulvey’s original thesis breaks down (O’Day, 2004).  
A particular configuration of the cinematic treatment of bodies as object 
spectacle in blockbusters is something of a cliché given that it occurs so 
often. It may be convenient shorthand to refer to it hereafter (using a well-
known but largely undefined term) as the “hero shot”, a specific dwelling 
upon the object as a site of spectacle and power. Often, the shot will start near 
the feet of the person and track upwards so that the person towers over the 
spectator. This sequence can be seen for example in Indiana Jones and the 
Temple of Doom (1984) when Indiana comes to rescue the boys trapped in the 
mine, and in Terminator 2 (1991), just after the terminator has acquired new 
clothes and the requisite sunglasses. In Gladiator Maximus is treated to the 
hero shot, but its placement in the film is worth noting: it occurs not the first 
time we see him but after he has become a hero to the crowd at the arena. 
Once again the object spectacle serves to align the spectator emotionally with 
the characters in the film. They now see Maximus as a hero and not just 
another slave to be killed for entertainment. The film sees him the same way 
too. The lighting, editing, framing, camera angles and other aspects of the 
mise-en-scene are used to project the body as object directly out towards the 
spectator, distinct for a moment from the diegesis of the film, inviting the 
spectator’s contemplation and amplifying the emotional effect being 
generated by the film.   
Objects are also treated to the hero shot, showing that object spectacle can 
extend not only to bodies (human or otherwise) but also to objects. For 
example, in Star Trek (2009) the USS Enterprise is shot on several occasions 
as an object spectacle, perhaps most obviously when it is first seen by the 
crew (and the spectator) emerging from behind another craft and also when it 
is seen rising out of the rings of Saturn rather like a submarine surfacing.  In 
Titanic (1997) the ship itself is subject to a number of CGI-enhanced 
sweeping shots travelling the length of the ship to emphasise its size and 
magnificence. The submarine in The Hunt for Red October (1990) is treated 
in much the same way. In the Transformers films people, cars and robots are 
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all treated to a hero shot almost indiscriminately. The camera circles lovingly 
around the machinery in the same way that it dwells upon Megan Fox, and 
from much the same set of angles.  
As discussed above, the revelation of a body as object spectacle can often be 
a complex layering of star and character so that the spectator is intended to 
see both simultaneously and the film communicates the star as object 
spectacle as much as the character they are playing. So for example the 
physiques of Schwarzenegger and Stallone and the opportunity to display 
those physiques in moments of object spectacle determine the narrative 
construction of the film. The opening sequence in Cliffhanger (1993) has 
Stallone wearing shorts and a sleeveless top climbing up a precipitous rock 
face and dangling above a huge drop. Not only are we supposed to be 
impressed by his character’s climbing skills, we are also intended to notice
his physique as emphasised by his clothing and the activities he is 
undertaking. Similarly, the opening sequence of Red Heat takes place inside a 
gymnasium, requiring Schwarzenegger to walk through the gym wearing only 
a small towel as a loincloth, allowing plenty of opportunity for the spectator 
to consider his gleaming torso. In Imitation of Life Lora Meredith as played 
by Lana Turner wears extravagant outfits and jewellery, accoutrements 
identified as much with Turner herself as the character she is playing, as Dyer 
has pointed out (Dyer, 1992, p.91). The physique, identified with 
Schwarzennegger or Stallone more than their characters, thus belongs to them 
as stars and is a constant feature in their films. The jewellery and elaborate 
costumes are identified with Lana Turner as much if not more than they are 
with Lora Meredith.
The use of the body as object spectacle can be found in films in which little or 
no event spectacle occurs. In Rear Window (1954), extensively analysed by 
Bordwell in Narration in the Fiction Film, a number of instances of object 
spectacle occur, centred around the depiction of Grace Kelly, both as Grace 
Kelly the film star and as Lisa Fremont, the character she is playing in the 
film. 
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Her character is cued within the narrative as an object spectacle prior to her 
appearance in the discussion between Jeff and Stella which dwells upon her 
beauty and desirability, her “perfection”. Her first appearance is carefully 
constructed to maximise its impact: as Jeff awakes from a dream she appears 
(unannounced by the narrative) and bends over him to kiss him. This 
movement is shown in close up and is split into two sequences by an 
intervening shot of her shadow falling over Jeff’s face so that the spectator is 
treated to not one but two close ups of her face, the edit serving to emphasise 
this moment of contemplation. The next shot, another close up, shows them 
both in profile, her moving in from left of screen to kiss Jeff on the lips. This 
movement is slowed down significantly. The overall effect of this sequence is 
to give her appearance and beauty a oneiric quality, as if she is something Jeff 
is dreaming rather than a real person, but it also allows the spectator to 
contemplate her physical beauty in a moment of object spectacle. This 
sequence is structured around the presentation of Grace Kelly as object 
spectacle, a direct exhibitionistic communication with the spectator utilising a 
manipulation of the mise-en-scene through editing, lighting and camera 
positioning. This sequence not only communicates something of Jeff’s 
feelings for her, hence aligning the spectator emotionally with Jeff, it is also 
and primarily aimed at the spectator: the majority of this sequence occurs 
whilst Jeff is asleep hence he is in one sense expressly excluded from the 
encounter between the spectator and Grace Kelly. 
Lisa has some connection with the fashion world which allows her to wear a 
number of elegant costumes throughout the film, again emphasising her as 
object spectacle and, like Sirk, Hitchcock displays these outfits in a number 
of full length shots as she draws attention to what she is wearing, seeking 
Jeff’s approval. In one sequence, after she enters his apartment she moves 
around the room turning on the lights, illuminating the frame in which she is
appearing so that she can be appreciated more fully by the spectator.
As a final example, during one sequence Jeff is listening to a song being 
played by a musician in an adjacent flat and Lisa enters wearing another new 
outfit and lies down on the couch in front of Jeff so that he is in the 
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background of the shot to the left whereas she occupies the foreground in the 
centre and right of the shot. He is partially obscured by her whereas she is 
entirely in shot, dominating the frame. The staging of this sequence serves no 
particular narrative purpose: the conversation that takes place could have 
occurred in any number of other settings. The purpose of the shot is to create 
a moment of object spectacle centred on Lisa/Grace Kelly. The lighting and 
staging of the scene are clearly created to focus the object spectacle out 
towards the spectator rather than in towards Jeff: indeed, Lisa is actually 
turned away from Jeff and towards the camera, propped up on her left elbow. 
Again, reading this sequence as object spectacle allows us to see that there is 
more happening here than just the mise-en-scene communicating diegetic 
information about the film: we can see that the sequence is actually spectacle 
structured to communicate directly with the spectator, intended to amplify an 
emotional effect, in this case lust, wonder, astonishment or other emotions 
generated by the physical beauty of Grace Kelly. 
5.3.4 Object spectacle – the background
It is not the case that only bodies or other objects such as guns or cars or 
spaceships can be the subject of object spectacle. The same technique is 
applied to elements which usually form the background to a sequence, such as 
the physical setting in which a sequence occurs. Very commonly, particularly 
at the opening of a sequence or when the audience sees a certain location for 
the first time, the film will allow that location to be seen as an object of 
spectacle in its own right. Helen Phillips’ garden and the lakeside scenery in 
Magnificent Obsession and the Hadley mansion in Written on the Wind are 
examples of backgrounds which are presented as object spectacles. In the 
opening sequence of Written on the Wind the camera follows Kyle Hadley 
into the mansion, shooting the entrance hall with its impressive sweeping 
staircase from a low angle to emphasise its size and splendour. The staircase 
itself features centrally in a number of shots, often as a prop for Marylee 
Hadley and in a central sequence Jasper Hadley suffers a fatal heart attack 
and falls down the staircase, his death cross cut with a sequence in which 
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Marylee dances in a revealing pink negligee in her bedroom upstairs, a fine 
example of object spectacle in itself.    
           
A common theme in the use of backgrounds as object spectacle is to 
emphasize either sheer size or profligacy of detail or sometimes both. In 
Lawrence of Arabia the match cut from the flame to the sun heralds a 
sequence where the immensity of the desert, seen for the first time, is 
presented as object spectacle. A similar match cut from an object seen in 
close up to an immense vista occurs in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) in the 
famous cut from the bone to the space ship. In Gladiator the first shot of 
Rome is from high above the city, the clouds parting to reveal its size and 
grandeur, remarkably similar to the parting of the clouds noted by Neale in 
the opening section of The Triumph of the Will (1979, p.68).  Many westerns 
use the familiar geography of Utah and Arizona not only to establish the 
context of the film but also as object spectacle. The immensity of the 
landscape is often emphasised in the Lord of the Rings trilogy through the use 
of a mobile camera that sweeps along and around the landscape, often 
following figures moving across the land and dwarfed by its size. 
Neale points out in his study of The Triumph of the Will that clouds may 
themselves be object spectacle:
In offering to the spectator’s gaze a set of forms which mask and fill 
an otherwise empty and potentially infinite space (the sky) while 
simultaneously signifying the very emptiness and infinity that they 
mask, clouds have come to function, in a sense, to signify spectacle 
itself  (1979, p.67).
Similarly, in Miami Vice (2006) while sequences shot in the urban 
environment use high definition video equipment, certain aerial sequences 
employ a deeper and richer image to emphasise the immensity and beauty of 
the cloud formations, presenting them as object spectacle in a sequence which 
otherwise serves only to show that the characters are moving from one 
location to another in a plane. 
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Profligacy of detail as object spectacle is a feature of the hyperrealist 
tendency in CGI sequences, discussed in the previous chapter. This is evident 
in sequences such as the siege of Minas Tirith in The Return of the King 
(2003), the initial attack upon the city walls in Troy (2004) and the battle 
between the ice giants and the Asgardians in Thor (2011). It also regularly 
occurs in science fiction films such as the second three films in the Star Wars 
saga and in the depiction of the urban landscape in The Fifth Element (1997).  
These sequences utilise multiplanar activity and a depth of field offering 
multiple layers of detail. Whilst CGI-created hyperreality lends itself to this 
sort of composition, the use of profligacy of detail as object spectacle is 
considerably older, going back at least to the massive sets and huge crowd 
sequences in Intolerance (1916) and encompassing the biblical epics of the 
1950s. The enormous crowded stadium which forms the backdrop to the 
chariot race in both the 1925 and the 1959 versions of Ben-Hur is an obvious 
example of this tendency. 
Brown suggests that profligacy of detail therefore functions as spectacle when 
it is excessive to the requirements of historical verisimilitude (2008, p.159).   
Brown’s comments arise in the context of his study of spectacle in historical 
films, particularly Gone with the Wind. As such his definitions of spectacle 
are confined (by him) to the context of historical drama. He identifies two 
types of spectacle arising from his consideration of this film: the “décor of 
history” and the “spectacular vista”. The former relates to what is here 
described as an element of object spectacle relating specifically to the 
presentation of background elements as spectacle in their own right. Brown 
includes costume in this definition, which is included in any event as part of 
the more expansive definition of object spectacle adopted here. 
The “spectacular vista” in Brown’s formulation is an “excess of action: 
excessive in scale and qualitatively excessive”. This latter category would 
equate to event spectacle, though again event spectacle encompasses a more 
expansive definition. More importantly, perhaps, spectacle as defined here 
does not rely upon the notion that it is in any case excessive. Brown’s 
formulation also does not link the purpose of spectacle to its emotional 
208
function. The notion that spectacle is excess to the requirements of 
verisimilitude also seems to suggest that it is in some way extraneous or akin 
to excess material in the Neoformalist sense or that the achievement of 
verisimilitude is an end in itself. As suggested here, spectacle is in fact an end 
to a means, the aim being the amplification of emotional impact. Far from 
being extraneous or excessive spectacle is thus central to the fundamental 
cinematic experience. 
Brown acknowledges that an element of spectacle is its exhibitionistic 
quality: “…it is worth emphasising that it is potentially problematic to discuss 
actions and objects as necessarily in and of themselves spectacular; they only 
become so when filmed in particular ways” (2008, p.160).  Sequences are not 
spectacular if “the filmmaker chose to abstract their qualities of ‘to-be-
looked-at-ness’”. As noted above, this quality of spectacle as being display 
and on display which is often identified as being one of its essential elements 
is really an acknowledgement that spectacle is exhibitionistic in nature, 
projecting itself out towards the spectator in a direct relationship with the 
spectator outside the voyeuristic confines of the narrative. A potentially 
spectacular sequence can thus be deliberately rendered “unspectacular” by the 
techniques used by the filmmakers. For example, in one sequence in Le 
Samourai (1967) (a film which dwells on Alain Delon as object spectacle 
(Neale, 1983, pp.6 and 7)) two characters fight near a railway line, but instead 
of cutting to close ups or subjective views of the action to draw the spectator 
in, the camera cuts away to a long shot taken from a passing train and the 
entire fight sequence lasts no more than a few seconds. Another example in 
the context of object spectacle is the first full view of John Merrick in The 
Elephant Man (1980). Up to this point in the film, the director has employed 
the traditional tactic of withholding a first complete view of the deformed 
Elephant Man but instead dwelling on reaction shots, cueing in relation to the 
horrific extent of his deformities and so on. When he is finally revealed, 
however, the film does not employ any cueing devices such as reaction shots 
or musical cues but instead simply cuts to a shot of him sitting in the corner 
of a room in an unthreatening posture. The camera looks slightly down on 
him, diminishing his figure. This tactic, intended to make him a sympathetic 
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rather than a frightening character, has the effect of preventing him from 
becoming an object spectacle intended to evoke fear or horror in the 
spectator. 
Clearly the use of background as object spectacle can be by definition only 
temporary. It therefore needs to be drawn to the spectator’s attention and this 
is done through the process of “foregrounding”: that is, the use of techniques 
to focus the spectator’s attention on the object as spectacle for a brief period 
of time. The most obvious technique employed is to dwell upon the 
background at the beginning of a sequence when it is new to the spectator and 
as such object spectacle may often appear as part of a series of establishing 
shots. A similar effect may be achieved by the use of saturated colour effects, 
such as those employed by Sirk in All That Heaven Allows and Written on the 
Wind or in stylised films such as Hero (2002) and The House of Flying 
Daggers (2004).  The colour effects allow the background to be seen as an 
object spectacle in its own right, foregrounding the background or clothes that 
the characters wear.
Foregrounding will apply equally to bodies as object spectacle. Again, often 
the appearance of the person in question is cued within the narrative, as 
occurs with Rock Hudson’s first appearance in All That Heaven Allows, 
where we first glimpse him with his back to the camera on the left of the 
screen as Agnes Moorhead walks past but then she pointedly looks back at 
him and he is the subject of a brief discussion between her and Jane Wyman. 
Object spectacle thus represents a more subtle shaping or manipulation of the 
transmission than event spectacle. It may, like event spectacle, employ cueing 
to create an alignment of the spectator’s emotions with the characters on the 
screen, but often it is not overtly part of the narrative structure of the film. 
Instead it represents a temporary foregrounding of certain elements of the 
mise-en-scene through the use of colour, camera angles, certain temporal 
distortions such as the brief slow motion movement, lighting and so on. If 
event spectacle represents an exaggeration of elements of the mise-en-scene, 
object spectacle is more of an emphasis of those elements.         
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It is in the nature of such effects that they are temporary: the spectator 
becomes used to the unusual colour scheme or the action of the film now 
takes over from a contemplation of the setting itself. Similarly, bodies as 
object spectacle may intrude at any point during the film but the effect is 
temporary. This is part of the necessary temporal limitations of spectacle. 
Event spectacle is temporally limited by the duration of the event. Object 
spectacle is temporally limited by the novelty value of the object. Whilst we 
may initially pause to contemplate the physical beauty of Grace Kelly or 
Dorothy Malone, or Rock Hudson or Brad Pitt, we will not do so 
continuously for the rest of the film. Spectacle relies upon impact and 
novelty: the impact of the event spectacle which comes and goes and the 
impact of the object spectacle which wears off with familiarity. 
5.3.5 Case study - the parachute jump
It will be helpful to place these proposals in context by examining their use in 
a particular sequence. The example chosen is LaVerne Shumann’s parachute 
stunt in The Tarnished Angels. This particular example has been selected 
because it is both slightly unusual in the context of the use of event and object 
spectacle, involving as it does both types of spectacle appearing in a family 
melodrama rather than a blockbuster, but also because in many other ways it 
provides a good example of the common strategies used in both structuring an 
event spectacle within the narrative framework and using object spectacle 
within the context of that event spectacle.
The Tarnished Angels was shot in black and white, allowing Sirk to make the 
most of Dorothy Malone’s height and blonde hair by dressing her in white for 
much of the first half of the film and contrasting her against the grey or black 
of the air strips and rooms which form much of the background to the film’s 
action. Malone as LaVerne is thus treated as an object spectacle by the film 
virtually from the beginning, the centre of the largely male-dominated world 
which she inhabits and an object of attraction to the three male leads in the 
film. 
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LaVerne’s husband, Captain Roger Shumann, is a former First World War 
flying hero now reduced to stunt flying in the travelling air shows held across 
America during the Depression. The centrepiece of these shows is a 
dangerous circuit race around pylons, a competition which often results in 
serious injury or death. LaVerne’s parachute stunt acts as a precursor to the 
first significant race in the film, which occurs nearly halfway through the 
story. The sequence in which it occurs begins with a shot of a plane crossing 
the sky trailing a banner on which the word “Welcome” has been printed. 
There is a cut to an apparently blind organ player, whose fairground music 
then underscores the next few moments of the sequence as a series of 
establishing shots show the crowd arriving at the carnival and taking their 
places in a stand to watch the show. Burke Devlin, the journalist involved 
with the Shumanns, is standing next to their young son when the tannoy 
announces the added attraction of a daredevil parachute jump by LaVerne. 
The fairground music stops. Startled, Devlin and others around him look up at 
something the spectator cannot at this point see. The Shumann’s son, who has 
clearly seen all this before, ignores what is going on and concentrates on his 
ice-cream.
Having been cued by the narrative and the preceding shot to expect to see 
what Devlin and the others are looking at, the sequence cuts to a long shot of 
a biplane in the sky and then cuts again to a shot close to the cockpit to reveal 
the pilot in the rear seat and LaVerne in the front. She clambers out of the seat 
and crouches on the wing of the plane. She is wearing a white dress, white 
pumps and elbow-length white gloves and has a parachute strapped to her 
back. As she jumps off the wing, the tannoy announces “There she goes” and 
there is a cut to a long shot of her parachute opening as she falls away from 
the plane, accompanied by dramatic music intended to underscore the danger 
of the stunt. 
The sequence then cuts to a medium shot of LaVerne descending on the 
parachute, her white dress now billowing up to reveal her legs and white 
panties. At this point her harness apparently fails and she drops in free fall 
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away from the parachute. The sequence cuts to reaction shots from the crowd, 
women screaming, horrified, their hands raised to their mouths, and Devlin 
looking worried. LaVerne then opens a second parachute and the tannoy 
announces “How’s that for thrills”, referring to her death defying free fall. 
Cut to reaction shots of men smiling admiringly as she descends. Whether 
they are smiling at the stunt or at her or both is difficult to tell.
The stunt is not over however: at this point, as the tannoy observes, she 
undoes her harness and holds on to a crossbar on the chute with her “bare” 
(actually gloved) hands. Again, there is a cut to a reaction shot of Devlin 
looking horrified and her son ignoring what is happening, clearly indicating 
that, contrary to what the tannoy is proclaiming, this is not the first time that 
this stunt has ever been performed by a woman. “Looks like she’s going to 
make it” the tannoy observes, and there are smiles and applause all round. 
She lands and acknowledges the applause. Afterwards, when talking to 
Devlin, she is dismissive of the stunt, noting only that “the boys” were 
disappointed that the wind hadn’t ripped her skirt off.
The event spectacle that is the parachute stunt can be seen to be cued within 
and contained by the narrative sequence described above, starting with the 
plane flying the “Welcome” banner and proceeding through a series of 
establishing shots to set the context of the carnival. Whilst the race involving 
Roger Shumann has been prefigured by the narrative, the stunt is unexpected. 
The spectator is however guided by the reaction shots from Devlin and others 
throughout the course of the stunt and also by the tannoy, which acts as a 
commentator on the event as it unfolds. The event spectacle itself contains a 
number of narrative developments and is effectively worked into the narrative 
structure, telling the spectator more about LaVerne’s strength of character, 
her relationship with her husband and Devlin’s growing infatuation with her. 
The structuring of the event and the use of the dramatic music, editing speed 
and cueing show that the sequence is intended to communicate directly with 
the spectator by creating an exciting sequence involving placing one of the 
central characters in a dangerous position and manipulating the spectator’s 
response through the visual and aural devices detailed above to create an 
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emotional effect which amplifies the emotional impact the film is seeking to 
communicate. 
Throughout the sequence, LaVerne is seen as an object spectacle, continuing 
the film’s treatment of her in this manner up to this point. This is both 
narratively-motivated but also clearly a direct communication with the 
spectator through the repeated and unrealistic use of LaVerne’s white 
costumes, which would be wholly impractical for everyday use in such 
circumstances even if the dress and gloves she wears for the stunt could be 
seen as part of the stunt itself. During the stunt sequence the film exploits a 
complex layering of imagery not uncommon in such moments: LaVerne as 
object spectacle exciting lust in the male spectator, as a site of lust and desire 
for the male characters within the film’s diegesis and playing on Malone’s 
height and blonde hair, at that time well-known characteristics of the actress 
herself (a natural brunette, she had in fact become a blonde for Written on the 
Wind, the film which had made her famous). The spectacle aligns the 
emotional response of the audience with the characters on the screen and 
heightens the emotional charge created by the film which has already been 
established by the narrative. The event and object spectacle coincide perfectly 
as LaVerne descends on the parachute in her improbable white dress and 
white gloves, her skirt billowing up to reveal her legs and white panties. This 
image in itself can serve as emblematic of the intertwining of event and object 
spectacle in the cinematic image.
Traditional readings of mise-en-scene allow for an understanding of the 
strategies employed by films to communicate with the spectator, often at an 
almost subconscious level, in connection with narrative or other information 
about the film and its characters. This communication is diegetic: it is about 
what is happening in the film, the mood that the film creates and the world 
which its characters inhabit. In Bordwell and Thompson’s formulation, it is 
about how the director stages the film for the spectator.  This definition in 
itself implies the establishment of the diegesis, the closed text which the film 
represents. Reading these films for examples of event or object spectacle, 
however, requires a different approach to the nature of the mise-en-scene. 
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This approach is driven by the reframing of the film through the transmission 
model, so that we can see the mise-en-scene as the vehicle through which the 
narrational and non-narrational transmission is organised to achieve the film’s 
ends. It is then clear that there are sequences in these films where the films 
will use the mise-en-scene and the narrative structure to construct sequences 
which speak directly and exhibitionistically to the spectator outside the 
diegesis of the film to achieve an emotional impact, to amplify the affect that 
the film is seeking to engender in the spectator. Mise-en-scene is thus not 
solely concerned with the establishment of the diegesis: it may also be used to 
communicate with the spectator outside the diegesis. This is often through 
spectacular sequences, be this event or object spectacle. Adopting this 
approach allows us to clarify the nature of spectacle in the context of mise-en-
scene and to differentiate between spectacle and mise-en-scene and their 
different contributions to the cinematic image.  
5.4 Conclusion
The concept of mise-en-scene examined in this chapter has long been in need 
of clarification in terms of its relationship to spectacle. This clarification is 
important to achieve a more precise understanding of the aesthetics of 
spectacle in this context.  This approach also allows us to understand the role 
that mise-en-scene plays and its relationship to spectacle. In the context of the 
transmission model, it is clear that the mise-en-scene is the vehicle for the 
organisation of the narrational and non-narrational transmission that is 
communicated to the spectator. Whilst the traditional approach to mise-en-
scene is therefore to see it as wholly focussed in towards the film’s diegesis, 
an examination of its operation from this perspective shows this not to be the 
case. The mise-en-scene shapes both narrational and non-narrational 
transmission and can equally be involved in the creation of a spectacular 
sequence which communicates directly and exhibitionistically with the 
spectator.  This understanding is important because it clarifies the role of 
mise-en-scene and differentiates it from spectacle, which can now be seen as 
a particular device for achieving specific aims, as explored in Chapters One to 
Three, which arises through the vehicle of mise-en-scene.  
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Object and event spectacle may be seen as a temporary rupture of the diegesis 
which momentarily reverses the energy of the sequences to create the 
exhibitionistic display characteristic of spectacle. If therefore we are to see 
mise-en-scene as relating solely to the creation of the film’s diegesis then 
spectacle must be a phenomenon that exists entirely outside the mise-en-
scene, elements of which it appropriates when it is occurring. If however, we 
see mise-en-scene as whatever occurs within the frame of the screen, which 
would be consistent with the transmission model approach, then it can 
incorporate those moments when spectacle occurs as simply being another 
part of the overall cinematic experience, which will include both 
exhibitionistic and voyeuristic elements, narrative and spectacle. The former 
approach would seem to be unnecessarily reductive: given that as Gibbs and 
Bordwell and Thompson suggest the true impact and meaning of mise-en-
scene lies in the interaction of elements it should follow that this would 
include those sequences which are spectacular since these all contribute to the 
film’s overall effect. It would seem rather strange to suggest that spectacle 
can somehow fundamentally alter the nature of the mise-en-scene to such a 
degree that it cannot be said to operate when a spectacular sequence occurs.  
Is it possible to evaluate what constitutes good or bad (or effective) spectacle? 
Whilst in certain circles the term has always been pejorative, whether for 
ideological reasons or simply out of a misplaced identification with narrative-
centred classical Hollywood cinema, it is possible to consider whether 
spectacle succeeds on its own terms as accomplishing what it is supposed to 
do. If its purpose is to amplify the spectator’s emotional response to a film, 
then it is good (or effective) if it succeeds and bad (or ineffective) if it does 
not. There is obviously a degree of subjectivity in such an assessment, as 
there is in any consideration of whether any film is good or bad. 
One indicator in the case of event spectacle may be the extent to which the 
spectacle is effectively tied into the narrative structure so that it is not only 
motivated by the narrative but also that the spectator has sufficient emotional 
involvement with the characters to care what happens to them during the 
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spectacular sequence. Paradoxically, from this perspective what makes a 
spectacle good may therefore depend on how good the narrative is at 
engaging the spectator’s empathy with the characters. This reinforces the 
point made in Chapter Two that spectacle and narrative are intertwined so 
that one should reinforce the other.  Given that spectacle also contains a 
narrative element, good event spectacle will, as Shane Black suggests, reveal 
something about the character of those participating. In fact it may be more 
revealing than conversation. As Seraph says to Neo in The Matrix Reloaded
(2003), you never truly know someone until you fight them.
In the same way we may judge the effectiveness of object spectacle by the 
success with which it conjures up the requisite emotional response.  If we feel 
awe and wonder at the desert landscape in Lawrence of Arabia or the majestic 
cloudscape in Miami Vice or a surge of excitement as the USS Enterprise 
rises up through the rings of Saturn or an erotic response to Dorothy Malone 
in Written on the Wind or The Tarnished Angels then the spectacle has 
achieved its desired effect. Object spectacle depends less on the context of its 
narrative structure and more directly on the presentation of the object as 
spectacle in itself. This is not necessarily the object as a site of desire (in the 
psychoanalytical sense) or lust since this category goes beyond just people or 
things, but an element of the mise-en-scene presented directly to the spectator 
in a way calculated to arouse the spectator’s emotions.  Unlike event 
spectacle, which may accomplish narrative closure, object spectacle serves a 
supporting role, for example by heightening the effect of the event spectacle 
which follows in the blockbuster or the repressed emotional conflict in the 
family melodrama.
Is it possible at this stage to draw any conclusions about the types of spectacle 
considered in this chapter and in Chapter Four? Is there any feature that is 
common to all of them outside the general characteristics that they all share 
which identify them as spectacle in the first place? Upon examination it is 
clear that all these forms of spectacle display power, whether this is physical 
or sexual prowess, the hyperrealism of CGI or the excessive detail or 
opulence of object spectacle, the exuberance and energy of event spectacle or 
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the technological prowess of formative or formalist spectacle. Spectacle is at 
least in part the display of the power of the cinematic image.  To this extent 
Neale is right to characterise spectacle as “presentational prowess”, although 
this definition is perhaps partial given that any such definition should 
encompass the purpose of spectacle and not just its broad characteristics 
(Neale, 2003, p.54).  It may also be more accurate to say, given that spectacle 
has been shown in this thesis to be central to the direct, visceral and 
emotional encounter that is the cinematic experience, that spectacle is the 
display of the power of the sensual image.
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Conclusions: The aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema
In Chapter One of this thesis the following research questions were posed: 
 How can spectacle in mainstream cinema be defined rigorously?  
 How does spectacle operate in and contribute to the cinematic 
experience such that it is possible to sketch an outline of the 
aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema? 
These fundamental questions gave rise to a number of subsidiary issues:
 Is it possible to construct a model of spectatorship which will 
accommodate the presence of both spectacle and narrative?
 To what extent can existing cognitive theories accommodate the 
presence of spectacle and is it necessary to go beyond these theories
in order to do so?
 What is the relationship between spectacle and technology, using 
technological developments as a way of historicising spectacle, and 
what does this relationship tell us about spectacle and about the use of 
technology in mainstream cinema?
 What is the relationship between spectacle and mise-en-scene and 
how can we characterise spectacle in the context of the manipulation 
of the cinematic image that mise-en-scene represents? 
In order to address these questions it has been necessary to step back and strip 
away preconceptions about narrative and spectacle. This has entailed 
proposing a model to account for the process of watching a film at its most 
basic, which I have called the transmission model. The use of the 
transmission model, with its division of all information transmitted by the 
film to the spectator into narrational and non-narrational transmission, 
provides a more flexible and inclusive approach capable of accommodating 
the revised definition of spectacle which this thesis proposes. Considering 
these questions also leads to an acknowledgement of the emotional power of 
the cinematic image, recognised by early theorists but never fully developed. 
The sensual image, derived from Eisenstein’s concept of “sensuous thinking” 
underlies the affective power of the cinematic experience.
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This thesis has shown that the model of spectatorship necessary to 
accommodate spectacle and the idea of transmission needs to be reformulated 
by re-examining early cinema and those early film theories that concentrated 
upon the power of the cinematic image. In these cases narrative was not 
considered to be central to the cinematic experience. Instead, the emotionally 
involved, actively engaged spectator interacted with an exhibitionistic display 
which was intended to communicate directly with the spectator outside the 
diegesis of the film. This thesis has shown that allowing spectacle its proper 
place in the cinematic experience requires a model of spectatorship which 
accords this relationship a central place rather than relying upon the detached 
and distant observer of more traditional approaches which were themselves 
predicated upon voyeuristic, narrative-centred models. 
This thesis has also demonstrated that a similar reformulation needs to occur 
in the context of existing cognitively-based models. Whilst cognitive film 
theory has done much to strip away the accumulated layers of ideologically 
and psychoanalytically based approaches and to recognise the importance of 
the spectator’s emotional involvement, the increasingly detailed examinations 
of the spectator’s mental activity when viewing a film risks becoming abstract 
and distanced from the lived experience itself. In this respect at least, 
cognitive theory has reached something of a dead end. A more radical 
approach is needed to embrace the inclusive approach predicated by the 
revised definition of spectacle and the idea of transmission. That can be found 
in Frampton’s Filmosophy, which straddles the boundary between criticism 
and philosophy to provide a more flexible approach to the cinematic 
experience. 
The case studies undertaken in Chapters Four and Five have shown how 
spectacle manifests itself on the screen. Chapter Four shows how technology 
can be presented as a spectacle in itself and how the relationship between the 
use of technology and film develops over a period of time so that what is and 
is not considered to be spectacle shifts according to the twin dictates of 
novelty and the way that the presentation of spectacle is structured within the 
film. Chapter Five shows how spectacle manifests itself as a manipulation of 
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the mise-en-scene as event and object spectacle. Event spectacle demonstrates 
the interaction between spectacle and narrative, how one reinforces the other 
in the delivery of the film’s emotional impact. Object spectacle shows how 
the film manipulates its mise-en-scene to draw a particular object to the 
spectator’s attention and to present it as spectacle in itself. 
This thesis has therefore addressed and answered the questions posed in 
Chapter One and in doing so has shown that it is possible both to define 
spectacle and to describe the outline of an aesthetics of spectacle in 
mainstream cinema. This exercise has also demonstrated that a number of 
fundamental pre-conceptions about the spectator’s cinematic experience need 
to be reconsidered. Primarily, this thesis has shown that spectacle is in fact 
central to the spectator’s relationship with the film. The narrative-centred 
view of the cinematic experience obscures the fact that the primary 
characteristic of this cinematic experience is its emotional core, that films are 
emotion machines and that spectacle is central to the provision of the 
emotional charge which the spectator seeks when they go to the cinema.  The 
spectator’s relationship to the film is not primarily that of the distanced, 
voyeuristic observer predicated by more traditional narrative-centred models 
of spectatorship. It is an affective and visceral relationship which is 
fundamentally exhibitionistic in nature, a direct communication between the 
spectator and the film via the medium of spectacle. The transmission model 
demonstrates that it is in any event reductive to try to separate elements of the 
cinematic experience into categories such as spectacle, narrative, voyeuristic 
and exhibitionistic and instead it is more helpful to understand the process as 
one of transmission of information comprised of  a balance of narrational and 
non-narrational transmission in a constantly fluctuating balance such that any 
given sequence will contain elements of both which will interact with and 
reinforce each other as part of the spectator’s cinematic experience. 
Given the time and space constraints of this thesis it is clearly not possible to 
provide an exhaustive survey of the aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream 
cinema but I believe that this thesis provides the groundwork for further 
research in this area. The definition of spectacle presented in this thesis and 
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the use of the transmission approach is flexible enough to allow the scope of 
this enquiry to be extended in a number of directions, some of which are 
reviewed briefly below. 
A significant topic which there has been no space to consider is sound, and 
particularly music. Superficially at least, music would appear to be closely 
related to spectacle in that, other than for relatively limited instances of 
diegetic music, it communicates directly with the spectator outside the film’s 
diegesis and seeks to enhance the film’s emotional impact. Does this make 
music spectacular in itself? If so, this runs the risk of falling into the trap of 
suggesting that every sequence containing a non-diegetic musical 
accompaniment is spectacle. On the basis of the conclusions reached in this 
thesis that does not seem to be correct. Clearly, a more nuanced approach to 
this issue is required.  Sound effects appear to contribute to the establishment 
of the film’s diegesis but non-diegetic music clearly has a role to play in 
reinforcing and indeed amplifying the emotional content of the sequence in 
which it is used. The interaction between spectacle and sound could shed light 
not only on the aural aspects of spectacle but also on the part that sound and 
particularly music plays in the spectator’s direct, emotionally-based 
engagement with the film. An issue to consider is whether, in certain 
circumstances, music’s function of reinforcing and amplifying the spectator’s 
emotional response to the film becomes so prominent that it can be described 
as spectacle in itself. If that is the case, then this will add a further dimension 
to our understanding of how spectacle manifests itself in film and will also 
clarify further the function that music plays as part of the cinematic 
experience. 
For reasons that are explained in the Introduction, this thesis has been limited 
to a consideration of the aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema, 
primarily that form of mass entertainment film produced by Hollywood or 
conforming to Hollywood-style film characteristics. Whilst such films are not 
necessarily all by definition blockbusters - and a significant number of 
examples reviewed in this thesis do not fall into that category - nevertheless it 
would be fair to say that the majority of films reviewed subscribe to certain 
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stylistic values which bracket them together as mainstream Hollywood-style 
cinema.  Perhaps the most obvious extension of the exercise undertaken in 
this thesis would therefore be to extend the aesthetics of spectacle to other 
national cinemas and also beyond mainstream film. A fruitful area of enquiry, 
as briefly referred to in the Introduction, would be to consider the extent to 
which the characteristics of spectacle and its aesthetics are altered by the 
social and cultural characteristics of other national cinemas. The technology 
of the cinema was clearly imported from Europe and the United States, but 
the development of cinemas in the non-Western world equally clearly cannot 
be judged by Eurocentric paradigms. Is there a difference between spectacular 
sequences in films from, for example, India, China, Japan, Africa and South 
America and those from the West? If so, what are these differences and how 
do they effect and broaden our understanding of spectacle? Is spectacle 
entirely a creation of social and cultural contexts or are there certain 
characteristics which transcend national boundaries and which therefore point 
to the fundamental nature of cinema itself?  
Similarly, what of films which fall outside the mainstream category, such as 
avant-garde productions that have traditionally placed less, if any, emphasis 
on narrative as an essential structural element of the film? Is it possible to 
have, as Simon West suggested in the context of Tomb Raider (2001) as 
referred to in Chapter One, a non-narrative cinema? If that is the case, what 
happens to spectacle? This issue is in reality as aspect of a related question 
which inevitably arises when considering the redefinition of spectacle 
undertaken in this thesis: having transformed spectacle from a marginalised 
Other to a dominant position in the cinema of the sensual image, and having 
shown that narrative-centred cinema is not the pre-eminent cinematic form 
which it has been perceived to have been, do we need to reconsider exactly 
what narrative now means? As Lavik noted and as recorded in Chapter One, 
exactly what constitutes advancement of the plot is still somewhat “mystical” 
notwithstanding Bordwell’s work and that of many other narrative theorists. 
King has suggested a form of thematic narrative, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, which does not derive directly from the narrative progression of the 
classical Hollywood cinema, and as noted in Chapter Five the way that a 
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film’s transmission is organised by the mise-en-scene may itself communicate 
information about the characters and their predicament which cannot 
otherwise be articulated, certainly not through dialogue or action. The 
tendency of CGI towards the excessively-detailed, hyperrealistic image has 
led to criticism that this wealth of extraneous detail is mirrored by a decline in 
the complexity and psychological depth of the plot, to the film’s overall 
detriment. Is this really the case, or is this in fact simply additional narrative 
detail (that is, detail about the characters and the spaces they inhabit) which 
does not bear directly upon the progress of the plot but which does 
nevertheless provide the spectator with useful information about those 
characters and their world? These are all examples of narrational transmission 
which does not conform to the traditional idea of classic narrative 
progression.  
The working definition of spectacle advanced in this thesis could also 
usefully be applied to other specific genres of film such as the musical or the 
comedy to consider how and to what extent these films use spectacle and 
what this may reveal about the way it manifests itself across various types of 
film. Is it the case that a spectacle in, say, a Western is intrinsically the same 
as in a musical or a Biblical epic? Whilst clearly the detailed nature of each 
spectacle will be dictated by genre constraints, to what extent do the basic 
characteristics remain the same? Do generic constraints affect only the 
surface detail of spectacle or is their influence more fundamental? In the case 
of the musical there may be interesting links between the staged musical 
number within the film’s narrative structure and the notion of music as 
spectacle in itself referred to above. For example, when does a sequence 
involving characters singing within a film become a staged musical number? 
Does this make any difference to the spectacular nature of that sequence? 
Whilst clearly Gold Diggers of 1933 (1933) is a film incorporating 
spectacular musical sequences and could reasonably be described as a 
musical, amongst other things, can the same be said for Distant Voices, Still 
Lives (1988), during which on a number of occasions the cast sing directly to 
the camera?  How do we analyse, in terms of spectacle, the sequence in 
Magnolia (1999) when a number of the cast in different locations, all sing 
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along to a song that is clearly non-diegetic? A consideration of the intended 
effect of such sequences in terms of event and object spectacle and their 
exhibitionistic, affective communication with the spectator could reveal much 
about spectacle and the nature of these sequences themselves. 
Finally, on a broader issue, the role of spectacle in the presentation of the film 
to the prospective audience is also of interest, the part that the spectacular 
sequences in a film play in the advertising of the film and the spectator’s pre-
knowledge of the film, what Ellis calls the film’s “narrative image” (Ellis, 
1982, p.30).  A consideration of the way the narrative image incorporates the 
spectacular elements of a film may reveal another aspect of the use and 
presence of spectacle in film and the central part that spectacle plays not only 
in the film’s structure but in the idea of the film sold to the potential spectator 
through the film’s narrative image. It may well be that the term “narrative 
image” is in fact misleading: it is not the narrative elements of the film that 
are most clearly expressed in the idea of the film that draws the spectator to 
the cinema, but the more directly emotive, spectacular elements. The 
narrative image functions to offer a broad thematic concept of the film 
through emotionally-directed, genre-keyed images which provide a 
preponderance of non-narrational transmission. Obviously, blockbusters will 
trade on this approach but other films which fall well outside this category 
will promote themselves through a publicity campaign based around images 
aimed at providing a direct, emotional approach to the potential spectator 
rather than any attempt to communicate much, if any, of the narrative content. 
The redefinition of spectacle and the preliminary work on establishing an 
aesthetics of spectacle in mainstream cinema opens up possibilities for further 
research in a wide variety of areas. There is still much to be learned from a 
more extensive and wide-ranging investigation, and this investigation will 
have implications not only for our understanding of spectacle itself but also 
the cinematic experience as a whole. Whatever shape this investigation may 
take, it is hoped that these and other issues can form the basis of further study 
of the concept of spectacle so that a more complete understanding of the 
aesthetics of spectacle can be achieved and spectacle can be accorded its 
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rightful place as one of the key elements, if not the key element, of the 
spectator’s cinematic experience.   
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